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him that he didn't-he had it in the wrong place")) The State did not believe the anal
sexual assault took place, however. The State in fact had dismissed the forcible anal sex
charge because the State did not believe it had happened. 16 The fact that the State
originally charged Petitioner with forcible anal and vaginal rape, indicates that Petitioner
was charged based upon Ms. Oliver's statements. The fact that the State dropped the anal
rape charge indicates they did not find that allegation credible. This is supported by the
fact that the State does not mention forcible anal rape in its opening sentencing statement,
even though the State does discuss why the charges were reduced from forcible to
statutory rape. (Tr., p. 4736, Ls. 12-16 (oral and vaginal sex); Tr., p. 4738, L. 24 - p.
4739, L. 4) Ms. Oliver herself believed that Petitioner had only been charged with
statutory rape (Tr., p. 4776, L. 9), the charge Petitioner ultimately pled guilty to. Despite
that, the State elicited testimony from Ms. Oliver regarding anal rape.
Ms. Oliver never even testified that there was a vaginal forcible rape. (Tr., p.
4767, Ls. 2-7 (the witness "thinks" Petitioner had sexual intercourse with her)) It was
only in response to a leading question that the witness acknowledged nonconsensual
sexual intercourse and that was only in response to a leading question. (Tr., p. 4775, Ls.
15-19 (witness responds "no" to State's leading question whether she wanted to have
sexual intercourse with Petitioner))
The State also had reason to believe that Ms. Oliver was incompetent to testify.
Ms. Oliver was "too distraught to even talk to" trial counsel, a fact brought out prior to
her testimony. (Tr., pp. 4755-4756) Ms. Oliver had been on medication but was not on

Petitioner will offer further support of this fact when the Court allows discovery on the
issue. The limited information Petitioner has access to indicates that no anal rape
occurred.
16
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medication at the time she testified, even though she admitted having a chemical
imbalance. (Tr., p. 4777, Ls. 2-7, p. 4783, Ls. 17-18) On direct, Ms. Oliver could not
recall critical events relating to the rape. (Tr., p. 4760, L.15 ("I only remember bits and
pieces"); p. 4761, L.18 ("I can't remember"); p. 4762, Ls. 4-5 (she met Petitioner at
Mountain Billiards "I think, but I'm not sure"); p. 4762, L. 18 (she's "not quite sure"
whether they sat around in the trailer at all); p. 4763, L. 24-25 ("I closed my eyes - I
don't' know [what happened]. I can't remember"); p. 4764, L. 12 ("I can't remember [if
she couldn't talk because Petitioner was strangling her]. I don't think I could."); p. 4764,
L. 14 ("I don't know [if I was scared]."); p. 4765, L. 3 ("I can't remember [what it was
like what I woke up.]"); p. 4765, L. 21 ("I can't remember"); p. 4766, L. 3 ("I can't
remember), L. 6 ("I can't remember), L. 9 ("I don't know. I'm sorry"), L. 17 ("I'm not
sure."); p. 4768, L. 1 ("I don't know."), L. 10 ("I don't remember); p. 4769, L. 7 ("I can't
remember"), L.l3 (witness does "not really" remember getting up the next morning); p.
4771, L. 3 (witness "can't really remember" being arrested at the Sands Motel); p. 4771,
L. 6 (witness "can't really remember" getting put into back seat of police car at Sands
Motel); p. 4771, L. 9 (witness "doesn't know" if she wound up at the juvenile detention
jail); p. 4771, L. 21 (witness "can't remember" meeting with police officer at
Intermountain Hospital because "it's a blur"))

On cross-examination, Ms. Oliver

explained that she was on SSI because she has a chemical imbalance and is unable to
keep ajob. (Tr., p. 4780, Ls. 6-18)
In a statement made to a federal investigator in West Virginia, Ms. Oliver
admitted that she's been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder,
post-traumatic stress disorder, and was not medicated when she testified. (Exhibit 16.)
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She recalls fleeing from Petitioner and jumping into "a yard filled with dogs, I think they
bit me." There was no evidence of dog bites when Ms. Oliver spoke to Detective Hess,
and no indications of dog bites in the emergency room report of Dr. Vickman. (Exhibit
2, Exhibit 17.) Ms. Oliver further reported that she "pretty much lived" at Intermountain
Hospital, had been hospitalized at Intermountain two or three times, and had been there
for a year at one time. Ms. Oliver "passed out" before the rape trial. Ms. Oliver's most
recent statement is filled with inconsistencies regarding the events surrounding the
purported rape.
Wendy Levy disputes Ms. Oliver's version of the 1991 events. Ms. Levy states
that she saw Ms. Oliver come out of the shower that following day, and "saw no marks,
scratches, bruises, or injuries of any kind on her face, neck, shoulders, arms or hands."
(Exhibit 7.) Ms. Levy states that she asked Petitioner to ask Ms. Oliver to leave the
property because she believed "there was something wrong with Ms. Oliver." Ms. Levy
was interviewed by the prosecutor's office. See Claim D.1, supra.
Not only did the State put on an incompetent witness as part of its sentencing case
against Petitioner, it attempted to explain away the reduction in the 1991 rape charges
against Petitioner to statutory rape by putting other state officials on the witness stand to
bolster Ms. Oliver's credibility, when those witnesses had every reason to know that Ms.

Oliver was in fact incompetent to testify.

See (Patrick) Hall, supra, (stating that

corroboration by other testimony does not establish that the testimony by the incompetent
witness is based on his own perception rather than on information acquired from others).
The next witness called by the State was Detective Daniel Hess, whose testimony was
nothing more than a substitute for the testimony of Norma Jean Oliver, and was rife with
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inadmissible hearsay that violated the Confrontation Clause. (Tr., pp. 4784-4813). The
State's examination was especially misleading when, after the Detective stated on
recross-examination that he did not know whether a competency evaluation had been
conducted on Ms. Oliver, the State followed up with questions designed to allow the
Detective to testify that Ms. Oliver was competent. (Tr., p. 4811, Ls. 21-23 (Detective
did not know whether competency evaluation had been conducted); Tr., p. 4812, Ls. 9-13
(prosecutor questioning whether Detective was able to carry on a conversation with Ms.
Oliver, and whether Ms. Oliver "tracked and gave appropriate answers")) If in fact Ms.
Oliver was legally incompetent to testify at that time, then the State's questioning was
highly misleading.
The State also elicited materially false testimony from Detective Hess. From a
photograph from which the State admits is "difficult" to discern injuries, Detective Hess
testified that there was swelling on the neck and throat just under Ms. Oliver's jaw line.
(Tr., p. 4793, L. 22 - p. 4794, L. 1.) His report, however, does not note this injury, and
Dr. Vickman's report does not note swelling and specifically states that there were
external signs of bruising on neck. The State also elicited testimony of significant facial
bruising:
Q.

Start, Detective with No. 148. It's difficult on a photo I know, but
if you could tell us what we're seeing, what that photo was taken
for and what it's meant to show?

A.

On the left side of her face in the area of the left side of her nose
was bruising on the cheek bone. There was bruising right in this
area here (indicating) was significant bruising on the cheek bone
and the jaw line on this side of her face."

(Tr., p. 4793, Ls. 16-21.) The photographs do not support this testimony. Dr. Vickman's
report contradicts this testimony. (See Report, noting "minimal bruising on the left cheek
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of her face.)17 The State further elicited testimony from Det. Hess that Ms. Oliver had
scratches and bruises on her left hand. (Tr., p. 4794, Ls. 5-17.) However, Dr. Vickman's
report states her examined Ms. Oliver's hands when she claimed she had discomfort, but
that he "could not see any sign of external injury." (Exhibit 17.)
Shortly after Detective Hess' testimony, the State then called Jay Rosenthal, the
former county prosecutor assigned to the Norma Jean Oliver rape case,18 to explain why
the State had reduced the forcible rape charges to statutory rape charges. Mr. Rosenthal's
testimony essentially bolstered Ms. Oliver's credibility in the instant trial, while at the
same time misleading the jury as to Ms. Oliver's competency in the original rape case.
Mr. Rosenthal testified that the forcible rape charges were reduced to statutory rape

because Ms. Oliver was "vulnerable," "fragile," "terrified," and "unable to effectively go
on with the case in front of a jury" or withstand cross-examination based in part on the
recommendation of her treatment providers. (Tr., pp. 4952-4954) If in fact, however, the
charges were reduced because Ms. Oliver was not legally competent to testify, as
suggested by Mr. Rosenthal's claim that his decision to reduce charges rested in part on
the recommendation of Ms. Oliver's psychiatrist and case worker (Tr., p. 5953, Ls. 1225), then his testimony was extremely misleading, and irreparably prejudiced Petitioner's
sentencing trial.

In addition to prosecutorial misconduct, on this record, the Court had an
independent duty to inquire into Ms. Oliver's competency, and move to strike her
testimony sua sponte. I.R.E. 602 (witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is
17 Given that the State turned over a copy of Dr. Vickman's report in discovery, they too
had possession of that report.
18 Mr. Rosenthal is now a Deputy Attorney General, as is juror McNeese's husband,
Timothy McNeese.
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introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the
matter); State v. Johnson, 92 Idaho 533, 447 P.2d 10 (1968)(holding where a witness said
he remembered nothing about a certain time period, he effectively declared himself
incompetent to answer questions relating to that period); State v. (Patrick) Hall, 111
Idaho 827, 727 P .2d 1255 (Ct. App. 1986)(holding trial judge erred in allowing testimony
of victim who expressed uncertainty as to whether his testimony was based on actual
memories; corroboration by other testimony does not establish that the testimony by the
witness is based on his own perception rather than on information acquired from others).
The admission of this testimony violated the Sixth Amendment, and because this
was a capital sentencing proceeding, the admission of this testimony violated the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process. There is a reasonable likelihood that the false and
misleading testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.

5. The Prosecutor Deliberately Injected Extra-Record And Materially
Misleading Evidence Through Leading Questions To Detective Daniel
Hess.
In cross-examining Detective Hess, the prosecutor asked:
Q.

All right. And to your knowledge, and looking at your police
report, was that rape kit done and ultimately examined by the State
Forensic Laboratory?

A.

It was.

Q.

It's kind of in the days before DNA testing, but did the laboratory
tell you whether or not there was any sperm found in the sex
crimes kit?

A

Yes, there -

MR. MYSHIN: Objection. Foundation, confrontation.
THE COURT: Well, I think you can lay more foundation. I'll sustain the
objection to that part. Back up for a moment.
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Q. BY MR. BOURNE: Did you -- after you knew that the sex crimes kit
had been taken, did you know that it had been submitted to the -- would be
the -- in those days it was the Department of Law Enforcement Forensic
Lab,lthink?
A.

I delivered it.

Q.

Okay. And at some point thereafter, did you speak to Criminalist
Pam Marcum who gave you -- just yes or no, who gave you some
information about her findings on the sex crimes kit?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And after she gave you information about the sex crimes kit, did
you write down in your police report what it was that she had told
you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And do you see that's still there in your report that you've read in
preparation for this?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

All right. What did Pam Marcum tell you?

MR. MYSHIN: Judge, objection. Confrontation.
THE COURT: I'll note your objection.
Overruled and allow the witness to respond.
THE WITNESS: She indicated that there was sperm found on the swabs.
MR. BOURNE: All right. One second. (Brief delay.) Thank you. No
further questions of the witness.
(Tr., p. 4804, L. 20 - p. 4806, L. 11.) The question suggested that DNA testing was not
available in 1991. This is materially misleading, as DNA testing was certainly available
in 1991. Moreover, the prosecutor injected evidence into the testimony by asking the
question itself Through the leading question, the prosecutor essentially testified that the
rape kit results were reliable evidence of sexual assault, and the only reason they didn't

AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

53

00207

conduct DNA testing was because it was unavailable and thus suggesting that the DNA
testing would merely confirm what was already known. There is a reasonable likelihood
that the false and misleading testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.

6. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Misrepresenting Conclusions
That Could Be Drawn From The DNA Test Results Taken From
Christian Johnson.
The prosecution misrepresented the test results by stating that DNA testing
excluded Christian Johnson as killer. (Tr., p. 3423, Ls. 11-12.) The prosecution made this
assertion knowing that the defense considered presenting Mr. Johnson as a potential
alternate perpetrator at trial. Further, the prosecution made this assertion knowing it to be
false; at most, the lack of Christian Johnson's DNA found on the victim only established
that he did not leave any semen. Thus, he could have been a co-perpetrator of rape.
Moreover, the lack of DNA does not exclude Mr. Johnson as the actual killer. Trial
counsel made this very point outside the presence of the jury, but failed to object. (Tr., p.
3682, Ls. 5-10.)

F. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT FOR USING TECHNIQUES TO
DISSUADE MITIGATION WITNESSES FROM TESTIFYING OR
PREDISPOSE THEM TO DISREGARD OR DOWNPLAY VALID
MITIGATING EVIDENCE.
During the course of Petitioner's reinvestigation of this case, he has learned that
the State, either acting through its prosecuting attorneys, or their agents, committed
misconduct when interviewing potential mitigation witnesses. Specifically,
•

Jean McCracken, Erick's mother, states that on September 27,
2004, a man working with the prosecution contacted her. He told
her that the defense team was going to say at trial that Frank,
Erick's father, and her had raised Erick to be a killer and that they
were responsible for what Erick had become. The prosecution also
asked her if she thought Erick's drug use excused his behavior.
Jean did not testify at the sentencing.
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•

Tamara McCracken, Erick's older half-sister, was also contacted
by the prosecution. She was asked whether she was a good
Christian and believed that someone did something wrong
shouldn't they be held accountable for it. They asked if she had
ever killed anyone. They suggested that since she had the same
childhood but hadn't killed anyone that the defense team should
not based a defense upon Erick's childhood. Tamara resented the
insinuations and attempts to trivialize the trauma Erick and she had
experienced. Tamara testified at the sentencing.

Based on these two incidents alone, Petitioner has reason to believe that the State
committed other acts of misconduct. Petitioner asserts that the State's conduct violated
Petitioner's First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and based on
the evidence to date, warrants reversal of his sentencing. Petitioner needs additional time
to finish his investigation and to determine whether the State's misconduct extended to
guilt-phase witnesses.
G. ADMISSION OF TESTIMONIAL AND OTHER HEARSAY VIOLATIONS
VIOAL TED PETITIONER'S SIXTH AMENDMENT AND DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS

Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him was
violated when witnesses testified to hearsay without a showing that the hearsay declarants
were unavailable, and without prior opportunity for Petitioner to have cross-examined
those declarants. Admission of testimonial statements without both unavailability and
prior opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant, violates the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 26, 59 (2004).
Among statements considered testimonial are those statements obtained with the
"involvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward
trial." ld. at 56 n.7.
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For example, Detective Hess' testimony violated the Confrontation Clause when
he testified about hearsay statements purportedly made to him by Ms. Oliver. Clearly
Ms. Oliver was not an "unavailable" witness in the Crawford sense, given that she
testified, therefore any hearsay statements were inadmissible. Detective Hess testified as
follows on redirect examination by the State:
Q. All right. And when you were speaking with Norma Jean, did she tell you
whether or not the defendant had tied her up with her clothing during this
rape?
A. Yes, she told me that.

Q. What did she tell you about that?
A. She explained that she had been unconscious a couple of times and woke up
undressed and was bound with her clothing, her pants and her shirt.

Q. Did she say whether or not she had been gaged (sic) with something?
A. Yes, she did.
Q. Did she say at some point that the defendant wanted her to perform oral sex on
him but she couldn't because she was gaged (sic)?

A. That's what she told me.
Q. And that she was able to spit the gag out and talk to him about what he was
doing to her?

A. Yes.

Q. Did she tell you whether or not she was frightened or that she thought that he
was going to kill her?
A. She told me that, yes.

Q. And at one point when she woke up did she tell you that, in so many towards
at least, that she thought she might be dead because she couldn't feel
anything?
A. Yes, that's what she said.
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MR. BOURNE: Good, thank you. That's all.
(Tr., p. 4810, L. 5 - p. 4811, L. 16)(sic added). Norma Jean Oliver's statements were
inadmissible through Detective Hess, and their admission violated Crawford and the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Petitioner's Confrontation Clause rights
were also violated when Detective Hess testified about results of the rape kit conducted
on Ms. Oliver. (Tr., p. 4804, L. 10 - p. 4806, L. 8.)
Petitioner requires additional time to assess all confrontation, Crawford, and
hearsay violations.

H. THE PROSECUTION COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY ASKING THE
JURY TO SPECULATE THE WORST SCENARIO, BY PRESENTING
ARGUMENT INCONSISTENT WITH THE EVIDENCE, AND BY
ALLUDING TO EVIDENCE OF ANOTHER MURDER.
To prove murder of the first degree, the State had to prove the element of
premeditation or prove that the murder was committed during the perpetration of a rape
or kidnapping. To prove premeditation, the State had to prove that Petitioner made the
conscious decision to kill. In support of their argument that Petitioner had plenty of
opportunity to premeditate, the State asserted that the victim was not rendered
unconscious from an initial blow to her head, but rather was screaming19 and struggling
against her perpetrator for at least three minutes, during which time the decision to kill
was made. (Tr., p. 4657, L. 18 - 4661, L. 24.) Roger Bourne, argued in part,
Now, I'll bet she didn't go easy. That's why her purse is 200 feet away
from her shoe. That's why she had to be tied up to control her. If the first
blow knocked her out why did he have to tie her up? She'd be
unconscIOUS.

19 Mr. Bourne's argument is a continuation of his opening statement and earlier portions
of his closing argument in which he encouraged the jury to speculate that the victim was
screaming based on the premise that she was abducted in an area where her screams
would not be heard. (Tr., p. 3430, L. 21 - p. 3421, L. 2; p. 4655, Ls. 11-16.)
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She's flailing around so he has to tie her up. Not just tie her up, he's able
to remember a double overhand knot on each of her arms. Is that goal
directed behavior? Or does he try to bury her with sand to control her?
Obviously he's doing the obvious thing. Well, to kill her is he tying a knot
around her ankle trying to choke her to death by her foot? Chokes her to
death by her neck, doesn't he. That's because he's thinking. He knows
how to kill somebody the same as we all know. If you tighten this up it
will kill her.
(Tr., p. 4660, Ls. 1-5; p. 4663, Ls. 9-20) (emphasis added).
The State's argument that Ms. Henneman was conscious when strangled to death
impermissibly called for speculation. The State's proffered theory was that Ms.
Henneman was alive and conscious when tied up and hogtied, and then strangled to death
by tightening the ligatures. However, the only evidence presented that the victim was
hogtied at all was evidence that can only occur post-mortem. In other words, the
argument that the victim was alive when hogtied was inconsistent with the State's own
expert's opinion. (Tr., p. 4030, Ls. 10-12; p. 4008, Ls. 3-7 (Q. Are you suggesting that
this occurred when the person was alive? A. No. I believe they were strangled and then
placed on her stomach when this was done.) Finally, the State inexplicably makes
rhetorical reference to Petitioner burying his victim in sand to control her. This is a clear
reference to the Cheryl Hanlon case intended to prejudice Petitioner with evidence of
another highly publicized murder he was charged with committing.
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still investigating facts that will
show that the State's misconduct cannot be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
For example, Petitioner still does not know exactly what the jury heard from his multiple
police interrogations. Petitioner is aware however that in one unredacted videotaped
interrogation, Petitioner apparently purports to have buried Cheryl Hanlon in sand.
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I. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN SENTENCING-PHASE CLOSING
ARGUMENTS
While counsel for the prosecution has traditionally been afforded latitude in
closing argument, see e.g., State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14, 909 P.2d 624, 632
(Ct.App.1995), there are limits that, if exceeded, can constitute reversible error. For
instance, it is improper for a prosecutor to make misstatements of the evidence during
argument, State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 521, 37 P.3d 18 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct, including improper closing argument, was
not harmless error); to express a personal belief as to the credibility of witnesses, State v.
Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 786, 948 P.2d 127, 141 (1997); and to make personal attacks on

trial counsel. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1,9 & n. 7 (1985); State v. Page, 135
Idaho 214, 223, 16 P.3d 890, 899 (2000).20

In the capital context, prosecutorial

20 The ABA Standards Relating To Prosecution Function, Standard 3-5.8, further
provides:
(a) In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor may argue all reasonable
inferences from evidence in the record. The prosecutor should not intentionally
misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.
(b) The prosecutor should not express his or her personal belief or opinion as to
the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt ofthe defendant.
(c) The prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to appeal to the
prejudices of the jury.
(d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury
from its duty to decide the case on the evidence.
Standard 3-5.9 provides:
The prosecutor should not intentionally refer to or argue on the basis of facts
outside the record whether at trial or on appeal, unless such facts are matters of
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misconduct during closing arguments is given heightened scrutiny. Accordingly, it may
constitute reversible error for the prosecutor to impede the jury's consideration of
mitigation through improper argument. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 326 (1989).
1. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Making An Improper
Closing Argument Regarding The Definition Of Mitigation By Asserting
That Mitigation Evidence Is Limited To Evidence That Is Causally
Linked To The Defendant's Criminal Conduct, Evidence That Excuses
The Defendant's Criminal Conduct, And Evidence That Prevented The
Defendant From Choosing Not To Kill.
An individual juror must be free to consider a mitigating factor, regardless of

whether other members of the jury agree as to its existence. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S.
367 (1988); McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990) ("each juror [must] be
permitted to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence"). It is not enough "simply to
allow the defendant to present mitigating evidence to the sentencer," rather there must not
be any impediment, through evidentiary rules, jury instructions, Hitchcock v. Dugger,
481 U.S. 393 (1987), or prosecutorial argument. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 326
(1989).
In this case, the State's closing argument impeded the jury's consideration of

valid mitigating evidence by mischaracterizing the law. Specifically, the State argued
that mitigating circumstances are limited to circumstances that excuse a defendant's
criminal conduct or circumstances causally connected to the defendant's conduct.
In early 2004, the United States Supreme Court, applying the "low threshold for

relevance," specifically rejected the view that mitigating evidence is only relevant if it is
causally connected to the crime. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274,284 (2004). Later that
common public knowledge based on ordinary human experience or matters of
which the court may take judicial notice.
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year, the Court revisited the issue and characterized the "nexus" requirement as "a test we
never countenanced and now have unequivocally rejected." Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37,
45 (2004). Thus, trial counsel, as well as the prosecutor, both having tried capital cases
previously, and both preparing for their first capital jury sentencing, should have been
well aware that there is no nexus requirement for the definition of, and consideration of,
mitigating circumstances. Indeed, the rationale for these decisions was well established
prior to Petitioner's sentencing.
Nearly thirty years ago, the Supreme Court released its opinion in Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion). In Lockett, the Court defined a mitigating
circumstance as "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death." Id., at 604. In Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), the Supreme Court
applied the rule in Lockett. The facts and outcome in Eddings are instructive when
judging the State's argument in the case at bar.
In Eddings, in the course of imposing and affirming the defendant's death
sentence, the trial judge and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had respectively
found that evidence of Eddings' young age and violent family history was not valid
mitigating evidence because it did not tend to provide an excuse from criminal
responsibility. Id., at 113-14.21 In reversing, the Supreme Court found that the evidence
was relevant mitigating evidence, noting that "[e]vidence of a difficult family history and

of emotional disturbance is typically introduced by defendants in mitigation. Id., at 115
(citation omitted). Lest there be any confusion about the different between legal excuses

While the Court of Criminal Appeals found the evidence of Eddings' family history
"useful in explaining" his behavior, the court found that it did not "excuse" it. Id., at 114.
21
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to criminal responsibility and mitigating circumstances reducing moral culpability, the
Court clarified:
All of this does not suggest an absence of responsibility for the crime of
murder, deliberately committed in this case. Rather, it is to say that just as
the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of
great weight, so must the background and mental and emotional
development of a youthful defendant be duly considered in sentencing.
Id.

Idaho has adopted the broadest definition of mitigation. State v. Osborn, 102
Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981).
We generally note that the concept of mitigation is broad. Mitigating
circumstances have been defined as: "Such as do not constitute a
justification or excuse of the offense in question, but which, in fairness
and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of
moral culpability." Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) at 903.
!d. at 415, 631 P.2d at 197. The Osborn Court stated that mitigating circumstances

include the defendant's "background, his age, upbringing and environment or any other
matter appropriate to a determination of the degree of culpability." Id. This "open ended
allowance of mitigating evidence provides the defendant with the opportunity to present
every possible justification for a sentence of less than death." State v. Creech, 105 Idaho
362, 369, 670 P.2d 463, 470 (1983), reversed in part on other grounds by Arave v.
Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993); Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 731 P.2d 192 (1986). As the

Court stated in Sivak, "[b loth Lockett and Eddings established the vital importance of
requiring the sentencer to consider any evidence proffered by the defendant which tends
to mitigate against the justness or appropriateness of the death penalty for this particular
defendant." Id., at 201, 731 P.2d at 196. Such evidence need not be related to any degree
of culpability for the crime.
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In Sivak, the Idaho Supreme Court held that evidence of a defendant's post-crime
conduct in prison, must be considered if offered in mitigation of punishment. Id. at 20102, 731 P.2d at 196-97 (citing Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 6 (1986)("[A]
defendant's disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life in prison
is itself an aspect of his character that is by its nature relevant to the sentencing
determination.") In Skipper, the U.S. Supreme Court held that mitigation does not have to
relate specifically to culpability. Id. Addressing a capital defendant's attempt to use his
post-crime good behavior as evidence in mitigation of punishment, the Court stated:
The State does not contest that the witnesses petitioner attempted to place
on the stand would have testified that petitioner had been a well-behaved
and well-adjusted prisoner, nor does the State dispute that the jury could
have drawn favorable inferences from this testimony regarding petitioner's
character and his probable future conduct if sentenced to life in prison.
Although it is true that any such inferences would not relate specifically to
petitioner's culpability for the crime he committed, see Koon I, supra, 278
S.c., at 536, 298 S.E.2d, at 774, there is no question but that such
inferences would be "mitigating" in the sense that they might serve "as a
basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett, supra, 438 U.S., at 604, 98
S.Ct., at 2965.
Skipper v. South Carolina, at 5 (emphasis added). Thus, both the State and trial counsel

were on notice that the definition of mitigation is broad and that a jury's ability to
consider all possible evidence that might serve as a basis for a sentence of less than death
cannot be impeded by improper argument. Penry v. Lynaugh, at 326. Nevertheless,
without objection, the State made the following arguments: 22
The issue in this case that deals with the propensity factor, and that is the
issue that makes mitigation relevant or not relevant, is the issue of choice
to kill, right? That's what we're talking about here is the choice to kill.

Nearly the entirety of the prosecutor's argument is improper for the reasons stated
above; however, to save space, Petitioner only cites to portions of the argument.
Petitioner moves this Court to take judicial notice of the entirety of the Reporter's
Transcript and Clerk's Record for purposes ofthis post-conviction case.
22
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That's at the core of this thing, is the choice to kill or not to kill. Not
whether he had a bad background, or not whether he would choose to
marry the same person I would or that you would, or the choice to have
the same kind of a home or not, or the same kind of a job or not. The core
issue here is choice. And don't kid yourself that there's a difference
between moral culpability and criminal responsibility.

(Tr., p. 5491, Ls. 3-17.)
But the reason we didn't cross examine [Drs. Cunningham and Pettis]
beyond the few relevant questions was because what they are saying is not
relevant to the question at hand. That what they have to say about the
defendant's background doesn't help you decide that mitigation,
aggravation issue. Because the issue, as I see it, at rock bottom is the
choice to kill or not to kill. And so if he had a bad background -- well, let
me put it a different way. If the defendant could choose to kill or not to
kill Lynn Henneman in September of 2000, then he is as responsible for
his actions as we are responsible for our actions. And it doesn't matter
what his background was like, whether it was a good background or bad
background if he could choose to kill or not to kill. If he couldn't choose
to kill or not to kill, he couldn't make that choice, then similarly it doesn't
matter what his background is. For instance if he was delusional, if he
was hallucinating, if he was psychotic, if he thought that by pulling that
thing tight around Lynn's neck he was really just wringing out the clothes
from the washing machine, then he's not responsible because he can't
make a choice, he's psychotic. And it doesn't matter whether he comes
from a good background or bad background, does it -- I mean it's not like
we hold people responsible for their actions if they're psychotic, if they
come from good background but not from bad ones. It's not like we only
prosecute people from the -- that have good families for murder when they
make choices or we don't prosecute people from bad backgrounds for
murder when they commit choices. That's why I didn't cross examine
those doctors, besides asking them "Could the defendant make a choice?
Did he know right from wrong? Did he understand the consequences?
Did he have a mental illness? Was he delusional or psychotic or for some
other reason couldn't make the mental connection that he had to make?"
The doctors both said he could make choices. He knew right from wrong.
He understood consequences. He's not psychotic. Now, if none of those
things apply and the defendant could make a choice then he's responsible
for the choice that he made the same as we are. We all come from a
background that influences our choice. But don" get confused on choices
how to live our life versus choices of kill or not to kill. The defendant's
choices on how to live his life are influenced by his background the same
as ours are, where to live, how to live, who to marry, what job to do, how
to spend our day. But the choice. to kill or not to kill is an entirely
diffet:ent thing and nothing you heard from these people tell you that the
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defendant doesn't know the difference between right and wrong, doesn't
understand consequences, couldn't make the choice ...
(Tr., p. 5493, L. 11 - p. 5495, L. 17.)
Counsel did it again today. He says that the doctors talked about head
injury, and being hit on the head by his brothers and such. Did the
Harvard medical doctor and a Ph.D. forensic psychologist give you one
reason to think that the defendant has somehow been injured in his head
by being hit on head when he was a kid? Did he say we gave the
following psychological tests and they clearly show that the defendant
can't understand consequences, cause and effect, the relation of A to B?
No. Why didn't they? It's because they're not trying to help you find the
truth here. They said, well, there's all kind of serotonin uptake inhibitors
that do all this. Did the Harvard medical doctor tell you that he did a test
on the defendant to show that the defendant needs a serotonin uptake
inhibitor or that he was lacking in serotonin or anything else? He didn't.
Why not? It's because he doesn't. There's not the cause and effect
relationship that they want.
(Tr., p. 5496, L. 21 - p. 5497, L. 15.)
I say what these good men say is interesting background, but it doesn't
help you with the core issue, which is could the defendant choose to kill
Lynn Henneman in September or choose not to kill her? And you know
that he can choose to kill her because he did. And you know that he could
choose not to kill her because he chose not to kill her. He could have.
That's what turns this mitigation into mitigation or not. This is the
difference between mitigation and an abuse excuse. I didn't think about it,
they thought of it. They said not abuse excuse. We want to tell you that
right up front. The heck it isn't. That's just exactly what it is. This is a
sympathy and I have sympathy for the defendant and I'll bet all of you do
too if half the stuff that we heard about his childhood is true, then I have
sympathy for him. But it's an excuse, because they cannot make the cause
and effect relationship.
(Tr., p. 5503, Ls. 1-19.)
We told you to begin with that the business here is the question of whether
or not the aggravation outweighs the mitigation. And to understand that
you have to understand whether it's really mitigation or not. And that's
why I wanted to spend the time with you to help you understand that the
defendant could make choices. Because if he can make a choice then the
things you heard about his background is not mitigating. It's sad but it's
not mitigating. And there's nothing about that that somehow indicates that
he couldn't choose to kill.
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(Tr., p. 5504, L. 16 - p. 5505, L. 2.)
The State's argument impeded the jury's ability to consider valid mitigation by
informing them that mitigation is limited to that evidence which has a causal relation to
the defendant's criminal conduct. The State did not argue that the jury should afford little
weight to the mitigation evidence presented. Instead, the State argued that there was
absolutely no mitigating evidence presented based on the improper standard that they
promulgated for the jury. The State's argument was flagrant intentional misconduct and
prejudiced Petitioner. Because of the State's misrepresentation of the law governing the
consideration of, and the definition of, mitigating circumstances, the jury failed to
consider relevant mitigating evidence and Petitioner's death sentence must be vacated.

2. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Making An Improper
Closing Argument Regarding The Manner In Which Mitigation Is
Weighed Against The Aggravation.
While arguing their view of mitigation, the State presented a slide that depicted
the weighing of aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances.

The

illustration was that of a scale, likened to the scales of justice, with the term "mitigation"
on one side weighed against all four aggravating circumstances the State sought to prove
to the jury: "HAC," "Propensity," "Utter disregard," and "In perpetration."

The

illustration resembled the following:
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As shown above, the prosecution drew a scale leaning heavily in favor of the four
aggravating circumstances weighed aggregately against the mitigation. Drawing upon the
scale in its argument, the prosecution asserted that Petitioner deserved the death penalty.
The State's argument and illustration is a grossly simplified and misleading
characterization of the weighing process required under

I.e.

§ 19-2515(8)(a)(ii). The

statute requires that all of the mitigation presented by the defense be weighed against
each ofthe statutory aggravators it has found as proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State
v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989).

The scale depicted by the

prosecution misstates the requirements under the law and constitutes gross misconduct.
This misconduct requires this Court to vacate Petitioner's death sentence.

3. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Arguing That The Defense
Experts Were Hired Guns.
During their closing argument, the prosecution encouraged the jury to view
Petitioner's experts as hired gunS.23

The prosecution also dropped the occasional remark suggesting that the jury should not
listen to "big city" (Dallas and San Francisco) "Harvard" educated, (Tr., p. 5496, L. 23 p. 5497, L. 2), boys like Petitioner's experts. This is part of the "don't trust these
strangers" appeal to regional bias taken by the State that trial counsel had seen in other
cases, yet did nothing to preclude such improper attacks on their experts.
23
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These men you heard from San Francisco and Dallas yesterday, experts.
You heard a full day of it. Couple of things you don't want to forget.
They're in the business of supplying criminal defendants with excuses.
You heard hours about poor Erick. And yet the first time you heard that
he can decide what he did, that he was accountable, that he wasn't
schizophrenic, that he wasn't psychotic was when Mr. Bourne raised his
hand and in the three or four questions he asked got that out of him and
forgot that part. Most of what they told you doesn't have anything to do
with this case. It just doesn't. The show you saw cost $100,000.
$100,000. And did it tell you anything that you didn't already know about
human nature? I don't think it did. And ask yourself a couple of things,
are they neutral observers of the evidence or are they hired to try to
convince you to spare the defendant? Was that testimony you heard from
the witness stand and from the podium or was it a performance? I suggest
to you that that's what it was. It was a performance and it is done
frequently enough by Dr. Cunningham that he is good at it. He could be
preaching on Sunday. He has done -- does this 15 times a year and he's
got it down. Coat yourself with the skepticism that protects you from that
sort of thing.
(Tr., p. 5460, L. 25 - p. 5462, L. 2.) This argument is a constitutionally improper
personal attack on the credibility of Petitioner's witnesses and seeks to penalize Petitioner
for exercising his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process,
to present a defense, to counsel, and to fairness and reliability in death penalty cases.
A defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense that includes the right
to expert assistance. In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court
held that "the Constitution requires that an indigent defendant have access to the
psychiatric examination and assistance necessary to prepare an effective defense based on
his mental condition." Id. at 70. The prosecution cannot attack a defendant for exercising
his constitutional rights.
A defendant's right to counsel can be violated by a prosecutor's improper
examination of a witness or argument that seeks to penalize the defendant for exercising
his constitutional right. State v. Masters, No. M2003-00305-CCA-R3-CD, 2004WL
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1208872, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jun. 2, 2004). In Masters, the court held that the
defendant's rights were not violated during cross-examination of his experts when the
prosecutor sought to attack "the reliability and impartiality of the witnesses in part
because of their attitudes toward capital punishment. Id. However, when the prosecution
goes beyond attacking the reliability and impartiality of a witness, the risk of depriving
the defendant of a fair trial increases significantly. One such instance is where the state
suggests that because the defense experts were paid hefty fees, their testimony would
weigh heavily in favor of the defense. State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 185,770 A.2d 255,
272 (N.J. 2001); see also State v. Schneider, 402 N.W.2d 779, 788 (Minn.1987)
("Experts are not the paid harlots of either side in a criminal case and should not be
portrayed in such a light.").
Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor's argument in his case went beyond attacking
the reliability and impartiality of his experts, and thus deprived him of his right to a fair
trial and his right to present a defense in mitigation of punishment. This misconduct
requires this Court to vacate Petitioner's death sentence.

4. The Prosecution Committed Doyle Error By Eliciting Through Dr. Mark
Cunningham Testimony That Petitioner Did Not Speak To Him About
The Crimes For Which He Had Been Charged.
A Doyle violation only occurs when the State attempts to elicit evidence at trial of

an accused's post-Miranda silence as evidence against him. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610
(1976). "Doyle rests on the fundamental unfairness of implicitly assuring a suspect that

his silence will not be used against him and then using his silence to impeach an
explanation subsequently offered at trial." Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756,763 (1987)
(citations and internal quotes omitted).
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Q.

Okay. I believe that you didn't ask the defendant anything about
the murder ofLynn Henneman when you spoke to him.

A.

No, sir.

Q.

So you didn't hear any of the details about the murder from his
lips.

A.

That's correct.

(Tr., p. 5387, Ls. 1-17.) Here, it appears the State elicited Petitioner's post-arrest silence
in an attempt to insinuate a lack of remorse and to undermine his experts' opinions based
on his childhood. This violated Doyle and requires, alone, and in conjunction with all
other claims of error listed herein, a new sentencing.
5. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Misrepresenting The
Testimony Of Michelle Deen And Evelyn Dunaway.
The

prosecutor

committed

misconduct

during

closing

argument

III

mischaracterizing Michelle Deen's and Evelyn Dunaway's testimony to establish that
Petitioner choked them during sex:
So, as we talk, as you look at this record and we think and talk about
propensity, let's talk for a moment about the defendant's prior conduct and
his appetite.
So has he exhibited by prior conduct or conduct in the commission of the
murder at hand a propensity to commit murder which will probably
constitute a continuing threat to society? I think you know the answer to
this. Let's talk for a moment about the women you met, I guess it was last
Saturday. Evelyn Dunaway, choked, beaten. Do you remember when she
told you about how the defendant pulled her out through a window of the
car and bit her in the fact? She left that night. It became clear to her what
- where this was leading. She left that night. Michelle Deen. Michelle
Deen told you after she had been choked, beaten, sexually abused, that
she snuck out at two o'clock in the morning with the clothes on her back
to get away from the defendant. And you remember we didn't pick these
people. The defendant picked them.
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(Tr., p. 5456, L. 16 - p. 5458, L. 4) (emphasis added). In the State's rebuttal
closing argument, the prosecutor argued:
And the last one propensity. Has he shown a propensity to commit murder
and probably constitute a continuing threat? Well, you've looked at the
evidence. You know, do we start to see a pattern going on here? Well,
what - you know what he did to Norma Jean. You know what he did to
Lynn. You know what he did to Michelle. You know what he did to
Evelyn. It's all pretty much the same, except he only killed once so far
in that group.
(Tr., p. 5507, Ls. 9 - 17)(emphasis added).
Ms. Deen did not testify that Petitioner choked her while having sex. Nor did Ms.
Dunaway. Yet the State mischaracterized their testimony to draw a prejudicial parallel
between Petitioner's prior behavior with women and the facts alleged in the Henneman
homicide for the purpose of establishing the propensity aggravator.
6. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Encouraging The Jury To
Speculate In The Course Of Determining Whether The Propensity
Aggravator Existed Beyond A Reasonable Doubt.
In closing argument, the prosecution impermissibly characterized as fact matters

based on pure speculation.
Well, let me ask you this one other question that will maybe kind of state
the obvious. Did he have to kill her? Did he have to kill Lynn or did he do
it for fun? Say that he grabs Lynn at the ambush point at the edge of the
bridge like he told you about and drags her down there and he's got her
under the bridge, he's got a knife. You know, he's got a knife if not that
one some knife because he has to cut through the hem of her parents too
thick to rip. He has to cut that and tear the rest. You know he's got a knife
you think he could have put the knife to Lynn's throat and said "give me
your purse, lady. Give me your wedding ring." Now, Lynn's a smart
woman. What do you think she would have said, "cut my throat, I'm not
going to give you my purse." Of course not. She would have given him
the purse. She would have given him the ring. She's a smart woman.
She's experienced, she's been around people.
What happens if he said "Now give me sex or I'm going to cut your
throat." Do you think she'd have given him sex to save her life? I think
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she would have. Not going to die over that. So why does he kill her?
Doesn't have to kill her. He kills her because he wants to, because he's
sadistic and brutal towards women. He doesn't have to kill her.
What does the instruction tell you that it's a person who likes to kill, who
kills without the normal amount of provocation who kills because they
have an affinity. What's their affinity? They like it. That's what it is.
That's what we're talking about here. He doesn't have to do that to her.
He does it because he likes it.
Does he kill Lynn with the normal amount of provocation? Man, there
was no provocation. He doesn't have to do anything to her. She's walking
down -- she's walking horne thinking of the kids that are going to like stuff
she's bought that she's carrying in her purse. There's no provocation for
that. She tries to get away from him and he chases her down. That's the
only logical conclusion you can draw from the way that crime scene looks.
She apparently dropped her purse as she was running. He catches her
down there and that's where she was found 250 feet away.
(Tr., p. 5507, L. 21 - 5509, L. 16.)
7. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Making An Argument
Inconsistent with Evidence Outside The Record.
The prosecution had the opportunity to rebut the testimony of the defense experts
during the penalty phase of the trial, yet they called no expert witness.

Indeed, the

prosecution had their own professional witnesses, Dr. Michael Estess and Dr. Robert
Engle, who they no doubt had to compensate to review Petitioner's experts' opinions as
well as their testimony. Dr. Estess was even present in the courtroom to view the defense
expert testimony at the sentencing. Nevertheless, the prosecution, after consultation
during a recess, chose not to call either doctor as a witness, presumably because they
could not rebut the defense experts' opinions.
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as Dr. Estess has refused to discuss his
findings or opinions of the defense testimony with Petitioner. Further, Petitioner is still
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awaiting a hearing and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006, in
which he made several requests relevant to this claim.
8. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct In Arguing For Imposition Of
The Death Penalty To Deter Future Crimes By Other Would-Be
Criminals And As Retribution For The Victim's Family.
While the potential for mistakes in the determination of punishment may be
tolerable in other areas of the criminal law, "in capital cases the fundamental respect for
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character
and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as
a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death."
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)(emphasis added). The Supreme
Court elaborated on the principle of individualized sentencing in Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion), wherein the Court held that, to be fair, a capital
sentencing scheme must treat each person convicted of a capital offense with that "degree
of respect due the uniqueness ofthe individual." Id., at 605. The plurality concluded:
Given that the imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly
different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an
individualized decision is essential in capital cases. The need for treating
each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the
uniqueness of the individual is far more important than in noncapital
cases .... The nonavailability of corrective or modifying mechanisms with
respect to an executed capital sentence underscores the need for
individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing
the death sentence.
Id.
It follows that consideration of general deterrence, as a factor supporting the

imposition of the death penalty, is fundamentally inconsistent with individualized
sentencing. Chief Justice Burger contrasted noncapital cases, stating, "in [such] cases,
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the established practice of individualized sentences rests not on constitutional commands,
but on public policy enacted into statutes."

Id., at 604-05.

Accordingly, where

noncapital defendants later claimed that their rights were violated by consideration of

general deterrence at sentencing, courts rejected their claims. See e.g., United States v.
Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1009-10 (3rd Cir.l988); United States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362,

1368-1369 (9th Cir.1985) (same);

us. v.

Thomas, 884 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1989) (same).

From an oft-quoted passage from the Third Circuit opinion in Frank,
the recognition of a substantive liberty interest in individualized treatment
in sentencing would be inconsistent with the generally accepted notion
that both retribution, which focuses on the interests of the victim rather
than the status of the defendant, and general deterrence, which focuses on
the interests of society at large rather than the status of the defendant, are
appropriate societal versions for imposing sanctions.
United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d at 1009-10. Accordingly, because a capital defendant

does have constitutional right to individualized sentencing treatment, consideration of
general deterrence in determination of punishment is impermissible. See e.g., People v.
Love, 366 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1961) (holding that it was improper for the prosecution during

closing argument to argue that the death penalty was a more effective deterrent than life
imprisonment), overruled on other grounds by People v. Morse, 388 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1964).
An argument made, or evidence presented, of general deterrence is a constitutional

violation no matter how clothed. Accordingly, inviting the jury to "send a message" to
other would-be criminals is equally improper because it may tip the scales in favor of a
death sentence. See Com. v. Baker, 511 A.2d 777 (Pa. 1986). In Baker, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court noted,
Even when a sentencing jury is unconvinced that death is the appropriate
punishment, it might nevertheless wish to "send a message" of extreme
disapproval for the defendant's acts. '" A defendant might thus be
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executed, although no sentencer had ever made a determination that death
was the appropriate sentence.
Id., at 788.

General deterrence arguments are intended to dissuade the jury from granting
mercy by"distracting them from the individual defendant by encouraging them to consider
a legitimate, but irrelevant, societal interest in preventing others from commiting crime.
See Wilson v. Kemp, 777 F.2d 621 (11th Cir. 1985). In Wilson, the Eleventh Circuit

reversed the defendant's death sentence, holding that the prosecutor's argument regarding
deterrent effects and society's greater good swayed the focus of the jury away from the
consideration of mitigating evidence in favor of evidence irrelevant to its consideration.
Wilson v. Kemp, 777 F.2d at 624.

The Idaho Supreme Court has also recognized that general deterrence is not a
legitimate consideration in death penalty sentencing. See State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546,
873 P.2d 800 (1993). In Pratt, the district court had referenced deterrence in its findings
when imposing the death penalty.

The Idaho Supreme Court found that the district

court's comments about deterrence were made after it had already properly made all the
required findings for imposition of the death penalty. Therefore, the Court was able to
determine with certainty, and as a matter of law, that any consideration of deterrence did
not affect the district court's findings and constituted mere surplusage, which, by itself,
would not invalidate the death sentence. No such assurances exist in Petitioner's case.
Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the jury considered general deterrence when
making its findings.24

24 Petitioner does not assert that the societal goal of deterring crime is not a valid
consideration in determining whether a state should adopt the death penalty -- that is a
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During closing arguments, the Ada County Prosecutor, Greg Bower, argued that
the jury should consider the community's interest in deterring future cnmes as
justification for imposing the death penalty. Specifically, Mr. Bower argued,
A few last thoughts: If your verdict for death, saves just one person in the
future, saves just one person in the future your sacrifice and your time will
not have been in vain.
(Tr., p. 5462, Ls. 3-6.) Mr. Bower further argued,
For the last year and a halfMr. Bourne and I have done our job. And now
it's time to end this and hand the baton to you. How many times have you
sat? How many times have you sat at the breakfast table reading the
newspaper and read about a horrible crime and said to your suppose [sic],
"Why don't they do something about this? This is our town. Why don't
they do something about this?" Well the reversal of that is, now you are
they. You are they. There is in your hands. Trust each other. You've run a
long path together. Trust each other. Remember last week to. Take your
common sense and your skepticism back into the jury room with you.
Don't forget it. And finally the law is only as strong -- the law is only as
strong as the weakest part on this jury which is heart.
(Tr., p. 5462, L. 24 - p. 5463, L. 15.)(sic added). Here, Mr. Bower is telling the jury that
the societal function of the jury is law enforcement. Specifically, by imposing the death
penalty, the jury ("they"), will reduce instances of "horrible crime[ s]" in the future that
they have all read about in the past. Mr. Bower is also stating that a jury, by listening to
their heart and granting mercy, is weakening the law.

See also Tr., p.5512, L.24 -

p.5513, L.14 (suggesting to jurors that they have civic and patriotic duty to impose death
penalty in this case).
The State continued this line of argument in its rebuttal. Specifically, Deputy Ada
County Prosecutor, Roger Bourne argued,

matter solely for legislative consideration. It nevertheless remains improper for a jury to
consider alleged deterrent effects of the death penalty in deciding whether it should be
imposed. See People v. Love, supra.
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Is Lynn's life worth nothing? Is a loss (sic) worth nothing? Did we go
through all this for nothing? What about retribution to her family?
What about the protection of society? What about deterrence of
others?
(Tr., p. 5510, L. 22 -po 551, L. 2) (sic added)
The State's argument drew persuasive support, not from evidence presented, i.e.,
evidence that the death penalty actually deters future crime, but from the beliefs and
opinions expressed by various members of the jury in their written questionnaires and
their oral testimony during voir dire. Indeed, in stark contrast to trial counsel who did not
weave its overall theory of defense into voir dire, the State began prepping the jury for a
death sentence during voir dire. The following jurors testified that they believed the death
penalty generally deters crime: Elizabeth Ann Keeney, John Basil Jasper, Ann McNeese,
and James David Kennedy.

The State's questioning of Juror James David Kennedy

included the following colloquy.
Q. [Mr. Bourne] Well, let's talk about the death penalty just for a minute.
You've told us that you are ofthe view that the death penalty is a deterrent
and that it is appropriate in some murder cases and that you could assess it
under the proper circumstances. Is that still your view today?
A. Yeah, a little bit of qualification there I guess. It is -- any form of
punishment is more deterrent, that's kind of legal for speeding and
whatever. Death penalty with carrying it out 30 years later may not be as
much deterrent as one sooner. It can be a deterrent in some cases and
whether people get it or not depends on all kinds of situations, so.
Q. Do you think society sends a message by assessing the death penalty -I mean you think that a jury sends a message to the community and to
the defendant and others by assessing the death penalty even if it takes
several years before it's carried out?
A. If that's a possibility, it's -- if there's a possibility of a death penalty I
think that should be a consideration of somebody making a choice or
decision, yeah, I think it would still work.
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(Tr., p. 3029, L. 15 - p. 3030, L. 14)(emphasis added). Here the State deftly primed Mr.
Kennedy for their closing argument. Trial counsel, with no experience in capital jury
sentencing, apparently ignorant of State's slight of hand and the constitutional grounds
for precluding this tactic, did not even notice they were already losing their case. The
difference between life and death should not come down to a prosecutor out lawyering
trial counsel.

Through trial counsel's questioning, it became apparent that the juror's

beliefs about the death penalty deterring crime was not a passing belief but one forged
through experience with working with inmates at a correctional institution. (Tr., p. 3045,
L. 24

p. 3047, L. 21.)
Another juror, Ann McNeese, responded to questioning by the State as follows:
Q. [Roger Bourne] Yeah. Looks like you've got some pretty strong
opinions about why crime rates are up, whether the system is harsh
enough or too harsh. My view is that -- or as I read your views I should
say, I'm of the impression that you think there should be more deterrent
effect to the criminal justice system to keep the crime rates down. Do I
read that correctly?

A. Yes.

***
A. [Ms. McNeese] ... I mean it's -- I really don't know what makes a
person a murderer. I can't relate to that at all. But I would say a lot of that
does have to do with society.

Q. It can-A. It's too liberal a society.

***
Q. Okay. All right. You think that some kinds of conduct are so bad by
themselves that -- that is that the crime is so heinous that the death penalty
is society's way of expressing itself about the death penalty -- or about the
crime I mean to say?
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A. They probably use it as a deterrent, yes.
Q. All right. Okay. Now, do you think that the death penalty holds the
defendant -- well, let me ask it a different way. Do you think that life
without parole holds a defendant as responsible for his choices as the
death penalty holds them responsible for his choices? Or do you think one
or the other one is more a serious message?
A. They would be the same.
Q. Okay. Do you think that society's telling a person that they've crossed
the threshold and are deserving of the death penalty is a stronger statement
about responsibility than life without parole is?
A. Yes.

(Tr., p. 2498, Ls. 7-15; p. 2501, Ls. 13-21; p. 2503, L. 16 - p. 2504, L. 11.)
Another juror, Elizabeth Keeney, responded to questioning by trial counsel as
follows:

Q. Have you always been in favor ofthe death penalty?
A. No.

Q. Okay.
A. No. I think -- I feel like the death penalty is a deterrent to crime. It
seems like the prison system is not a deterrent to crime, it seems to me in
all cases. But I think that if we use the death penalty -- I mean when
someone is convicted of -- and sentenced to death, if the evidence is clear
and convincing --

Q. Urn-hum.
A. -- beyond a shadow of a doubt, then do it.
Q. Urn-hum.
A. Because I think it's pretty well known that an person can sit on death
row for many, many, many years. And so what's that say? You know.

Q. And I take it that your view of it changed at some point? You didn't
believe that in the beginning or some other time, some earlier time?
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A. Has it changed? No, I think this opinion has solidified. I don't know
that I'd say it's changed. I think I was probably more without opinion on
it.
Q. Okay. Can you pinpoint in time when you changed?
A. Nope -- or something.
Q. Something happen?
A. No, I don't know. Maybe it's just get older. I don't know.
Q. Why do you think it's a deterrent?
A. The death penalty?
Q. Yes.
A. Oh, because I think if somebody that was considering committing a
crime knew that they were going to give their life I think would be a
deterrent.
Q. Okay.
A. If they knew that, that our justice system was imposing that and
sticking with it. I think that would be a deterrent. It's just like in other
countries where they -- you steal something they chop off your arm.
Q. Urn-hum.
A. I think that crime rate is much lower because people like to keep their
. limbs. Just a personal opinion.
Q. Okay. It's an eye for an eye kind ofthing?
A. Yeah.
(Tr., p. 2093, L. 14

p. 2095, L. 14.) As discussed elsewhere, Ms. Keeney attended the

same church with, and knew a lot of information about, Angie Abdullah, the victim of
murder in a capital case that was proceeding to trial on the same courtroom floor and at
the same time as Ms. Keeney was giving her voir dire testimony. (Tr., 2074, Ls. 12-19.)
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Another juror, John Jasper, responded to questioning by trial counsel as follows:
Q. How long have you felt in support of the death penalty?
A. As far as I can remember. I've never thOUght about it.
Q. Okay. Has your view ever changed?
A. No.
Q. Been pretty consistently in support of it?
A. Yes.

Q. Okay. How strong are your views?
A. Well, I tend to think they're pretty strong. It's not that they could never
be changed if the right argument came upon it. I mean everything is
always subject to change. But at this point that's the way I feel about it.
That's the way it should be.
Q. Okay. I guess I want to ask you two questions. One is, why do you
feel the way you feel and why do you feel so strongly about it?

A. Well, society as a whole -- I think the most deterrent -- the biggest
deterrent we can have to keep people on the straight and narrow is a
deterrent -- in the case of a child, to keep a child from doing things wrong
they know that there's punishment. The punishment is not great then it's
not going to be a big deal to them. If the punishment is severe -- I know
as I was growing up that I would rather do the right thing so I wouldn't
get a spanking growing up as a child because the deterrent was great
enough. You know, it hurts I don't want that so I did the right thing. So if
the deterrent is grate enough then it would sway more people to stay
within the laws and the bounds of laws.
Q. Do you mean a deterrent to crime in general or just to murder?
A. Well, to murder. To any crime. I mean if the punishment is severe
enough it would deter people from doing the crime.
Q. Urn-hum. Do you think that a life sentence is a powerful punishment?

A. It is.
Q. Do you think it acts as a deterrent?
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A. Somewhat.

Q. Okay. Can you explain that for me?
A. Well, I guess it would depend upon the person. If they were not able
to function within society, to them serving time in jail for life they've got a
roof over their heads, you know, they're going to have their meals, they
can go out and exercise. And it is a deterrent in a way, but it could be
more of a deterrent if there was more restrictions. Kind of hard to explain.

Q. Yeah. I think I understand what you're saying. Well, if a crime is
called life without possibility of parole, would you believe that?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And if there's no hope of ever getting out of prison, do you
think that makes it worse than the possibility of parole?
A. Yes. Yes, that would definitely make it worse.
(Tr., p. 2151, L. 9

p. 2153, L. 20.)25

Despite the exercise of due diligence, it is impossible for Petitioner to fully state
this claim as Petitioner has not yet received the juror questionnaires.

These

questionnaires likely include more information on the juror's views of the death penalty
as a deterrent to future crime. Further, these questionnaires were critical; as the State
noted, they were the parties' "bible" during voir dire. (Tr., p. 5445, Ls. 1-3.) Further, the
Court has improperly precluded Petitioner from unrestricted access to jurors that would
provide additional support for this claim. Finally, Petitioner needs additional time to
consult with an expert in criminal justice for the purpose of showing trial counsel could
have precluded this argument as inconsistent with evidence, or sought to rebut the

25 Testimony regarding deterrence from jurors John Jasper and Elizabeth Keeney was
actually elicited by trial counsel. This fact does not change the claim but only shows that
the State cannot show that the prosecutorial misconduct was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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argument with the presentation of evidence. As Justice Breyer noted in his concurring
opinion in Ring:
Studies of deterrence are, at most, inconclusive. See, e.g., Sorensen,
Wrinkle, Brewer, & Marquart, Capital Punishment and Deterrence:
Examining the Effect of Executions on Murder in Texas, 45 Crime &
Delinquency 481 (1999) (no evidence of a deterrent effect); Bonner &
Fessenden, Absence of Executions: A special report, States With No
Death Penalty Share Lower Homicide Rates, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 2000,
p. Al (during last 20 years, homicide rate in death penalty States has been
48% to 101 % higher than in non-death-penalty States); see also Radelet &
Akers, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The Views of the Experts, 87
J.Crim. L. & C. 1, 8 (1996) (over 80% of criminologists believe existing
research fails to support deterrence justification).
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. at 615. Despite the need for further investigation to fully state

this claim, Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to relief as stated.
9. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Expressing Their Personal
Opinion That The Death Penalty Was The Appropriate Punishment.

Prosecutors are given leeway in making closing arguments.

Prosecutors can

appropriately argue the record, highlight the inconsistencies or inadequacies of the
defense, and forcefully assert reasonable inferences from the evidence. Bates v. Bell, 402
F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2005) (reversing death sentence for prosecutorial misconduct in
making improper arguments). However, prosecutors cannot put forth their opinions as to
credibility of a witness, guilt of a defendant, or appropriateness of capital punishment.
Id. (emphasis added).

This is because "the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the

imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government's
judgment rather than its own view of the evidence." Id. (quoting United States v. Young,
470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985)).
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During closing arguments, the Ada County Prosecutor stated his opinion that the
death penalty was the appropriate punishment for Petitioner's crimes. Specifically, Greg
Bower argued,
You said you could impose the death penalty in the right case, but what you
wanted was overwhelming proof. And I think that this is the right case. And I
think that you know this is the right case.
(Tr., p. 5445, Ls. 14-18.) This represents an improper personal opinion of the appropriate
punishment for this case, was improper, and warrants reversal on its own, and in
conjunction with all other claims raised by Petitioner.

10. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Making Extra-Record
Argument That Lethal Injections Are Painless and Humane.
The State argued that executing Petitioner would be a humane forn1 of death,
especially when compared to the asserted suffering of the victim. This argument had no
support in the record, began in voir dire, and continued into closing argument where the
State argued,
Are those things the same? Is execution the same as what he did to Lynn
Henneman? It's not. It's not anything like it. It's nothing like it. Being
executed is like going into a surgery and getting put to sleep and not
waking up. Is that what happened the Lynn?
(Tr., p. 5511, L. 24 - p. 5512, L. 4.)
Not only is this argument improper because based on information not

III

the

record, Petitioner asserts that rather than being a humane form of execution; the drugs
used to kill death row inmates can actually cause an excruciatingly painful and protracted
death. According to an April 2005 report by the British journal, "The Lancet," as many as
four often prisoners put to death by injection in the United States may receive inadequate
anesthesia, causing them to remain conscious in tremendous pain. Therefore, Petitioner
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claims that the State's argument was improper in two ways: (1) it was based upon an
assertion of fact not supported by evidence in the record, and (2) it was based on the false
assertion that Petitioner's execution will necessarily be painless. This argument violated
Petitioner's rights to a due process, his right to a fair trial and his right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishments as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Petitioner

IS

still investigating and researching for case law developments;

information on botched, problematic, or otherwise suspicious/unusual lethal injection
execution situations; documented cases where more than one dose of a chemical was
administered; toxicology data available at the time of Petitioner's sentencing; and any
other relevant data and information. Petitioner is in the process of identifying a competent
and independent medical expert to provide an affidavit in support of this claim. Petitioner
cannot attach such an affidavit at this time due to time constraints.
11. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Arguing That A Life
Sentence Would Be Too Lenient And Otherwise Speculating As To What
Might Happen To Petitioner If A Death Sentence Were Withheld.
The State argued that a life sentence would be too lenient, in part by, speCUlating
as to what might happen to petitioner if a death sentence were withheld, and by
speculating as to what the Court might impose for Petitioner's other crimes. The
prosecution argued:
You heard the instructions and you know what the potential sentences are
for these cases. You know that the defendant's given life without parole
that he can be in general popUlation in five years. You know that in
general population he'll have access to a number of things television, gym,
contact visits, he'll have access to sunshine. Remember the last picture
that -- go down. But the last picture that Mickey showed you of Lynn
sitting in the sunshine? She won't sit in the sunshine again. You give the
defendant life without parole, he will.
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(Tr., p. 5460, Ls. 9-20.) This statement encourages the jury to discount a life sentence as
easy living and violates the principle in capital cases that jurors must be able to give
legitimate consideration to life sentences. See California v. Brown, 479 US. 538 (1987);

Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 US. 302 (1989), Mills
v. Maryland, 486 US. 367 (1988); Simmons v. South Carolina, 111 S.Ct. 2187 (1994);
see also Claim E.l, supra (discussing materially false and misleading testimony of
Dennis Dean regarding conditions of confinement).
The prosecutor then told the jury that imposing a life sentence was the equivalent
of imposing no punishment at all:
Counsel says give life. Here's the deal. You know that Judge Neville can
give the defendant life on the rape, a life on the kidnapping. You know
he's got one and so he's going to go to prison for life. He's got two rapes
now that one prior conviction, he's going to go to prison for life.
And so when Counsel says give him life, what he's really saying is give
him nothing. Because the Ada County Prosecutor could stand up right
now and say to Judge Neville, "We move to dismiss the murder charge.
Dismiss it, we're done." And Judge Neville could give the defendant a life
sentence for rape and a life sentence for kidnapping and the dismissal of
the murder charge would not add a minute's time because he only has one
life. And so when Counsel says "give the defendant life." And what he's
really saying is give him nothing because he's already been -- going to get
life so don't do anything else to him. Let's just let that go. Give him
nothing. I think you ought to know that because that's the point of this. Is
Lynn's life worth nothing? Is a loss worth nothing? Did we go through all
this for nothing? What about retribution to her family? What about the
protection of society? What about deterrence of others? What about the
punishment for the defendant that he knows he deserves, that he earned,
that he worked on, that he knew he had coming when he talked to the
detectives back in March of 2003. What about those goals of society?
Are we just going to give him nothing? We have talked about the
minimum sentence and maximum sentence, but it isn't life. Giving him
life is nothing. It's Brere Rabbit don't throw me in the brier patch because
I'm already there. That's the deal.
(Tr., p. 5510, L. 1 - p. 5511, L. 12.)
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This was again, pure speculation. While the sentences for rape and kidnapping
have a maximum of life imprisonment, they do not carry mandatory minimums. For the
prosecutor to tell the jurors that the Court would impose life sentences for the rape and
kidnapping was not only outrageous, it fundamentally altered the only decision properly
before the jury-the proper sentence for murder, and only after finding at least one
statutory aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. It focused the jury's attention on matters
not within their concern. The prosecutor in effect told each juror that his or her only
moral choice was death, when the law requires each juror to make a "reasoned moral
response." See Penry, supra; Mills, supra; Simmons, supra. Petitioner asserts that the
prosecutor's misconduct warrants reversal of his death sentence.
12. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Arguing That Petitioner
Showed A Lack Of Remorse.
The prosecutor impermissibly argued during closing argument that Petitioner's
silence demonstrated an apparent lack of remorse that should be considered as a factor
weighing in favor of the death penalty:
The family coming up here to give impact statements is enough to put a
bronze statue on its knees for sorrow. None of us even know Lynn and I
know the effect it had on me and what I could see from you. What effect
did it have on the defendant? Did he weep? Did he bury his face in his
hands and agonize over the things that he had done? Does he show you
remorse? Did he give you confidence to think that he won't do this again,
that he's learned his lesson, that he's repentant, that he's sorry, that he's
willing to change his life, that he wants to make amends to Lynn's family?
Does he do that? Is this letter that says "I'm going to offer myself as a
sacrifice for your loss". Is that a way of showing that he's repentant?
(Tr., p. 5506, Ls. 7 - 22)( emphasis added).
Petitioner had the right to remain silent under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. No negative inference from Petitioner's failure to testify is permitted.
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Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 329 (1999). This rule applies at sentencing as
well as the guilt phase. Id. Thus, just as a jury cannot infer guilt from a failure to testify,
it cannot infer lack of remorse from a failure to testify at sentencing.

allow him to do

without adverse consequences, and his silence may not be converted by a prosecutor into
an expression of lack of remorse. The prosecutor invited the jury to do and thereby
violated Petitioner's right to remain silent.
In conclusion, when ruling on all the forgoing claims of prosecutorial misconduct
III

closing argument, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to review Justice

Blackmun's dissent in Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986), where he, joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshal, and Stevens, quoting in part a Second Circuit dissent, stated:
This court has several times used vigorous language in denouncing
government counsel for such conduct as that of the [prosecutor] here. But,
each time, it has said that, nevertheless, it would not reverse. Such an
attitude of helpless piety is, I think, undesirable. It means actual
condonation of counsel's alleged offense, coupled with verbal
disapprobation. If we continue to do nothing practical to prevent such
conduct, we should cease to disapprove it. For otherwise it will be as if we
declared in effect, 'Government attorneys, without fear of reversal, may
say just about what they please in addressing juries, for our rules on the
subject are pretend-rules. If prosecutors win verdicts as a result of
"disapproved" remarks, we will not deprive them of their victories; we
will merely go through the form of expressing displeasure. The
deprecatory words we use in our opinions on such occasions are purely
ceremonial.' Government counsel, employing such tactics, are the kind
who, eager to win victories, will gladly pay the small price of a ritualistic
verbal spanking. The practice of this court--recalling the bitter tear shed by
the Walrus as he ate the oysters--breeds a deplorably cynical attitude
towards the jUdiciary (footnote omitted).

Id., 477 U.S. at 205-206 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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J. TRIAL COUNSEL LABORED UNDER MULTIPLE AND VARIED
CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS THAT ADVERSELY AFFECTED THEIR'
PERFORMANCE.
1. Trial Counsels' Competing Obligations To Attend To Other Cases

Created A Conflict
Performance.

Of Interest

Adversely

Affecting

Counsels'

Petitioner's conflict claim summarized as follows: trial counsel had a duty not to
zealously represent all clients. That duty creates an inherent conflict for counsel if their
caseload does not permit enough time for adequate preparation. Something has got to
give, and that, in Petitioner's case, was effective representation.
It is common knowledge that public defenders carry heavy caseloads. See Bell v.

Quintero, 125 S.Ct. 2240 (2005) (noting the "shuffle of a heavy caseload" carried by
public defenders). The American Bar Association has described the problems associated
with excessive caseloads.
One of the most significant impediments to the furnishing of quality
defense services for the poor is the presence of excessive workloads ....
All too often in defender organizations[,]... attorneys are asked to
provide representation in too many cases .... Unfortunately, not even the
most able and industrious lawyers can provide quality representation when
their workloads are unmanageable. Excessive workloads, moreover, lead
to attorney frustration, disillusionment by clients, and weakening of the
adversary system.
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 6.1 (citations, footnotes, and quotations
omitted).
While Petitioner is still investigating this claim, he is aware that one of his trial
lawyers, D.C. Carr, has recently left the Ada County Public Defender's Office. Petitioner
has reason to believe that heavy caseloads influenced Mr. Carr's decision to leave the
office and enter private practice. Along these lines, Petitioner notes that there were times
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during the underlying criminal proceedings that Mr. Carr was not present, presumably
attending to his other cases. 26 Further, one ofthe lead attorneys at the Ada County Public
Defender's Office, August Cahill, has previously testified that an attorney's caseload in
that office is not decreased if the attorney is assigned a capital case. Mr. Cahill also
conceded that he was not familiar with the ABA Guidelines governing workload. State v.
Michael Jauhola, Ada County case no. SPOT0100492D, (Tr., p. 4083, L. 22 - p. 4085, L.
14); see also ABA Guidelines, Guidelines 6.1, 10.3, and accompanying Commentary.

Petitioner cannot fully state this claim due to the trial team's failure to adequately
cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case. Further, Petitioner is still awaiting a hearing
and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006. Nevertheless, Petitioner
asserts that trial counsels' duty to attend their other cases adversely affected their
perfonnance in his case.

2. Norma Jean Oliver

Trial counsel had the duty to investigate or reinvestigate the Nonna Jean Oliver
rape charges, in order to rebut the State's evidence purporting to show propensity.
However, Amil Myshin represented Petitioner on the charges initiated by Ms. Oliver, and
thus worked under a conflict of interest in reinvestigating that case because an adequate
reinvestigation would have shown ineffective assistance in the previous case.
Petitioner has reasonable grounds to believe that counsel's investigation on the
original 1991 rape case was severely deficient.

The extent to which Mr. Myshin's

conflict of interest adversely affected his perfonnance is also being investigated. Review

26

(y

vee e.g., (Tr., p. 3682, L. 24 - p. 3683, L. 2.)
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of the requested records is a necessary part of current counsels' investigation. Further,
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still awaiting a hearing and ruling on his
Motion For Discovery, filed January 5,2006.
3. April Sebastian
April Sebastian testified against Petitioner at his sentencing. At the time of her
testimony, she was actively represented by Petitioner's trial counsel, Amil Myshin, in her
upcoming "rider" hearing in the case of State of Idaho v. April Sebastian, Ada County
case no. H0400228. (Tr., pp. 4868-70; pp. 4875-96.) At the time of her testimony, Ms.
Sebastian also had another active case, State of Idaho v. April Sebastian, Ada County
case no. H0400335//M0401584. Mr. Myshin cross-examined Ms. Sebastian without ever
receiving a waiver from her of confidential matters, including information learned
through the attorney/client relationship or through Mr. Myshin's investigation and
research on her behalf.
Following her testimony, Ms. Sebastian appeared for her "rider" hearing with her
counsel, Amil Myshin (Exhibit 18.). The district court presiding over the case granted
her probation with recommendation from the State. The extent to which Ms. Sebastian's
cooperation with the State assisted her in getting probation is being investigated.
Petitioner has reasonable grounds to believe that the State offered Ms. Sebastian
benefits in her other cases in exchange for her testimony against Petitioner. For instance,
based on a review of court documents, Ms. Sebastian was not a good candidate for
probation, appearing to have failed on probation twice previously (Exhibit 19, Exhibit
20.)

The extent to which Mr. Myshin's conflict of interest adversely affected his

performance is also being investigated. Review of the requested records is a necessary
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part of current counsels' investigation. Further, Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as
he is still awaiting a hearing and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5,
2006.

4. Christian Johnson
Petitioner believes that either of his trial counsel, or other members of the Ada
County Public Defender's Office represented Christian Johnson. Petitioner is still
investigating this claim and reserves the right to withdraw it upon completion of his
reinvestigation of the case.
K DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
FAILURE TO REQUEST PRETRIAL EVIDENTIARY HEARING FOR
THE PRESENTATION OF FACTS ALLEGED IN SUPPORT OF THE
NOTICED AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Trial counsel should have requested a pretrial evidentiary hearing for the State's
evidence in support ofthe noticed aggravating circumstances. The purpose ofthe hearing
would have been three-fold: (1) to provide notice to the defense so that they could
adequately prepare for sentencing; (2) to ensure that the evidence was reliable; and (3) to
ensure that the facts offered in support of the aggravating circumstances existed by a
preponderance of the evidence; and (4) that the noticed aggravating circumstances were
based on independent evidence. Trial counsel should have relied on grounds for the
motion including the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
L. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
CASELOAD.

Petitioner incorporates by reference his arguments under Claim L.1. Petitioner
asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to decline
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assignment of additional cases, or in the alternative, by failing to remove themselves
from Petitioner's case due to excessive caseloads. Petitioner asserts these failures
constitute deficient performance.
To demonstrate prejudice, Petitioner asserts that prejudice should be presumed in
that his counsels' obligations to other clients effectively denied him counsel. United

States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). Alternatively, applying the Strickland standard,
Petitioner asserts that but for counsels' deficient performance, there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim due to the trial team's failure to adequately
cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case. Further, Petitioner is still awaiting a hearing
and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006. Nevertheless, Petitioner
asserts that trial counsels' duty to attend their other cases adversely affected their
performance in his case.
M. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
FAILURE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.
Trial counsel were ineffective in (a) failing to claim a Miranda violation during
Petitioner's interrogations, and (b) failing to move to suppress the third interrogation on
the basis that Petitioner had already been formally charged and his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel had attached by the time of interrogation.
Petitioner has not had the opportunity to review the interrogations, reports,
pleadings, and transcripts relevant to this claim and reserves the right to either expound
or withdraw this claim after further investigation.

In addition, Petitioner requires

additional materials, requested in his discovery motion, in order to precisely state the
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deficient perfonnance and prejudice--namely enhanced videotapes and the videotapes as
played to the jury.
With regard to (c), Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches the
moment fonnal judicial proceedings have been initiated. Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964). The right is triggered when judicial proceedings are initiated against the
accused, "whether by way of fonnal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
infonnation, or arraignment." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977). Once the
right attaches, the state, including the police and their agents, may not interefere with the
accused's right to counsel. Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 2398-2399 (1990).
The fonnal complaint was filed against Petitioner in the Henneman case at 3:50
p.m. on April 1, 2003. (Exhibit 21.) The April 1st interrogation with Detectives Allen
and Mace did not take place until 5 p.m. (Tr., p. 4177, L. 23

p. 4178, L.21). Thus, the

interrogation violated Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Trial counsel were
ineffective under the Strickland standard in failing to move to suppress statements
obtained from Petitioner in this interrogation.
N. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
FAILURE TO MOVE FOR CHANGE OF VENUE, OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, FAILING TO MOVE TO HAVE A JURY FROM
ANOTHER COUNTY IMPANELED.
Criminal defendants are entitled to a trial before an unbiased jury. This right is
guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, Article I, Sections 7 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution, Idaho Code §§ 191902, -2019, and -2020, and Idaho Criminal Rule 24(b). "The bias or prejudice of even a
single juror is enough to violate that guarantee." United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d
1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000).
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The Supreme Court has long held that where a criminal case receives excessive
publicity, the defendant's rights to an unbiased jury and, consequently, a fair trial, may be
violated if the trial court does not take prophylactic measures, such as changing venue to
a place less saturated by publicity, to insulate the insulate the jury's decision-making
process from the outside influences of the pUblicity. See, e.g., Marshall v. United States,
360 U.S. 310 (1959) (remanding case for a new trial where seven jurors had been
exposed to news accounts containing information which was not presented at trial); Irvin
v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (vacating the conviction of a prisoner sentenced to death
based on the saturation of the jury pool with pretrial publicity and the fact that eight out
of twelve jurors came into the trial with a preconceived opinion that the defendant was
guilty); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (holding that the trial court had erred in
denying the defendant's motion for a change of venue where the media, prior to trial, had
broadcast a taped confession of the defendant); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333
(1966) (holding that the defendant's right to a fair trial was violated due to circus-like
media involvement); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (reversing defendant's
conviction because the media had broadcast the defendant's pretrial hearing).
Notwithstanding the fact that the United States Supreme Court has held that a
defendant's right to a fair trial can be violated without a particularized showing of
prejudice, see Rideau, 373 U.S. 723,27 Idaho's appellate courts sometimes adhere to the
view that in order to prevail on a claim related to pretrial publicity, the defendant must

The dissent took issue with this aspect of the Rideau decision, complaining that the
majority opinion, which had failed to "establish[ ] any substantial nexus between the
televised 'interview' and the defendant's trial, which occurred almost two months later,"
was not faithful to precedent. Rideau, 373 at 1420-23.
27
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affirmatively demonstrate prejudice, i.e., that his own jury was biased.

28

See, e.g., State

v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 687-88, 85 P.3d 656, 663-64 (2004); State v. Fee, 124 Idaho
170,175,857 P.2d 649, 654 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766, 769 & n.l,
710 P.2d 1202, 1205 & n.1 (1985). However, they do not always do so. In State v. Hall,
111 Idaho 827, 727 P.2d 1255 (Ct. App. 1986), the Court of Appeals noted that:
a defendant's inability to make a detailed and conclusive showing of
prejudice is not a proper ground for refusing to change venue. Prejudice
seldom can be established or disproved with certainty. Rather, it is
sufficient for the accused to show "a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial
news [coverage] prior to trial will prevent a fair trial." Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 ....

Hall, 111 Idaho at 829, 727 P.2d at 1257, (emphasis and alteration in original). See also
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 278, 77 P.3d 956, 967 (2003) (adopting the "reasonable
likelihood" standard set forth in Hall). Regardless of whether a showing of prejudice is a
strict requirement though, the Idaho courts have said that there are certain basic factors
that should be considered on appeal in evaluating the question of whether pretrial
publicity had necessitated a change of venue below: (1) the nature and content of the
pre-trial publicity; (2) the amount of time elapsed between the pretrial pUblicity and the
trial (and sentencing); (3) whether there is evidence, e.g., affidavits, indicating prejudice,
or a lack thereof, in the community where the defendant is to be tried; (4) voir dire
testimony by actual jurors indicating whether or not they had pre-formed opinions as to

In this regard, the Idaho courts often do not distinguish between motions to change
venue based on pretrial publicity and other claims involving biased jurors. Petitioner
respectfully contends that, to the extent that the Idaho courts fail to recognize pretrial
publicity cases as different, the Idaho courts are in error. Petitioner contends that Rideau
recognized that these cases are a unique subset of "unfair triallbiased juror" cases in that
the defendant is not required to prove prejUdice and move to strike individual jurors for
cause.
28
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the defendant's guilt or innocence; and (5) whether the defendant moved to strike any of
the jurors for cause. Hall, 111 Idaho at 830, 727 P.2d at 1258.
In the present case, the nature and volume of pretrial publicity that the case

received should have caused trial counsel to investigate and weigh a motion to change
venue. This would have required counsel to obtain and analyze the articles and television
and radio broadcasts that had saturated Ada County, and either conduct a poll or obtain
affidavits evidencing the level of bias that existed in Ada County. In addition, counsel
should have filed a motion to change venue and, if that motion had been denied,
developed a record that would have allowed Petitioner to challenge that denial on direct
appeal. This would have required counsel to question potential jurors during voir dire as
to the amount, and nature, of the pretrial publicity to which they had been exposed, as
well as their preconceived opinions as to Petitioner's guilt, and it would have required
counsel to move to strike apparently biased jurors for cause and to exercise peremptory
strikes against those apparently biased jurors for whom for-cause challenges had been
unsuccessful.
1. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Obtain And Analyze Copies

Of The Articles And Television And Radio Broadcasts That Had
Saturated Ada County.
Had trial counsel engaged in an adequate investigation and analysis, they would
have discovered that both quantity and the nature of the publicity in this case, and in the
other crimes for which Petitioner has been charged, rendered it impossible to find an
impartial jury composed of Petitioner's peers.
The first flurry of news coverage resulted from Lynn Henneman's disappearance.
That news coverage, stretching from September 26, 2000, through November 10, 2000,
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which included near-daily stories

III

The Idaho Statesman,29 as well as extensive

.. news coverage, 30·IS detm'1 ed, III
. part, b e1ow: 31
te1eVlslOn

•

September 26, 2000. One day after she was reported missing, the Statesman
reported Ms. Henneman's disappearance in the banner headline of its "Local"
section. Patrick Orr, Woman missing since Sunday, police say, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Sept. 26, 2000, at IB. The article detailed the highly visible
efforts to find Ms. Henneman: a dive temn, Life Flight flying over the Boise
river, and Idaho Mountain Search and Rescue temn. Id. It also included a
picture of Ms. Henneman. Id.

•

September 28, 2000. The Statesman's front-page banner headline was that
some of Ms. Henneman's personal effects had been found. Patrick Orr, Boy
finds missing woman's purse, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 28, 2000, at lA, 12A.
That article indicated that after the effects had been discovered, police
engaged in a throrough search of the immediate vicinity-in full view of the

29 The Statesman, headquartered in Boise, and claiming Ada and Canyon Counties as its
primary markets, see The Idaho Statesman (visited Apr.
14, 2006)
<http://custserv.idahostatesman.comiCustSvc/advertising_services/adv-pdfs/marketprofile12005BoiseMSASnapshot.pdf>, is, by far, the most widely circulated Idaho
newspaper.
The Idaho Newspaper Association reports the Statesman's circulation as
68,060 copies.
See Idaho Newspaper Association (visited Apr. 12, 2006)
In comparison, the next most widely
<http:///www.idahopapers.comlmap.html>.
circulated Idaho newspaper is the Post Register, at only 26,551 copies. See Idaho
Newspaper Association (visited Apr. 12, 2006) http:///www.idahopapers.comlmap.html

It is interesting to note that undersigned counsel has searched for, but has been
unable to locate any articles regarding Ms. Henneman's disappearance and death, or
Petitioner, in either the Coeur D'Alene Press or the Idaho State Journal, two of the major
newspapers in north Idaho and east Idaho, respectively. See Idaho Newspaper
Association (visited Apr. 12, 2006) <http:///www.idahopapers.comlmap.html>. Thus, the
chances of prejudice attributable to pretrial publicity in this case could have been cut
drastically by transferring venue to a court in north or east Idaho.
30 In response to Petitioner's requests for information, only one of four local network
affiliates voluntarily provided Petitioner with materials related to its coverage of Ms.
Henneman's disappearance and death, Ms. Hanlon's death, and the Petitioner. Copies of
those materials are provided on the DVDs and corresponding transcripts marked as
Exhibit 22 and provided herewith. The other three network affiliates have refused to
cooperate with Petitioner and, thus, this claim cannot be fully developed unless or until
this Court allows Petitioner to obtain issue subpoenas.

All of the articles from the Statesman are marked as Exhibit 23 and are provided
herewith.
31
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public. Id. at 12A. One witness to the search commented that she knew the
search had to do with Ms. Henneman "because they kept it so hush-hush." Id.
(quoting a local resident). In discussing Ms. Henneman's disappearance
generally, the article also indicated that "[t]he news media has really hit the
airwaves hard with her picture .... " Id. at 12A (quoting the spokeswoman for
the Garden City Detective Unit). It also indicated that the publicity was
apparently working as detectives had already received fifty different tips. Id.
Finally, the article again included a picture of Ms. Henneman. Id.
•

September 29, 2000. Another banner headline about Ms. Henneman's
disappearance appeared in the "Local" section of the Statesman. Patrick Orr,
Henneman may have gone to comedy club, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 29,
2000, at IB. That article revealed that the publicity campaign had led to the
police receiving some 34 more tips in only 24 hours. See id. It also included
Ms. Henneman's picture. Id.

•

September 30, 2000. The Statesman ran a front-page story revealing that a
$20,000 reward was being offered for information leading to the arrest and
conviction of anyone involved in Ms. Henneman's disappearance. Emily
Simnitt & Patrick Orr, $20,000 reward offered, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 30,
2000, at lA, 7A. That article also reported that a "tearful" press conference
had been given by Ms. Henneman's family:
[F]amily members aid Henneman
rarely showed anger.

IS

a friendly person who

"I miss Lynn," [Micki] Husienga [Ms. Henneman's mother]
said. "She was the mediator between Mark and Laura
(Henneman's brother and sister). I want my daughter back.
Please try to help just a little bit more."
Henneman's older brother, Mark Husienga, described her as
someone who would naturally strike up a conversation with
anyone. "I don't know if I've ever seen her angry," he said.
Mark Husienga also said he hoped the reward would keep up
the momentum of support the family has already received from
the community.
Micki Husienga said when she went to pick up Mark Husienga
and his wife, Diane, from the airport, several people hugged
her and expressed their support.
Id. at 7A. The article also included a very moving photo of at least five
members of Ms. Henneman's family holding each other during that press
conference; it included a second emotional picture of Ms. Henneman's
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husband obviously breaking down, with his hands covering his face, it
included yet another picture of Ms. Henneman. Id. at lA, 7A.
With regard to the community's support of Ms. Henneman's family, the
article indicated that Boise residents had been passing out missing person
fliers, and it urged all Boise residents and businesses to tum on their lights on
Sunday, October 1,2000, as a show of support for the family. See id. at lA,
7A.
•

October 1,2000. For the fourth day in a row, the Statesman reported on Ms.
Henneman's disappearance, but only to say that no new leads had developed.
No leads develop in hunt for woman, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 1,2000, at Bl.
It also reiterated the Statesman's plea that anyone with any information about
Ms. Henneman's disappearance come forward. Id.

•

October 4, 2000. In an article prominently displayed on the first page of its
"Local" section, the Statesman reported that Ada County residents were
feeling uneasy about using the "Crown Jewel" of their community, the Boise
River Greenbelt, in light of Ms. Henneman's disappearance: "Henneman's
recent disappearance has many shaken up. 'Seeing those pictures [the missing
person fliers] everywhere is haunting. It really makes you apprehensive .... I
didn't really start worrying about it until this last incident. '" Patrick Orr,
Greenbelt incidents make users nervous, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 4, 200, at
lB, SB (quoting a local resident). In discussing the public's unease, the article
highlighted two previous rape-killings on the Greenbelt in recent years-that
of Kay Lynn Jackson in 1998, and that of Samantha Maher earlier in 2000.
Id. at SB. But, at the same time, it included a large photo of a bicycle police
patrol, id. at IB, and included numerous reassurances from officers that the
Greenbelt is actually relatively safe, id. at lB, SB.

•

October 8, 2000. The banner headline on the cover of the Statesman indicated
that Lynn Henneman's body had apparently been found. Jeff McKinni &
Patrick Orr, Body Found in Boise River, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 8,2000, at
lA, 9A. This article included a timeline and an annotated map of the
Greenbelt and downtown Boise, showing, among other things, where Ms.
Henneman had last been seen and where her body was recovered; two photos
of officers, apparently at the scene of the body recovery; and yet another
photo of Ms. Henneman. Id. at lA, 9A.

•

October 9, 2000. The day after reporting her body apparently found by a
fisherman, the Statesman reported, in another front-page banner headline, that
Ms. Henneman's body had been positively identified. Patrick Orr, Coroner
confirms body's identity, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 9, 2000, at lA, 9A. That
article quoted the Ada County Coroner, Erwin Sonnenberg, as asserting
unequivocally: "It was definitely a homicide. There were no gun wounds or
stab wounds, but there are other findings we can't release right now that
indicate it was a homicide." Id. at lA (quoting Mr. Sonnenberg). The article
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also discussed the high-profile "massive search," which had included boats,
divers, search-and-rescue dogs, and helicopters, that had failed to uncover Ms.
Henneman's body. Id. Finally, the article included yet another picture of Ms.
Henneman. Id. at IA.
•

October 10, 2000. For the third day in a row, the Statesman carried a frontpage banner headline about Ms. Henneman. Patrick Orr, Searchers find items
from slain woman, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 10,2000, at lA, 8A. The article
reported that additional items belonging to Ms. Henneman had been found:
"Right now, we are not disclosing what those items are, but there are some
things we know are hers, Boise Police Spokesman Jim Tibbs said at the scene
Monday. "We need to look at all the evidence before we can release that
information." Id. (quoting police spokesman). It also included an annotated
Greenbelt/downtown map, two large photos of police officers' evidence
recovery efforts, and another photo of Ms. Henneman. Id. at lA, 8A.

•

October 11, 2000. In another front-page banner headline, the Statesman
again, for the second time in eight day, addressed the public's safety concerns
in light of Ms. Henneman's disappearance and apparent murder. Patrick Orr,
Boise to step up Greenbelt security, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 11,2000, at lA,
7A. The article quoted then-police chief Don Pierce as saying: "I think first
and foremost it was a traumatic event for this community. The Greenbelt is
one of our most prized possessions, and when something like this happens, it
is like someone steals one of our possessions." Id. at IA.
In a separate article, carrying its own banner headline, and appearing on the
first page of the Statesman's "Local" section, it was reported that the Ada
County Coroner was expected to reveal the cause of Ms. Henneman's death
later that day. Patrick Orr, Cause of woman's death expected today, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Oct. 11, 2000, at IB, 6B. It went on to repeat the earlierreported "knowledge" that certain items found in or near the Boise River over
previous days "definitely" belonged to Ms. Henneman. Id. at IB. The article
included another photo of Ms. Henneman. Id. at IB. It also reported that Ms.
Henneman's family had expressed gratitude to the citizens of Boise for all
their support, but were also "fearful for the citizens of Boise, because there is
a killer on the loose." Id. at IB, 6B (quoting a Boise lawyer who had been in
contact with the family).

•

October 12, 2000. In its fifth Henneman-related front-page banner-headlined
article in a row, and again including a picture of Ms. Henneman, the
Statesman reported that, although the Ada County Coroner would not publicly
reveal his opinion as to the cause of Ms. Hennman's death, he had "ruled out
stabbing, shooting, and blunt head trauma," and another newspaper had
reported that she was "probably strangled" to death. Patrick Orr, NY.
newspaper: Henneman was 'probably strangled,' IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 12,
200, at lA, 6A. The article went on to report that police had said that they
were withholding the exact cause of death for tactical reasons:
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Sonnenberg said not releasing the infonnation could be a
helpful tactic in detennining whether any leads are true or in
questioning potential suspects, though they have none.
"It helps if leads come in on infonnation that has not been

released," he said. "There are some things the people don't
know but a perpetrator does know."

Boise Police Spokesman Lt. Jim Tibbs said Wednesday
releasing infonnation about the evidence could be detrimental
to the investigation.
"At the initial stage of this investigation, especially in a
case this unique, so little infonnation is available that you do
not publicize everything you have found," he said.
Not publicizing sensitive infonnation can help detectives
when they are interviewing potential suspects, Tibbs said.
"Again, you have to think down the road instead of
running to the media," he said.
ld. at lA, 6A. In addition, the article noted that the reward for infonnation
about Ms. Henneman's death had been increased to $30,000 with the
anonymous $10,000 contribution ofa local businessman. ld. at 6A.
In the "Local" section of the Statesman, Ms. Henneman's obituary appeared.
Obituaries, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 12,2000, at 7B. That obituary indicated
that Ms. Henneman had "become a part of the community" during the
previous two weeks, it asked that the "residents of the Treasure Valley" pray
for the Henneman family, and it urged "the residents of the Treasure Valley"
to attend a public memorial service to be held on October 19,2000. ld. The
obituary also included another picture of Ms. Henneman. Id.

•

October 13,2000. For the sixth day in a row, the Statesman reported on the
Henneman's, but only to say that no new no infonnation had been released by
the police. No new info released in Henneman case, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct.
13, 2000, at Bl. That article indicated that police had, by then received in
excess of300 tips from members ofthe community. ld.

•

October 20, 2000. [Officer tells women to trust instincts, stay safe]32

32 In some instances, Petitioner has provided the Court with only a date and an article
title. In such instances, Petitioner knows that an article, believed to support his claims,
was published, but he has not yet been able to obtain a copy of that article. For the most
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October 23, 2000. In a front-page banner headline, the Statesman again
discussed the community's safety concerns regarding the Greenbelt in light of
Ms. Henneman's death. Emily Sirnnitt, Police to rethink Greenbelt safety
after attack, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 23, 2000, at lA, 7A. That article
reported on an apparent attempted attack on a 20-year old woman which
garnered a "heightened [police] response [which] was due in part to a partially
implemented plan to beef up security around the Greenbelt after Henneman
was slain near the pathway on about Sept. 24." Id. at IA. Despite the
overwhelming police response, the article indicated that members of the
public were still greatly disturbed:
"It's outrageous (that) as women, we can't go out
walking any place after dark," said Sue Fellen, whose office is
near the Greenbelt.
"The city is paying attention, but
obviously, it's not doing enough. They need to take this
seriously. "
"We need to send the message to bad people: 'Don't
corne to our town because there are consequences to pay. '"

For Bryana Deits, the stronger officer presence and better
lighting discussed by police and the parks department can't
corne soon enough. Deits, who moved to Boise three weeks
ago from Seattle, says she's more scared here. On Sunday
afternoon, Deits carefully chose a spot in the open and close to
busy Broadway Avenue in which to picnic.

Id. at 7A. The article went on to detail measures that were being taken to
enhance Greenbelt security, including stepping up bike, horse, and motorcycle
patrols, increasing lighting, adding telephones, and moving transients out of
the area (even though police acknowledged that transients have as much of a
right to use the park system as do other residents, and that they had no reason
to believe that transients had been involved in the most recent attack). Id.
•

October 27, 2000. In a banner headline on the front page of its "Local"
section, the Statesman reported a new lead in the Henneman case. Emily
Simnitt, Taskforce investigates Henneman lead, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 27,

part, undersigned counsel represents that articles have not been obtained due to technical
difficulties with the Idaho Statesman's website and a lack of cooperation from Idaho
Statesman staff. Petitioner believes that, given sufficient time and discovery, he will be
able to obtain the missing articles, and that all of the articles, taken together, will
demonstrate that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to adequately
develop some form of a "motion for change of venue or, in the alternative, motion to
have a jury from another county impaneled," and for failing to file the same.
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2000, at 1B. That article indicated that Ms. Henneman was seen talking to
someone on the Greenbelt shortly before she diappeared, but it also reported
that the police still refused to disclose the cause of her death, and whether she
had been sexually assaulted, for tactical reasons: "'Hypotehtically, let's say
she was sexually assaulted,' Boise Det. Dave Smith said. 'If we put that out,
the killer knows we know and might leave the area. '" Id. It also included Ms.
Henneman's picture again, as well as another plea from help from the
community, promising a $42,500 reward for information leading to an arrest
and conviction. Id.
•

November 10,2000. [Henneman task force loses members.]

This summary of the early news coverage of the Henneman case makes a number
of things clear: (1) not only was the media spreading information about the Henneman
case through traditional channels, but police, Ms. Henneman's family, and concerned
members of the community were actively reaching out to everyone in the communitynot just news readers/watchers-through pleas for information and missing person
posters; (2) the net result of these combined efforts was that Ms. Helmeman's death was
thrust to the forefront of Boise's consciousness virtually every day for over a month; (3)
Ms. Henneman's disappearance and death were deeply emotional, not only for her
family, whose personal suffering was shared with the entire community, but also for the
community as whole, many of whom were able to empathize with the family's personal
loss; (4) Ms. Henneman's disappearance and death, which had come relatively soon after
two prior rape/murders on the Greenbelt, was a terrifying event not only for those Ada
county residents who regularly used the Greenbelt, but for all members of the local
community who perceived the Greenbelt to be a symbol of everything that is great about
the Treasure Valley; and (5) the police were completely in control of the information that
was disseminated to the public through the various media outlets, such that where police
suspicions were presented, they were given as fact, and where the police suspicions were
in doubt, they were presented as being withheld for tactical reasons. In the aggregate,
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this coverage virtually guaranteed that all of Ada County's residents would have strong
feelings about whoever might eventually be charged with harming Ms. Henneman. They
felt deep and pain and fear, and they had been led to believe that everything the police
said was fact.
After November 2000, although the specifics of the Henneman case were no
longer reported on a near-daily basis, the case never strayed far from people's minds.
Throughout 2001 and 2002, the major media outlets occasionally reported on the fact that
no progress had been made in the Henneman case, but were actually more likely to report
on the related issue of the public's safety concerns regarding the Greenbelt
•

April 4, 2001. [City to light Greenbelt tunnels]

•

April 26, 2001. [Ada residents still worry about Greenbelt safety]

•

June 10,2001. [Guardians of the Greenbelt]

•

August 20,2001. [Group seeks to light Greenbelt]

•

September 25,2001. [Clues still sought in Henneman case]

•

October 20, 2001. [Boise adds to Greenbelt trail security]

•

November 19,2002. [Police chief tries to allay CIU fears]

•

April 11, 2002. [Boiseans to gather on birthday of flight attendant slain in
2000]

•

April 13,2002. [Boiseans show their support for slain woman's family]

•

June 19, 2002. [Boise council awards bid to light up the Greenbelt]

•

September 24, 2002. [Murders, other crimes prompt Boise Police to increase
Greenbelt safety] [2 years later, detectives still search for killer]

It is undersigned counsels belief that these articles demonstrate that, although
months had passed since the discovery of Ms. Henneman's body, the residents of Ada
County had not forgotten either: their deep sense of hurt over Ms. Henneman and her
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family's suffering; or their new-found fear that their beloved Greenbelt was no longer a
safe place to recreate.
On March 1, 2002, anther tragic event greatly impacted the Henneman
investigation and, ultimately, Petitioner's prospects of getting a fair trial in the Henneman
case: Cheryl Ann Hanlon was found dead in the Boise foothills. That event led to more
saturation-style media coverage, and eventually led to Petitioner being labeled a "killer"
in the public's eye.
•

March 2, 2003. In a front-page banner-headlined article, the Statesman
reported that Cheryl Ann Hanlon had been found dead on a North End
hillside, the victim of an apparent ligature strangulation. Chereen Langrill,
Woman found strangled on North End hillside, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 2,
2003,2003, at 1, 8. The article contained a small map of the North End, twp
photos of the body recovery scene, a photo of Ms. Hanlon, and pleas for
citizens to help the police by calling in all potential tips. Id. at 8.

•

March 3, 2003. In a banner-headlined article on the first page of the
Statesman's "Local" section, the paper provided a sketch and a physical
description of a man supposedly seen with Ms. Hanlon shortly before she
turned up dead. Jonathon Brunt, Sketch of man released by police, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Mar. 3,2003, at 1, 7. The article also included another picture of
Ms. Hanlon, another map of the North End, another plea for help from the
community, and a photo of Ms. Hanlon's truck. Id. at 1, 7. Finally, the
article, intimated that Ms. Hanlon's apparent murder might be related to one
or more of the numerous other unsolved Boise murders, including those of
Kay Lynn Jackson and Lynn Henneman. Id. at 1, 7.

•

March 4, 2003. In another banner-headlined article on the first page of the
Statesman's "Local" section, the paper reported again on Ms. Hanlon's
apparent murder, providing another picture of her, another composite sketch
and physical description of the man she was supposedly seen with, and
another plea for information from the community. Jonathon Brunt, Police
follOWing up tips in killing, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 4, 2003, at 1, 3. The
article also included a number of safety tips for area residents. Id. at 3.

•

March 5, 2003. On the first page of its "Local" section, the Statesman
reported that Ms. Hanlon had leisurely strolled into the foothills alone, had
stopped at some point, had struggled with her assailant, and then had been
dragged downhill to the place where her body was ultimately found. Chereen
Langrill, Police: Murder victim walked into foothills, IDAHO STATESMAN,
Mar. 5,2003, at 1, 3. That version of events, apparently derived from police
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measurements of footprints at the scene, was presented by the police (through
the Statesman) as fact. See id. at 1. The article also provided another picture
of Ms. Hanlon, another composite sketch and physical description of the man
she was supposedly seen with, and another plea for information from the
community. Id. at 1, 3.
•

March 15,2003. On its front page, the Statesman reported that Petitioner had
been charged with the murder of Ms. Hanlon. Patrick Orr, Transient charged
in Hanlon death, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar.15, 2003, at 1, 11. That article
prominently referred to Petitioner as a "transient," which was the same
negative label that had been used to describe the homeless people who were
assumed to present safety challenges on the Greenbelt after Ms. Henneman's
death. See Police to rethink Greenbelt safety after attack, IDAHO STATESMAN,
Oct. 23, 2000, at lA, 7A. It also offered a side-by-side comparison of the
composite sketch of the individual supposedly last seen with Ms. Hanlon, to
Petitioner's unflattering mug shot. Patrick Orr, Transient charged in Hanlon
death,
IDAHO
STATESMAN,
Mar. 15,
2003,
at
1.
It also made it appear that the police had, without doubt, found their man:
"The city of Boise can breathe a sigh of relief that Eric
Hall is off the streets," Boise Police Chief Don Pierce said
Friday morning.
Pierce said Hall admitted to detectives late Thursday that
he killed Hanlon, 42, in the foothills near 5th and Alturas
streets in the early morning hours of March 1.

Piece also said detectives had amassed a significant
amount of physical evidence tying Hall to the sexual assault
and murder but declined to specify the evidence.
Investigators believe Hall sexually assaulted Hanlon and
strangled her to death, then tried to conceal her body in a
shallow hole by covering her with grass and tree branches,
Pierce said.
Detectives say Hall then took Hanlon's car, eventually
abandoning it near 13th and Franklin streets.
Id. at 1, 11. The article then went on to detail what it called Petitioner's
"extensive" criminal history, highlighting his conviction for statutory rape
after having been accused of sexually assaulting and choking a 17-year old
girl, and his subsequent charge of failure to register as a sex offender. Id. at
11. It also indicated that Petitioner had been implicated based on tips from the
public: "'This is a very good example of how we rely on our community to
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help us,' Pierce said, praising the more than 100 people who came forward

with tips on the case." Id. at 11. Finally, the article included yet another
picture of Ms. Hanlon, as well as a photograph of Boise Police Chief Don
Pierce. Id. at 1, 11.
In a separate article, the Statesman reported that a DNA sample taken from
Petitioner would be sent out-of-state for analysis. Chereen Langrill, DNA
tests in slaying may be delayed, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 15,2003, at Local
11.

•

March 18, 2003. On the front page of its "Local" section, the Statesman ran
an article reiterating many of the inflammatory content of its March 15 article.
Patrick Orr, Suspect in Hanlon killing faces hearing on March 28, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Mar. 18,2003, at Local 1. It included Petitioner's unflattering
mugshot; it reported that prosecutors claimed he "used a belt to strangle
Hanlon," as if that allegation had already been established as fact; it asserted
that Petitioner had admitted to killing Ms. Hanlon; it stated that police had
categorized Petitioner as a "transient"; it implied that Petitioner may have
raped and killed either Kay Lynn Jackson or Lynn Henneman; and it detailed
his criminal history, highlighting the unproven allegation that he had raped,
bound, and choked a 17year old girl. Id.

•

March 29, 2003. [Murder suspect also charged with rape]

The intense media coverage surrounding Ms. Hanlon's death, while at first
playing to the community's fear for the safety of its young women and, perhaps, outrage
for having to be concerned with such matters, later offered the community an expedient
path to peace of mind: get rid of Erick Hall. The media coverage, driven by police
statements, portrayed Petitioner as a "transient" sexual deviant, with a penchant for
strangulation during rape, who has lived a life of crime. Thus, it dehumanized him.
Furthermore, it portrayed his guilt in the Hanlon case as having been already established,
and it implied that Petitioner may be guilty of other unsolved murders in Boise. And,
even if he is not guilty of other crimes, it implied that Petitioner was certainly guilty of
something and, therefore, should be removed from society: "The city of Boise can
breathe a sigh of relief that Eric Hall is off the streets .... "

Patrick Orr, Transient

charged in Hanlon death, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar.15, 2003, at 1 (quoting the Boise
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Police Chief).

Thus, it also made him a lightening rod for all of the community's

frustration about its crime problems.
On April 2, 2003, based on the DNA sample obtained from Petitioner in relation
to the Hanlon case, the State accused Petitioner of raping and murdering Lynn
Henneman.

As detailed below, that charge only served to heighten the prejudicial

reporting on Petitioner.
•

April 3,2003. In a prominent article on its front page, the Statesman reported
that Petitioner had been charged with Ms. Henneman's murder. Patrick Orr,
Suspect charged in Henneman murder, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 3,2003, at 1,
6. That article included a sub-headline reading "DNA test shows Eric [sic]
Hall killed flight attendant in 2000, Boise police say," which appeared next to
the unflattering mugshot of Petitioner. Id. The article then went to great
length to report that in police officers' minds, trial would be nothing more
than technicality because Petitioner had already been "proven" guilty beyond
all doubt:
Boise police say DNA evidence links the same man to
two brutal rape/murders, providing a major break in a 2~-year
old murder case that changed the way Boise residents view
safety on the Greenbelt.

Lead Detective Dave Smith and others in the department
took the case personally, Pierce said ....

Two and a half years later, Pierce said, Boise is a safer
place with the Henneman murder finally solved.
"Today, we know the man who killed her, Eric [sic]
Virgil Hall, is behind bars," Pierce said Wednesday during a
news conference. "Weare 100 percent certain we have our
man."

Id. at 1, 6. After all of that, however, "Pierce declined further comment,
saying he wants to ensure Hall gets a fair trial." Id. at 6. Detective Smith,
however, picked up right where Chief Pierce had left off. According to the
Statesman, Detective Smith claimed that the "details at the Hanlon crime
scene ... immediately brought to mind the Henneman case.... 'Right at the
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(scene), we had strong feelings there might be a match here,' Smith said.,,33
Id. at 6 (alteration in original).
The Statesman's lead article on April 3, 2003 also tugged at the public'
heartstrings. It was topped by a large picture of Ms. Henneman's relatives, at
taken at the previous day's City Hall news conference announcing that
Petitioner had been charged, showing them overcome with emotion. Id. at 1.
Later, it had a large photo of Ms. Henneman's husband and sister hugging at
the conclusion of the press conference. Id. at 6. The article said that during
the news conference, Ms. Henneman's parents and sister stood behind Chief
Pierce, "at times holding each other for support," while Ms. Henneman's
husband stood quietly to the side. Id. It then quoted Ms. Henneman's
husband, Walter Us, as being just as convinced of Petitioner's guilt as Chief
Pierce and Detective Smith were, and printed his request that 'justice" be
done: '" I am sad another person had to die to catch this killer, but I am glad he
is behind bars and will have to face justice," Us said. Lynn deserves justice.
All we can do is pray and hope for the best and pray justice is carried out. '"
Id. at 1,6 (quoting Ms. Henneman's husband).
Finally, it is worth noting that the article touched on the psychological effects
of Ms. Henneman's disappearance and death on the Boise community. It
noted that "Henneman's disappearance as she walked along the river to her
hotel frightened city residents and led to several safety improvements on
Boise's Greenbelt." Id. at 1, 6. It made it clear that Ms. Henneman's
disappearance and death had changed the way many Boiseans viewed their
community: See id. at 6.
In its April 3, 2003 edition, the Statesman devoted a full page (besides the
front-page coverage) to Petitioner's alleged crimes. At the top of the page
was an article detailing Ms. Henneman's family's two and a half year ordeal.
Patrick Orr, Henneman's family has mixed feelings about arrest, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Apr. 3, 2003, at 6. In that article, it was noted that Petitioner's

33 It should be noted that Detective Smith's claim on or about April 3, 2003, which was
reiterated by the Statesman on AprilS, 2003 and April 24, 2003, Jonathon Brunt,
Henneman suspect fell through cracks of DNA testing, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 5, 2003,
at 8; Patrick Orr, Suspect to plead in rape, killing of woman, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 24,
2003, at Local 6, is directly at-odds with statements made by Chief Pierce a few weeks
earlier. See Patrick Orr, Transient charged in Hanlon death, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 15,
2003, at 1 ("Pierce said a DNA sample has been taken from Hall and will be compared
against DNA evidence from other major unsolved crimes in Boise, likely including the
Lynn Henneman and the Kay Lynn Jackson rape/murderer cases in 2000 and 1998 and
last year's serial rape attacks in the Winstead Park area. However, he said, there is no
suspected link to those cases at this point."); Patrick Orr, Suspect in Hanlon killing faces
hearing on March 28, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 18,2003, at Local 1 (same). Thus, one
has to wonder whether Detective Smith's statement is true or whether, p'erhaps, his
recollection was altered by the DNA testing results.
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arrest had "eased the minds" of the family, and had given them "some relief."
Interestingly, the article appeared with a large photo of a tough- and
serious-looking Detective Smith posing next to an American flag. Id. In the
article, Ms. Henneman's family and Chief Pierce heaped praise upon
Detective Smith, portraying him as a tireless advocate of justice:

Id.

"This guy is just fantastic," Micki Husienga said,
pointing at Smith.

"For the last two and a half years, Micki has been calling
and saying 'Dave, I love you, and I have been praying for you'
... " Smith said ....
Smith said he took the case personally, working on the
case at least a week--chasing every lead, re-examining old
clues, scouring the Internet for similar cases and getting DNA
samples from people of interest while working on his regular
caseload.
"These are the kinds of cases where good detectives
become intimately, personally involved in the case," Chief Don
Pierce said.
Id. at 6.
Also in the April 3, 2003 edition of the Statesman was an article largely
vilifying Petitioner. See Jonathon Brunt, Suspect in two slayings has lengthy
criminal record, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 3,2003, at 6. In that article, which
contained a second copy of Petitioner's unflattering mugshot, Petitioner's
prior criminal history was detailed, with particular attention paid to the fact
that he had been on probation for "assaulting a different woman when one of
the victims [Ms. Hanlon] was killed .... " Id. However, the article did finally
reveal some information that did not come directly from the police: it quoted a
friend as saying that Petitioner had cried and asserted his innocence, and that
he is actually a kind and gentle young man. Id.
•

April 4, 2003. The Statesman reported that Petitioner had been arraigned in
the Henneman case. Patrick Orr, Suspect arraigned on rape, murder charges,
IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 4, 2003, at Local 1. The article then went on to offer
the police department's version of the facts without question: "he [Petitioner]
eventually confessed to [the Hanlon murder]"; and "[a] DNA sample taken
from Hall linked him with the two murders .... " Id. The article then went on
to quote a friend of Petitioner's who, despite her faith in him, had already
been persuaded by the State's evidence which had been reported in the media,
and her misperception of the strength of that evidence:
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[Jillian] Stone said she first met Hall during the summer
of 2000 at Julia Davis Park. "He was like a father figure to me,
so the first time I heard about this, I didn't believe it-there
was no way he could have done it. But DNA doesn't lie."
She added: "Now I think, 'What if that was me?'"
Id.

•

April 5,2003. The Statesman, in a front-page article that provided yet another
copy of Petitioner's unflattering mugshot, as well as much more flattering
photos of his two alleged victims, reported that despite Petitioner's criminal
record, the State did not have a sample of Petitioner's DNA on-hand when it
started investigating the Henneman and Hanlon murders because he had been
released from prison before Idaho's DNA sampling law went into effect.
Jonathon Brunt, Henneman suspect fell through cracks ofDNA testing, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Apr. 5,2003, at 1, 8. The clear implication of this article is that
if the DNA sampling law had gone into effect sooner, then Petitioner would
have been apprehended sooner and Ms. Hanlon might never have been killed.
See id. However, this implication pre-supposes the accuracy of the DNA
testing and interpretation, and Petitioner's guilt.

•

April 14, 2003. Lest there have been any confusion about whether the
Statesman had prematurely adjudged Petitioner guilty in its April 5, 2003
article, the newspaper made its position clear in an April 14, 2003 editorial:
It's outrageous to think that Eric [sic] Virgil Hall, now
accused of killing two women in Boise, could sit in prison for
seven years without submitting to a DNA test. But it's
downright scary to think that other violent criminals may have
slipped by the DNA database because of lack of administrative
follow-up.
Editorial, DNA testing is a must, preferably at booking, IDAHO STATESMAN,
Apr. 14, 2003, at Local 8. Thus, the newspaper labeled Petitioner a violent
criminal and, by arguing that his alleged crimes had "slipped by the DNA
database," it presupposed that he is actually guilty of those crimes. It then
went on to argue that DNA matches are indisputable by quoting then-Ada
County Sheriff, Vaughn Killeen: '''DNA determines guilt or innocence,'
Killeen said. 'It's more reliable than eyewitness accounts. If I were falsely
accused of a crime, I'd want to have the DNA testing. ,,, Id. It should be
noted that the Statesman's editorial also featured Petitioner's unflattering
mugshot.

•

April 24, 2003. On the front-page of its "Local" section, the Statesman
reported that Petitioner had been arraigned in the Henneman case. Patrick
Orr, Suspect to plead in rape, killing of woman, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 24,
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2003, at Local I, 6. In that article, the Statesman, which referred to Petitioner
not as "the man" or "the person," but rather "the transient" accused of killing
Ms. Henneman, reiterated: the details of Ms. Henneman's disappearance and
death; the fact that Petitioner stood accused of killing not only Ms. Henneman,
but also Ms. Hanlon; the allegation that Petitioner had confessed to killing Ms.
Hanlon; the allegation that "[a] DNA sample taken from Hall after his arrest
in the Hanlon killing linked him with the Henneman killing"; and Detective
Smith's questionable claim that the Hanlon crime scene immediately brought
the Henneman case to mind because it appeared to involve a similar modus
operandi. Id. at 1, 6. In addition, the article indicated that, in discussing
supposedly secret grand jury proceedings, the Ada County Prosecutor had
selectively leaked information which he obviously felt would help his chances
of convicting Petitioner: the fact that multiple out-of-state experts had testified
"that DNA taken from murder suspect Eric [sic] Hall matched DNA taken
from victim Lynn Henneman." Id. at 6.
•

May 6,2003. [Greenbelt patrols spring into action]

•

May 8, 2003. [Execution sought in Henneman slaying]

•

May 20, 2003. [Plea in Henneman case delayed]

•

May 22, 2003. In an article on the front-page of the "Local" section, the
Statesman reported that Petitioner had been indicted in the Hanlon case.
Patrick Orr, Hall indicted in Hanlon murder, rape case, IDAHO STATESMAN,
May 22, 2003, at Local 1. The article contained cursory summaries of both
cases and highlighted what the police/Statesman saw as the damning
evidence: Petitioner's "extensive" criminal record; a DNA sample which
"linked him to the Henneman killing"; and the questionable claim that the
Hanlon crime scene bore such similarities to the Henneman case that that
crime scene immediately brought the Henneman case to mind for
investigators. Id. It should be noted that this article also once again
showcased the unflattering mugshot of Petitioner, and a smiling picture of Ms.
Hanlon. Id.

•

May 29,2003. [Recent rash of murders strains police, prosecutors]

•

June 7, 2003. [Not guilty pleas entered in two Ada County murder cases]

As the above news reports make clear, after Petitioner had been charged with Ms.
Henneman's death, the police began to use the press to begin conditioning the community
to internalizing the themes that it would later develop during voir dire and, ultimately, at
trial. The press portrayed Detective Smith, the lead investigator on the Henneman case,
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as being a indefatigable proponent of justice: a tough, hardworking cop on the outside,
but a caring man on the inside whose only flaw is sometimes he take the pursuit of
"justice" too personally. See generally, e.g., Patrick Orr, Henneman's family has mixed
feelings about arrest, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 3,2003, at 6. At the same time, the press

reported that the officers involved in the Henneman case, whose integrity and
professionalism had already been bolstered, could personally vouch for the "fact" of
Petitioner's guilt. See, e.g., Patrick Orr, Suspect charged in Henneman murder, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Apr. 3,2003, at 6 ("We are 100 percent certain we have our man.") (quoting
Police Chief Pierce). At the same time, the press characterized the police department's
evidence as being virtually incontrovertible. First, it treated the police department's
characterization of the DNA evidence as being the unquestionable truth.

Second, it

adopted Detective Smith's after-the-fact and highly suspect contention that once he saw
the Hanlon crime scene, it immediately brought the Henneman case to mind because of
an allegedly similar modus operandi. Third, it portrayed Petitioner as evil: it included a
sinister-looking mugshot with every article; it adopted the police department's
dehumanizing label of "transient"; and it highlighted what it repeatedly called
Petitioner's "extensive" criminal record at every tum while, at the same time, trying to
draw analogies between the pending rape/murder charges and his prior statutory rape
conviction and assault charge. Indeed, if there is any doubt about the degree to which the
police had shaped the public's preconceptions about the case through their use of the
media, one need tum no further than the statements given to the Statesman by Jillian
Stone. Ms. Stone was a friend of Petitioner's who, at one time, had trusted him so much
that she though of him as a father-figure. But even Ms. Stone was quickly convinced of

AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF

114
;

002G8

Petitioner's guilt and the infallibility of the State's DNA evidence-not by evidence
adduced at trial or by a jury's verdict, but by the pretrial media publicity (as driven by the
statements of the police): "[T]he first time I heard about this, I didn't believe it-there
was no way he could have done it. But DNA doesn't lie. Now I think, 'What ifthat was
me?'" Patrick Orr, Suspect arraigned on rape, murder charges, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr.
4,2003, at Local! (quoting Ms.Stone).
Any time the press shows the police and, in particular, the lead investigator on a
case, such adoration, treating the individual officers as saviors of the community, and
also presents the State's evidence as categorically true, while at the same time denigrating
the defendant and treating him as sub-human, there is always going to be a risk that the
public will develop a tremendous prejudice against the defendant. However, that risk
was heightened in this case because the messages offered to the public by the press were
the very types of messages that the public so wanted to embrace. In this case, the public
was so deeply saddened, angered, and terrified by the circumstances of Ms. Henneman
and Ms. Hanlon's deaths, that it must have been comforting to hear-and to believethat the cause of all the suffering had been removed from society and, therefore, that the
streets of Boise were once again safe.

See, e.g., Patrick Orr, Suspect charged in

Henneman murder, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 3, 2003, at 1 ("Today, we know the man

who killed her, Eric [sic] Virgil Hall, is behind bars.") (quoting Chief Pierce).
While the intensity of the news coverage surrounding the Hanlon and Henneman
cases certainly diminished after Petitioner was indicted in those cases, it did not go away.
Consequently, neither case strayed far from the public consciousness. As detailed below,
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from the winter of 2003 to the start of the Henneman trial in the fall of 2004, both cases
continued to be the subject of publicity.
•

November 30,2003. On the front page of its "Local" section, the Statesman
reported that the $42,500 reward that had been offered for information leading
to an arrest and conviction in the Henneman case would not be given to
anyone because the case was "solved" by police work, not a tip. Patrick Orr,
Reward won't be given for solving homicide, IDAHO STATESMAN, Nov. 30,
2004, at Local 1, 5. In that article, besides proclaiming Petitioner's guilt in
the Henneman case by referring to it as having been "solved," the newspaper
reiterated a number of its previous prejudicial statements. It continued to refer
to Petitioner as "Boise transient"; it made it clear that Petitioner stood accused
of two crimes which the police now claimed involved a similar modus
operandi; and it repeated the police department's assertion that "[t]he DNA
samples matched Hall with both Hanlon and Henneman." Id.

•

January 17, 2004. [Trial put off in Henneman slaying]

•

January 24,2004. [October trial set in slaying ofLynn Henneman]

•

February 10, 2004. [Bill would require more criminals to have DNA test]

•

February 23,2004. [Greenbelt seems safer-and stats say it is]

•

February 24,2004. [City is investing wisely in keeping Greenbelt safe]

•

February 26, 2004. [Volunteers free up Garden City police for more time on
street]

•

March 24, 2004. On the front page of its "Local" section, the Statesman
reported that during the previous afternoon another young woman had turned
up dead near the Boise Greenbelt. Kathleen Kreller & Patrick Orr, Passer-by
discovers body of woman in Boise pond, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 24,2004, at
Local 1. Later, this woman was identified as Amanda Stroud, an individual
who was listed as a potential State's witness in the Henneman case.

•

March 25, 2004. On the front page of its "Local" section, the Statesman
reported that the dead body found two days earlier near the Greenbelt was that
of Amanda Stroud. Patrick Orr, Police seek clues to where woman was living,
Idaho Statesman, Mar.25, 2004, at Local 1, 3. It further reported that the
cause of her death was unknown. Id.

•

March 27,2004. [Dead woman linked to murder suspect]

•

April 3, 2004. [Toxicology results pending in woman's death]
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•

April 22, 2004. [Tests fail to show how woman, 21, died]

•

September 22,2004. [Courthouse to host 2 big trials]

The above media coverage, while certainly not as intense as it had been at
previous times, undoubtedly kept the Hanlon and Henneman cases on the public's
collective mind. Moreover, since the coverage had been so persistent for so long (it was
just about four years between Ms. Henneman's disappearance and Petitioner's trial), the
State's message, as reported through the media, had no doubt become ingrained in
people's thinking about the cases. Indeed, as the Idaho Court of Appeals has already
recognized: "When prospective jurors are incessantly exposed to news stories selectively
packaged for mass consumption, they may become subtly conditioned to accept a certain
version of facts at trial. Such repetitive exposure may diminish the jurors' ability to
separate information absorbed before trial from information during trial." State v. Hall,
111 Idaho 827, 830, 727 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Ct. App. 1986) (discussed favorably in State v.
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 278, 77 P.3d 956, 967 (2003)). This danger seems especially

insidious in cases such as this one--where some, but not a great deal, of time has passed
between the most frenzied media coverage and the actual trial. In this case, enough time
has passed (approximately a year and half between the time that the police, amid great
pomp and circumstance, announced that they had collared "their man," and the time that
Petitioner was actually tried) for potential jurors to forget the details of what they had
heard and seen in the news, such that their biases would not have been readily articulable
during jury selection, but an insufficient amount of time had passed for those potential
jurors to have forgotten their much more subtle biases about the police, the evidence, and
the defendant.
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In light of both the quantity and the quality of the pretrial pUblicity in this case,

trial counsel should have, at the very least, thoroughly investigated and considered the
issue of whether it was possible for Petitioner to receive a fair trial before an unbiased
jury in Ada County. ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.7 ("Counsel should
maintain copies of media reports about the case for various purposes, including to support
a motion for change of venue, if appropriate, to assist in the voir dire of the jury
regarding the effects of pretrial pUblicity, to monitor the public statements of potential
witnesses, and to facilitate the work of counsel who might be involved in later stages of
the case.")

Moreover, because even a cursory review of the pretrial pUblicity that

occurred in this case reveals that there was "a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news
coverage prevented a fair trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution," State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956, 967 (2003), and, thus, a
change of venue would likely have been granted, counsel should have done more than
simply investigate; counsel should have fully developed and litigated a motion for a
change of venue.
2. Trial Counsels' Failure To Poll The Community And/Or Obtain
Affidavits Demonstrating A Community Bias Against Petitioner.
Although the sheer volume and prejudicial nature of the pretrial publicity in this
case was sufficient to warrant a change of venue, see, e.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
723 (1963), counsel was, nevertheless, required to do more than rely on the publicity
itself; counsel was required to develop a thorough motion to change venue, highlighting
all possible grounds for that motion to be granted. See ABA Guidelines, Commentary to
Guideline 10.8 ("Whether raising an issue specific to a capital case (such as requesting
individual, sequestered voir dire on death-qualification of the jury) or a more common

AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

118

motion shaped by the capital aspect of the case (such as requesting a change of venue
because of publicity), counsel should be sure to litigate all of the possible legal and
factual bases for the request. This will increase the likelihood that the request will be
granted and will also fully preserve the issue for post-conviction review in the event the
claim is denied."). That means that counsel had an obligation to obtain evidence that the
community was, in fact, biased against Petitioner. See Hall, 111 Idaho at 830, 727 P.2d
at 1258 ("Among the factors considered [when reviewing a judge's denial of a motion to
change venue] are the existence of affidavits indicating prejudice, or lack of prejudice, in
the community where the defendant was tried .... ") Thus, in this case, trial counsel
should have made some effort to document, in a systematic and reliable way, the bias of
the community, i.e., the jury pool.
In the present case, every indication is that trial counsel made no effort

whatsoever to document, in a systematic and reliable way, the bias of the community.34
Because such an effort would likely have revealed an overwhelming bias against
Petitioner, and because such bias would likely have led to a motion for change of venue
being granted, Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective.

3. Trial Counsels' Failure To File A Motion To Change Venue Or, In The
Alternative, To Have A Jury From Another County Impaneled.
Because no motion for change of venue was filed, this Court was never given the
opportunity to review the significant amount of damaging media coverage regarding this
case and Petitioner generally.

As discussed above, such a motion would have been

extremely compelling, and would have been likely to succeed based solely upon the

34 Because trial counsel has refused to disclose their notes or to otherwise cooperate with
post-conviction counsel, this claim cannot be fully developed until such time as Petitioner
is allowed to engage in discovery.
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prejudicial media coverage. However, it would have been more thorough, and would
have had a better chance to succeed if supported by evidence-such as affidavits or a
poll-quantifying the level of actual bias against Petitioner. Either way though, trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to file any motion to change venue.

4. Trial Counsels' Failure To Develop An Adequate Record For Appeal By
Failing To Adequately Question Potential Jurors During Voir Dire As To
The Amount, And Nature, Of The Pretrial Publicity To Which They Had
Been Exposed.
As discussed above, the Idaho courts have been incorrect when they have said that
in order to obtain a change of venue based upon unfair pretrial publicity the defendant
must show that he was actually prejudiced by inclusion of a juror, specifically proven to
be biased, on his jury. See, e.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). Nevertheless,
there can be no doubt that inclusion of a juror, specifically shown to be biased, warrants
vacation of the defendant's conviction. United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1111
(9th Cir. 2000). Thus, in this case, trial counsel should have thoroughly examined all of
the prospective jurors regarding the extent to which they had been exposed to, and
influenced by, pretrial publicity-whether to make a record to appeal a denial of a motion
for change of venue (had one been filed) or to ferret out instances of actual bias. See
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.8 ("Whether raising an issue specific to a
capital case (such as requesting individual, sequestered voir dire on death-qualification of
the jury) or a more common motion shaped by the capital aspect of the case (such as
requesting a change of venue because of publicity), counsel should be sure to litigate all
of the possible legal and factual bases for the request. This will increase the likelihood
that the request will be granted and will also fully preserve the issue for post-conviction
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review in the event the claim is denied."). However, as set forth in detail below, trial
counsel utterly failed to do SO.35
Linda Ostolasa (Juror No. 6)
Ms. Ostalasa, and the rest of a mini-panel of six prospective jurors, was asked by
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. I, p.850, Ls.2224.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.850, L.25.) Later, in response to a question from the prosecutor, Ms. Ostalasa indicated
that she had seen "the media" before. (Tr. Vol. I, p.1060, Ls.17-I8.) But it is not clear
whether the prosecutor was talking about a news program or fictional television
programming when he asked that question. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.1060, Ls.5-23.)

Either

way, it is obvious that these questions, which were the only questions that could have
gone anywhere toward delving into the question of whether Ms. Ostolasa had come into
contact with any of the extensive pretrial pUblicity in this case, or had formed some type
of opinions about the case based on that publicity, were not well-crafted for that purpose.
Thus, trial counsel should have followed up with questions of their own. However, they
did not. They did not ask a single question about pretrial pUblicity, or Ms. Ostolasa's
pre-conceptions about the case, before passing her for cause. (See generally Tr. Vol. I,
p.1067, L.I8 -p.1083, L.5.)
Betty Clark Mitchell (Juror No. 51)
Ms. Clark Mitchell, and the rest of a mini-panel of six prospective jurors, was
asked by the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion
Undersigned counsel is not aware of the extent to which the juror questionnaires
inquired into matters of pretrial publicity since Petitioner has not yet received them.
35
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that the defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II,
p.1766, Ls.lO-12.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affinnatively.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.1766, L.B.)
The prosecutor asked Ms. Clark Mitchell if she was a Greenbelt user, and Ms.
Clark Mitchell answered affmnatively. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1829, L.IS - p.1830, L.3.) Later,
the prosecutor asked Ms. Clark Mitchell if she remembered the details of the Henneman
case and whether she was a television news watcher, and Ms. Clark Mitchell answered
affinnatively again-to both questions. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1831, Ls.9-18.) Thereafter, the
prosecutor tried to elicit testimony along the lines of "but that's all I can remember about
the case," but Ms. Clark Mitchell kept coming up with additional details that she could
recall-she volunteered that she remembered that Ms. Henneman's body was not found
for some time, that Ms. Henneman's disappearance and death "was a huge story," that
she was exposed to the details of the Henneman case through newspapers and television
news, and that Petitioner was finally "caught" and arrested. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.1831, L.9
-p.1832, L.1O.)
Despite the fact that Ms. Clark Mitchell had said that she was a Greenbelt user,
that she had been exposed to the extensive (prejudicial) news coverage about the
Henneman case, and that she remembered that Petitioner had been "caught," trial counsel
never asked any worthwhile follow-up questions about the pUblicity issue. (See generally
Tr. Vol. II, p.1832, L.21 - p.1849, L.16.) Instead, counsel asked cursorily whether Ms.
Clark Mitchell could recall Petitioner's background or the circumstances of his being
charged and, when she said no to both questions, counsel tried to essentially rehabilitate
her by asking, in a leading fashion, whether, when she said Petitioner had been "caught,"
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she meant to imply that she believed he was guilty. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1833, Ls.2-16.) Ms.
Clark Mitchell answered this last question with a "no." (Tr. Vol. II, p.1833, Ls.ll-16.)
Ultimately, trial counsel passed Ms. Clark Mitchell for cause. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1849, L.16.)
An effective voir dire would have entailed deeper, more probing, questions about

what Ms. Clark Mitchell knew about: the Henneman case, including the highly emotional
fact of her disappearance on the Greenbelt and the spectacle that was made of her
family's suffering; the Hanlon case and the allegations of a similar modus operandi
between the two cases; and the media's repeated assertions of Petitioner's guilt.

Elisabeth Keeney (Juror No. 62)
Ms. Keeney, and the rest of a mini-panel of six prospective jurors, was asked by
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, p.1985,
Ls.17-19.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr.
Vol. I, p.1985, L.20.)
The prosecutor asked Ms. Keeney what she remembered about the Henneman
case, and Ms. Keeney testified that she could recall little. (Tr. Vol.

n, p.2074, L.20 -

p.2076, L.5.) The only follow-up to this line of questioning on the part of trial counsel
was to ask whether Ms. Keeney had followed recent articles in the newspaper regarding
capital juries in general.

(Tr. Vol.

n, p.2103, L.22 - p.2104,

LA.)

Ms. Keeney

responded negatively, indicating that she does not like the Statesman, and that was it.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.2104, Ls.5-16.)
Again, an effective voir dire would have entailed deeper, more probing, questions
about what Ms. Keeney knew about: the Henneman case, including the highly emotional
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fact of her disappearance on the Greenbelt and the spectacle that was made of her
family's suffering; the Hanlon case and the allegations of a similar modus operandi
between the two cases; and the media's repeated assertions of Petitioner's guilt.

Tammie Johnson (Juror No. 63)

Ms. Johnson, and the rest of a mini-panel of six prospective jurors, was asked by
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, p.l985,
Ls.17-19.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr.
Vol. I, p.1985, L.20.)
The prosecutor asked Ms. Johnson if she could remember anything specific about
the Henneman case. (Tr. Vol. II, p.1211, L.24 -p.2112, L.2.) As Ms. Johnson answered
that question, first saying that she could not remember any specifics, but then beginning
to recite those details that she did remember, the prosecutor cut her off "[t]hat suits us
just fine." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2112, Ls.3-6.) At that point, Ms. Johnson, probably feeling that
her knowledge of the case actually wasn't important, stated simply: "Just from the paper,
you know." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2112, L.7.)
Trial counsel did not ask a single follow-up question about Ms. Johnson's
exposure to pretrial publicity, or any pre-conceived opinions that she may have
developed based on that publicity, before passing her for cause. (See generally Tr. Vol.
II, p.2121, L.22 - p.2136, L.22.) Again, an effective voir dire would have entailed deep,
probing, questions about what Ms. Johnson knew about: the Henneman case, including
the highly emotional fact of her disappearance on the Greenbelt and the spectacle that
was made of her family's suffering; the Hanlon case and the allegations of a similar
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modus operandi between the two cases; and the media's repeated assertions of

Petitioner's guilt.
John Jasper (Juror No. 65)

Mr. Jasper, and the rest of a mini-panel of six prospective jurors, was asked by the

Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, p.1985,
Ls.17 -19.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr.
Vol. II, p.1985, L.20.) .
The prosecutor asked Mr. Jasper ifhe and his family used the Greenbelt, and Mr.
Jasper explained that they had done so on a regular basis. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2146, Ls.12-16.)
However, he did not follow up with any questions about whether this case had alarmed
Mr. Jasper, or even whether he knew anything about this case going into it.

(See

generally Tr. Vol. II, p.2140, L.3 - p.2149, L.2.)

Even though Mr. Jasper had indicated that he and his family had used the Boise
Greenbelt and, therefore, he was a prime candidate for having been influenced by the
media's coverage of the Henneman case, trial counsel never questioned him further about
his feelings about the Greenbelt or about this case. (See generally Tr. Vol. II, p.2149, L.5
- p.2169, L.22.) Nor did counsel question him about pretrial publicity at all. (See
generally Tr. Vol. II, p.2149, L.5 -p.2169, L.22.)
Omar Alloway (Juror No. 68)

Mr. Alloway, and the rest of a mini-panel of four prospective jurors, was asked by

the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2177, L.24
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- p.2178, L.l.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr.
Vol. II, p.2178, L.2.)
Neither the prosecutor nor trial counsel ever asked Mr. Alloway a single question
about the quantity and nature of the pretrial pUblicity to which he had been exposed, or
whether such publicity could have caused him to form preconceptions about this case.
(See generally Tr. Vol. II, p.2227, L.9 - p.2238, L.22 (prosecution's voir dire); p.2239,

L.l-p.2268, L.2 (defense's voir dire).)
Ann McNeese (Juror No. 83)
Ms. McNeese, and the rest of a mini-panel of four prospective jurors, was asked
by the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that
the defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2441,
Ls.1O-12.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr.
Vol. II, p.2441 , L.13.)
In response to the prosecutor's questions, Ms. McNeese admitted that she

remembered, based on television and newspapers, that this case is "the case about the
woman that was the flight attendant .... It's just that the case on the Grrenbelt, she was
found murdered." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2491, Ls.2-12.) Ms. McNeese indicated, however, that
she did not know how Petitioner came to be charged in the case. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2491,
Ls.lS-17.) Later, Ms. McNeese told the prosecutor that her strong pro-death penalty
views were formed, at least in part, based on her knowledge of criminal cases as reported
in the newspaper and on television. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2497, L.16 -p.2498, L.lS.)
After all of that, trial counsel failed to follow up in any meaningful way. Counsel
did ask if she had ever talked about the Henneman case with her husband (who happens
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to be a Deputy Attorney General) and, eventually, after twice denying that she had done
so, Ms. McNeese grudgingly admitted that they may have discussed the case "in passing"
because "[i]t's odd to have murder cases in Boise." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2511, L.5 - p.2512,
L.l.) However, trial counsel never sought to find out the details of what Ms. McNeese
may have known about the Henneman case, what she may have discussed with her
husbands, and what opinions, preconceptions, or biases she may have formed.

(See

generally Tr. Vol. II, p.2507, L.12 - p.2534, LA.)

Later, trial counsel asked Ms. McNeese about other high-profile criminal cases,
such as those of Scott Peterson and O.J. Simpson. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2515, L.23 - p.2517,
L.l6.) In response to counsel's questions, Ms. McNeese indicated that she had formed
opinions as to both defendants' guilt based on what she had heard through the media and,
with regard to the Scott Peterson case, which was ongoing at that time, she had adjudged
the defendant guilty at "day one." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2515, L.23 - p.2517, L.16.) Yet, trial
counsel never tried to relate these questions back to the Henneman case by asking why, if
she was interested in the Peterson and Simpson cases out of southern California, she was
not interested in a high-profile case right here at home.

(See generally Tr. Vol. II,

p.2507, L.12 - p.2534, LA.) Nor did counsel ever question her ability to remain neutral
and unpersuaded by the pretrial pUblicity where she readily admitted that she had formed
steadfast opinions as to defendants' guilt based on pretrial pUblicity in the past. (See
generally Tr. Vol. II, p.2507, L.12 - p.2534, LA.)

Joann Frances Brown (Juror No. 85)

Ms. Brown, and the rest of a mini-panel of four prospective jurors, was asked by
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the
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defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2441,
Ls.lO-12.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr.
Vol. II, p.2441 , L.13.)
The prosecutor asked Ms. Brown what she could recall about the Hennemen case
from what she had read in the newspaper. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2562, Ls.17-19.) Ms. Brown
indicated that she remembered that a flight attendant had gone missing and that Ms.
Henneman's name had "hooked" her, but that Petitioner's name did not, and that she
could not recall the circumstances of his being charged in this case. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2562,
L.20 - p.2563, L.ll.) However, trial counsel never followed up with these responses in
any way. (See generally Tr. Vol. II, p.2567, L.20 - p.2594, L.17.) Counsel never sought
to ferret out the specific details of what she had read and seen, never sought to jog her
memory about individual news stories, and never sought to determine whether she had
formed any preconceptions about the case.
Lori Ann Green (Juror No. 89)
Ms. Green, and the rest of a mini-panel of five prospective jurors, was asked by
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2607, Ls.911.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.2607, Ls.12-13.)
The prosecutor asked Ms. Green what she knew about the Henneman case going
into it. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2693, Ls.5-6.) Ms. Green responded by saying that she did not
"know a whole lot." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2693, Ls.7; 10-11.) She indicated that she read about
Ms. Henneman's disappearance and death, but was not aware that a suspect had been
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found. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2693, Ls.7-11; p.2693, L.21 - p.2694, LA.) She further indicated
that she did not know anything about the defendant or how he came to be implicated in
the Henneman case. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2693, Ls.15-20.)
Trial counsel, once again, failed to adequately follow up on the pUblicity issue.
The only question counsel presented to Ms. Green was in leading fonn: "I understand
from what you said before, you haven't been following this case particularly closely?"
(Tr. Vol. II, p.2713, Ls.19-2l.) Not surprisingly, Ms. Green responded in the negative.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.2713, L.22.) Thus, counsel once again utterly failed to ferret out the
specific details of what this juror had read and seen, never sought to jog her memory
about individual news stories, and never sought to detennine whether she had fonned any
preconceptions about the case.
Luke Anson Call (Juror No. 102)
Mr. Call, and the rest of a mini-panel of four prospective jurors, was asked by the
Court whether any of them had "fonned or expressed an unqualified opinion that the
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2836,
Ls.21-23.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affinnatively. (Tr.
Vol. II, p.2836, L.24.)
In response to the prosecutor's questions, Mr. Call indicated that he gets his local

news on the Statesman's website. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2858, L.25 - p.2859, L.ll.) However,
the prosecutor never asked whether Mr. Call had read anything about this case on that
website or had, in any other way, obtained any infonnation about this case.

(See

generally Tr. Vol. IT, p.2847, L.17 - p.2869, LA.)
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Although trial counsel followed up on the publicity, counsel did so in a cursory
and wholly inadequate way. Counsel asked Mr. Call whether he remembered anything
reading about this case, and Mr. Call responded affinnatively. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2869, L.24
- p.2870, L.3.) Counsel then asked if Mr. Call remembered reading anything about the
case other than that infonnation which was contained in the juror questionnaire, and Mr.
Call responded negatively. (Tr. Vol. II, p.2870, Ls.4-9.) Finally, counsel asked if Mr.
Call knew anything about Petitioner, and Mr. Call again responded negatively. (Tr. Vol.
II, p.2870, Ls.I0-ll.) Without ferreting out the specific details of what this juror had
read and seen, without jogging his memory as to what he had been exposed to, and
without seeking to detennine whether he had fonned any preconceptions about the case,
counsel moved on to other topics and, ultimately, passed Mr. Call for cause.

(See

generally Tr. Vol. II, p.2870, L.12 - p.2892, L.15.)

James Kennedy (Juror No. 110)
Mr. Kennedy, and the rest of a mini-panel of eight prospective jurors, was asked
by the Court whether any of them had "fonned or expressed an unqualified opinion that
the defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, p.2951, ,
Ls.6-8.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affinnatively. (Tr. Vol.
II, p.2951 , Ls.8-9.)
The prosecutor asked Mr. Kennedy simply: "And it looks like you have heard that
the -Lynn Henneman's body was-well, she disappeared and then her body was found.
Have you heard much beyond that? (Tr. Vol. II, p.3021, Ls.18-21.) In response, Mr.
Kennedy said no, he works a lot and does not have time to watch much television. (Tr.
Vol. II, p.3021 , Ls.22-24.)

At that point, the prosecutor positively reinforced Mr.
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Kennedy's downplaying of his knowledge of the case, explaining: "That suits us fine ....
The less you know before you walk in here the easier it is for you to make decisions."
(Tr. Vol. II, p.3021 , L.25 - p.3022, L.4.)
Trial counsel did follow up on the pretrial pUblicity issue, but not in a meaningful
way. Counsel started by mischaracterizing and downplaying Mr. Kennedy's knowledge
of the case: "you say that you haven't heard anything about this case?"

(Tr. Vol. II,

p.3069, L.24 - p.3070, L.l.) Mr. Kennedy clarified the facts, while at the same time
apparently taking the cue of both attorneys: "Not very much. Heard a little bit, yeah."
(Tr. Vol. II, p.3070, L.2.) At that point, the follow-up question from counsel was a
leading query confirming that Mr. Kennedy had not heard how Petitioner came to be
implicated in the case, again conveying a subtle message that counsel really did not want
to hear what Mr. Kennedy knew about the case. (Tr. Vol. II, p.3070, L.3-4.) Moreover,
when Mr. Kennedy's answer indicated that he did not understand the question ("Mr.
Hall's what-the defendant.

Yeah, we read the charges and stuff."), counsel almost

immediately abandoned the inquiry and passed Mr. Kennedy for cause. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.3070, Ls.3-8.) Thus, not only did counsel generally fail to ask relevant questions, but
the few questions that counsel did ask were terrible because they were not calculated to
determine what Mr. Kennedy had actually heard or what preconceptions Mr. Kennedy
might actually have and, in fact, conveyed to Mr. Kennedy that the "correct" response
was to say "no, I don't know anything about the case."

Diane Proctor (Juror No. 111)
Ms. Proctor, and the rest of a mini-panel of eight prospective jurors, was asked by
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the
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defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr. Vol. II, p.29S1, Ls.68.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affinnatively. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.29S1, Ls.8-9.)
The prosecutor asked Ms. Proctor about the fact that she knew Dave Smith, the
lead detective in the Henneman case. (Tr. Vol. II, p.307S, Ls.2-12.) However, he never
asked Ms. Proctor if she had seen the extremely favorable media coverage of Mr. Smith
during the pendency of the Henneman case. (See generally Tr. Vol. II, p.3073, L.23 p.3086, L.S.) In fact, he never asked if Ms. Proctor had seen any pretrial coverage of the
case. (See generally Tr. Vol. II, p.3073, L.23 - p.3086, L.S.)
Again, trial counsel utterly failed to follow up in a productive manner. Counsel
again raised the issue of pretrial publicity with a leading question conveying the message
that the "correct" was to say "no, I know nothing about this case:" "You have indicated
you know something about this case, and I don't know that you know anything other than
what we've already told you. But do you know anything about?" (Tr. Vol. II, p.3086,
Ls.l7-21.) Not surprisingly, Ms. Proctor parroted back many of the same words used by
counsel in his leading question: "I know nothing about it, other than what's been reported
in the Statesman early on." (Tr. Vol. II, p.3086, Ls.22-23.) At that point, counsel
confinned that Ms. Proctor believed that her memory of the case was constrained to Ms.
Henneman's disappearance and death in the 2000 timeframe, not Petitioner's becoming a
suspect in the 2003 timeframe, and was content to move on to other matters. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.3086, L.24 - p.3087, L.S.) Counsel never sought to investigate the issue of whether
Ms. Proctor had been traumatized by the event or preconditioned to look favorably upon
the State's evidence; counsel was concerned only with the issue of whether she knew that
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Petitioner stood accused of murder in the Hanlon case as well, but did not even examine
that issue carefully.
5. Trial Counsel Failed To Develop An Adequate Record For Appeal By
Failing To Question Potential Jurors During Voir Dire As To Their
Preconceived Opinions As To Petitioner's Guilt And The Sentence That
He Should Receive.
See Claim N.4, supra
6. Trial Counsel Failed To Develop An Adequate Record For Appeal By
Failing To Move To Strike Biased Jurors For Cause.
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim because he is still conducting his
reinvestigation of the case, as well as awaiting receipt of the jury questionnaires,
discovery, cooperation from trial counsel, and permission from the Court to contact the
Jurors.
7. Trial Counsel Failed To Develop An Adequate Record For Appeal By
Failing To Exercise Peremptory Strikes To Remove Jurors Who Had
Admitted That Pretrial Publicity Had Caused Them To Be Biased
Against Petitioner, But Who Were Not Removed For Cause.
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim because he is still conducting his
reinvestigation of the case, as well as awaiting receipt of the jury questionnaires,
discovery, cooperation from trial counsel, and permission from the Court to contact the
Jurors.
O. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
FAILURE TO PRECLUDE AND OBJECT TO TESTIMONY.
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Object To, Or Otherwise Preclude, Opinion Evidence Of Dr. Glen
Groben Not Based Upon A Reasonable Degree Of Medical Probability,
And Their Failure To Move For A Mistrial When Dr. Groben Testified
Before The Juror Inconsistently With An Opinion Relayed During His
Voir Dire Outside The Presence Of The Jury.
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To be admissible, an expert's opinion must be based on a reasonable degree of
medical probability. Bloching v. Albertson's, Inc., 129 Idaho 844, 934 P.2d 17 (1997).
Expert opinion, which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the
record, is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict, and therefore is
inadmissible under IRE 702. State v. Alger, 115 Idaho 42, 764 P.2d 119 (1988); Bromley
v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 979 P.2d 1165 (1999) (trial court did not err in excluding

testimony of ballistics expert where expert never performed testing and only speculated
about possible causes); but see State v. Schneider, 129 Idaho 59, 921 P.2d 759 (Ct. App.
1996) (Ct. App. 1996) (where expert previously expressed opinion on cause of death,
subsequent testimony on other possible causes properly expressed qualifications on that
opinion). Expert opinion testimony based upon a mere possibility of a causal connection
does not satisfy the standard for admissibility. Bloching v. Albertson's, Inc., supra.
Petitioner also asserts that due process and the need for heightened reliability in capital
cases guaranteed by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments requires that Dr. Glen
Groben's opinions should have been, but were not, supported by a preponderance of
evidence. In addition, permitting Dr. Groben to base his opinions on mere speCUlation or
possibilities violated Petitioner's rights to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.
Petitioner asserts that several opinions related by Dr. Groben were objectionable
as speCUlative, conclusory, unsubstantiated, or based upon mere possibilities.

Trial

counsel apparently shared this opinion, and moved to strike Dr. Groben's reenactment
opinion based on a lack of foundation, relevance and prejudice, (Tr., p. 3967, L. 14 - p.
3969, L. 17; p. 4001, L. 4), but did not specifically move to exclude or strike such
opinion, the assumptions upon which the opinion was based, as well as other independent
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opinions based on IRE 702 or the constitutional grounds asserted above. Opinions that
should not have been admitted included the following:
•

That "[t]here were seven defects on [the victim's] head, but only five of
those could I say were definitively impacts. (Tr., p. 3981, Ls. 17-19)

•

That the cause of death was ligature strangulation. (Tr., p. 3989, Ls. 5-7
(Q. Do you have an opinion, Doctor, on the cause of death of Lynn
Henneman? A. Ligature strangulation.); p. 4069, Ls. 3-11.).)

•

That the cause of death was not drowning. (Tr., p. 3990, Ls. 21-23.)

•

That the victim's body was lying on a hard surface with the upper body in
contact with that surface for at least a twelve-hour period. (Tr., p. 3994,
Ls. 4-7; Tr., p. 4056, Ls. 17-20 (Q. SO you think that the person died and
then remained on a flat surface on the shore for the full 12 hours you
think? A. Probably did, yeah.); p. 4057, Ls. 1-2 (So 12 hours is a good
median, happy medium there. So I can't say for sure.).)

•

That the lividity on the victim's body was due to being hogtied and that
the reenactment photographs were an accurate rendition of the victim's
post-mortem condition. (Tr., p. 4000, L. 20 - p. 4001, L. 23.)

•

Any opinions in regard to the reenactment photographs due to
inconsistencies in Dr. Groben's testimony and bias for the prosecution.
Specifically, while the jury was in recess and during voir dire in aid of the
defense objection to the photographs on relevance grounds, Dr. Groben
testified that the victim was hog-tied after death. (Tr., p. 4030, Ls. 10-12;
p. 4008, Ls. 3-7 (Q. Are you suggesting that this occurred when the person
was alive? A. No. I believe they were strangled and then placed on her
stomach when this was done.) Following this testimony, the State made an
argument that despite Dr. Groben's testimony, the victim may have been
alive when tied up. (Tr., p. 4008, Ls. 22-23.) Subsequently, during crossexamination, trial counsel inquired whether the victim was tied before or
after death, presumably assuming that the doctor would testify consistently
with his voir dire testimony. However, the doctor stated that he had no
way of knowing thus leaving the jury with the impression that the victim
may have been alive and conscious when hogtied. (Tr., p. 4078, L. 19 - p.
4079, L. 3) (Q. Okay. Do you have any way of knowing whether the
hands were tied before or after death? A. No. Q. In the scenario that you
had photographed with the -- using the -- the cloth, I guess, to tie both
wrists and the ankles together. Do you have any way of knowing whether
that could have happened before or after death? A. No.) Trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial. In the alternative, trial should
have moved to have the record read back for impeachment purposes and
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requested a special instruction from the Court that the jury could use such
prior statement to establish the truth of the matter asserted and to question
Dr. Groben's credibility.
•

That the victim died approximately thirty minutes after her last meal. (Tr.,
p. 4038, Ls. 6-10.)

•

That the victim's right arm was broken post-mortem but prior to the body
being placed in the river. (Tr., p. 4056, Ls. 2-5) ("So that would be the
most logical assumption on that. I can't say for sure though. That's just
my opinion on when it would have occurred.)

•

That the alcohol in the victim's body was produced post-mortem. (Tr., p.
4061, Ls. 5-10.)

In support of this claim, Petitioner submits the affidavit of Dr. Sally Aiken in

which she notes numerous opinions by Dr. Groben that were conflated, were not based on
a reasonable degree of medical probability, or were otherwise not based on sound
science. (Exhibit 24.)
Petitioner asserts that trial counsels' failure to object or otherwise preclude Dr.
Groben's opinions constituted deficient perfonnance that creates a reasonable probability
that the outcome would have been different both at trial and at sentencing. Petitioner also
asserts that trial counsels' failure to move for a mistrial, after Dr. Groben testified before
the jury that he had know way of knowing whether the victim was alive when hogtied
where he had just testified outside the presence of the jury that he believed the victim was
dead when hogtied. Petitioner was prejudiced because there is a reasonable probability
that a mistrial would have been granted. Further, if the motion for mistrial had been
denied, then counsel should have asked the court reporter to playback Dr. Groben's
testimony to both undennine his credibility and to establish that the victim was in fact
deceased at the time she was hogtied. Trial counsels' failure to take such measures also
prejudiced Petitioner. Since Dr. Groben's testimony was relevant at both trial and
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sentencing, there is a reasonable probability that Petitioner would not have been
convicted of murder of the first degree or sentenced to death.
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still investigating this claim and is
anticipating additional relevant evidence to be disclosed following a positive ruling on his
Motion For Discovery, filed January 5,2006, and scheduled for hearing in June 2006.

2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Object To, Or Otherwise Preclude, Testimony Of Norma Jean Oliver Due
To Her Lack Of Competency To Testify.
Trial counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Norma Jean
Oliver. (R., p.372-375.) In their motion, counsel noted that the circumstances to which
Ms. Oliver was to testify were thirteen years old and involved criminal charges resulting
in a plea agreement that precluded any contemporaneous cross-examination.
Trial counsel was fully aware of her state of mind prior to Ms. Oliver taking the
stand. Prior to her testimony, the Court inquired about upcoming witnesses:
THE COURT:

Okay. Who is your first witness?

MR. BOURNE:

Norma Jean Oliver.

THE COURT:

And you have had the opportunity, Mr. Myshin, to
prepare for this?

MR.MYSHIN:

Yeah.

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. MYSHIN:

I mean she was too distraught to even talk to.

THE COURT:

Okay. All right.
tonight, sir was?

And then the second witness

Tr., p.4755, L.21·- p.4756, L.3.
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Trial counsel should have moved to exclude Ms. Oliver's testimony based on a
lack of competence. Trial counsels' failure to object to or move to strike Ms. Oliver's
testimony based on her incompetence was both deficient and prejudicial under Strickland.
Trial counsel obviously heard the testimony of Ms. Oliver, yet failed to move to strike
her testimony or preclude further testimony. A witness' lack of recollection is grounds for
exclusion of testimony. I.R.E. 602 (witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the
matter); see Claim F.3, supra, State v. Johnson, supra, State v. (Patrick) Hall, supra. The
admission of this testimony violated the Sixth Amendment, and because this was a capital
sentencing proceeding, the admission of this testimony violated the Eighth Amendment
and the Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Object To, Or Otherwise Preclude, Testimony Of Other Criminal Acts.
Petitioner asserts that evidence of other criminal activity was used as nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. (Tr., p. 5518, L. 5 - p. 5520, L. 20.) As such, the
Court should have instructed that the State bore the burden of proving such circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt. Such other criminal acts included the alleged forcible rape of
Norma Jean Oliver. Petitioner was entitled to a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt on
such crimes based on his rights as guaranteed by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.
In addition, with the advent of jury sentencing, and the inability, or limited ability,
of juries to disregard irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible evidence, Petitioner submits
that evidence of other crimes should not be admitted into evidence as support for
statutory aggravating circumstances unless they are proven to have occurred beyond a
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reasonable doubt. But see State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983). In the
alternative, Petitioner asserts that where evidence of other crimes are admitted as support
for statutory aggravators, the Court should instruct the jury to disregard such evidence
unless the jury finds that the other crimes are proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See
People v. Kennedy, 36 Ca1.4th 595, 636 (2005). Further, Petitioner asserts that even if

evidence of other crimes are admissible upon a mere preponderance of the evidence, trial
counsel should have moved for a pretrial evidentiary hearing to determine the reliability
and sufficiency of the evidence prior to admission before a jury.
Petitioner asserts that evidence that he forcibly raped Norma Jean Oliver, i.e.,
evidence of another charged crime to which he pled guilty to reduced charges, would not
have been admissible under any of these claims. Petitioner asserts that he has satisfied
both prongs of Strickland.
4. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Object To, Or Otherwise Preclude, Hearsay Testimony.
Trial counsel failed to object to or inadequately objected to numerous instances of
the admission of inadmissible hearsay violating both the rules of evidence and the
Confrontation Clause to the United States Constitution and applicable state and federal
case law. See Claim G, supra. Petitioner requires additional time to analyze the trial
transcripts in order to fully state this claim.
P. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
FAILURE TO EFFECTIVELY CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES AND
REBUT STATE THEORIES.
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To

Effectively Cross-Examine Dr. Groben And Rebut The State's
Presentation Of Evidence That The Victim Was Hogtied And Suffered A
Terrifying And Tortuous Death.
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The State's evidence and subsequent argument that the victim was not only
hogtied, but hogtied while conscious, and that the victim suffered a terrifying and
tortuous death was based nearly entirely on the testimony of Dr. Glenn Groben. Trial
counsel failed to hire a forensic pathologist or other expert to review Dr. Groben's results
and make an independent determination of cause of death or injuries inflicted upon the
victim prior to her death. Trial counsel should have obtained independent consultation in
each of these areas to truly subject the prosecution's case to the level of adversarial
testing demanded in capital cases at both the guilt and penalty phases at trial.
During Petitioner's reinvestigation of the case, he has consulted with Dr. Sally
Aiken. Dr. Aiken is a pathologist with the Spokane County Medical Examiner's officer
in Spokane, Washington. (Exhibit 24.) Dr. Aiken also consulted with trial counsel on
both the Hanlon and Henneman cases; however, trial counsel failed to consult with her
until after Petitioner's trial and jury sentencing.

(Exhibit 24.)

Had trial counsel

consulted with Dr. Aiken in a timely manner, they would have been able to preclude
much of Dr. Groben's speculative testimony.

They also would have been able to

effectively cross-examine Dr. Groben.
For instance, Dr. Groben testified that the victim died of ligature strangulation
(Ir., p. 3989, Ls. 5-7), and that it would take three to five minutes for death to take place.
(Ir., p. 4040, Ls. 19 - 20). Dr. Aiken strongly disagrees, and states:

An article of clothing around the neck is not enough evidence to draw the
conclusion that strangulation occurred. Dr. Groben's opinion in this
regard is speCUlation. The decedent had no internal neck injuries .... Dr.
Groben cannot exclude the possibility that this ligature was applied after
death to aid in moving the body, for example. In my opinion, the cause of
death would have been listed most accurately as "homicidal violence of
unknown etiology."
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(Exhibit 24.)
Dr. Aiken also disavowed Dr. Groben's re-enactment of ligatures because it was
"not based on a reasonable degree of medical probability." Dr. Aiken disputes that
ligatures were necessarily applied at all, and rejects Dr. Groben's testimony to the jury
that there was no way to know whether the ligatures, if any, were applied before or after
death. (See Tr., p. 4078, L. 19 - p. 4079, L. 3.) Dr. Aiken would have testified that the
lack of injury beneath the ligature of the left wrist argues against this ligature being
present premortem. (Exhibit 24.)
Trial counsel's failure to consult with Dr. Aiken was highly prejudicial. The State
used Dr. Groben's testimony as the basis for setting out an egg timer to support a finding
of premeditated murder, to dramatize the horror of dying in this manner to support, at a
minimum, the utter disregard aggravator:
... This utter disregard aggravating factor refers to the defendant's lack of
conscience regarding the killing of a human being. Again doesn't this jury
instruction look like it was written for Erick Hall? Doesn't it look like it
was written to describe him? You know that it fits. Last Thursday Mr.
Bourne talked to you about this utter disregard and how Lynn was killed.
He did it with his egg timer and you've been in the courtroom with a lot of
high tech things. But what has been more dramatic at showing you what
this was like with this egg timer?
(Tr., p. 5452, Ls. 11-22.) The State also admitted the highly inflammatory "re-enactment
photos of the victim's nude, partly decomposed body "hog-tied."
Had counsel consulted with Dr. Aiken, there would have been doubt as to the
cause of death, no consideration of speculative theories about the cause of death, and no
consideration of speculative theories about horror endured by the victim. Trial counsel
could have kept highly prejudicial speculative displays from the jury.
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Dr. Aiken would have testified at Petitioner's trial or sentencing regarding her
findings if she had been contacted prior to Petitioner's conviction and sentence of death,
and her testimony would have contradicted that of Dr. Groben.

Further, timely

consultation with Dr. Aiken would have at least provided trial counsel with an
opportunity to effectively cross-examine Dr. Groben.
In summary, consultation with Dr. Aiken would have provided trial counsel with

the information necessary to challenge Dr. Groben's testimony regarding: cause of death;
cause of lividity patterns; whether, even if present, ligatures were applied before death;
time of death; the murder weapon; the number pre-mortem head wounds; Dr. Groben's
qualifications; and the accreditation status and reliability of the Ada County Coroner's
Office.
Dr. Aiken requested trial counsel provide X-rays, microscopic slides and formal
toxicology reports. (Exhibit 24.) Dr. Aiken never received this information from trial
counsel. These items and others are still necessary to conduct a full review of the case,
but Petitioner is awaiting a decision on his Motion for Discovery. This investigation,
then, is ongoing, and further information will be provided to Dr. Aiken in order to obtain
a complete consultation. Nevertheless, Petitioner asserts that he has satisfied both prongs
of Strickland.

2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Effectively Cross-Examine Catherine Colombo And Rebut The State's
Argument That Petitioner Was The Only Contributor Of DNA Removed
From The Victim.
The DNA testing prior to trial showed that there was a 13th allele at the D5
marker. Neither Petitioner nor the victim had a 13th allele at that location. Trial counsel
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was ineffective in failing to call an independent DNA expert as a witness to dispute the
misleading conclusions given to the jury despite the presence of the 13th allele.

36

Kathryn Colombo testified for the State regarding the DNA evidence.

Even

though Ms. Colombo acknowledged that the 13th allele "could be the true nature of the
sample" (Tr., p. 4467, Ls. 15-16), she downplayed its importance by repeatedly testifying
that it could be a "stutter artifact," a ''technical artifact," or "contamination." (Tr., pp.
4466, L. 20 - p. 4467, L. 15.) Ms. Colombo testified that she could not "make any
conclusions about that type because it's just so little information." (Tr., p. 4467, Ls. 34.)

Trial counsel was ineffective in allowing the State's expert to downplay the

probability of a second semen contributor by labeling it a mere "possibility" among other,
unlikely possibilities.
Dr. Colombo's conclusions were based on an assumption that there were only two
sources of the DNA and that the non-sperm donor is one source:
Q.

Okay. And in that letter do you say that your calculations, or your
conclusions are based upon the assumption that there was only one
contributor to the - one male contributor to the sperm fraction?

A.

No. I stated that there are only two sources of the DNA and that
the non-sperm donor is one source. Those are the assumptions.

Q.

Assumptions.

A.

Correct.

Q.

In fact, you used the word, didn't you?

It appears as though trial counsel did consult with a DNA analyst at Forensic
Analytical. However, due to trial counsel's failure to consult with and fully disclose files
to post-conviction counsel, it is unknown the extent of the consultation. It appears that
trial counsel did not attempt to retain a DNA expert for trial for either consultation or
expert testimony. Thus, Petitioner asserts that counsel's failures precluded adequate
cross examination and rebuttal of the State expert's DNA testimony, to the prejudice of
Petitioner.
36
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A.

I did. And actually in the original reports I told you that there was
an original report written in December of 2000, and that I then
amended it on April 28th, 2003. And the only difference between
those two reports is that I crossed out that assuming two people in
the chart. And we decided to do that because the primary profile is
so clear and so unambiguous you don't need to make any
assumptions in order to pull out that primary profile.

Q.

Is it possible that there was a second male contributor to the sperm
fraction?

A.

It's possible. We've got one reading, it the only reading, a small
type that cannot be attributed to the non-sperm donor or the
primary source of the sperm fraction. So I don't know where that
came from.

Q.

Thank you.

(Tr., p. 4525, L. 23 - p. 4526, L. 25.) The non-sperm donor is, of course, the victim.
Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to elicit that the 13th allele was in fact positive
evidence of a second sperm donor, and for not adequately challenging the assumptions
upon which Ms. Colombo based her findings.
Petitioner has consulted with Dr. Greg Hampikian, Ph.D. Dr. Hampikian teaches
at Boise State University and his expertise is in forensic biology and DNA analysis.
(Exhibit 8.)

After reviewing data and testimony,37 Dr. Hampikian is certain, "to a

reasonable degree of medical probability," that "the semen sample recovered from the

victim includes DNA from more than one male." (Exhibit 8.) Dr. Hampikian's
analysis shows that the 13th allele is a "real" DNA peak, and it indicates a second male
contributor. Had trial counsel called an expert to testify, the jury would have heard
testimony similar to Dr. Hampikian's conclusion, "The most direct interpretation of the

Again, these consultations are still in preliminary stages due to time restrictions and failure to
receive discovery necessary to expert conSUltation.

37
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DNA evidence presented at trial is that a second male contributor is included in the
semen sample recovered from the victim. The best evidence of this is the 13th allele at
D5." (Exhibit 8.)
This was critical infonnation to a jury detennination both at the guilt and penalty
phases of trial, and casts doubt on Petitioner's role in the homicide and therefore casts
doubt on Petitioner's moral culpability as to guilt and punishment. Trial counsel's failure
to adequately consult with an expert at trial and failure to call an expert to testify, left the
jury with a muddled, confusing picture of the DNA evidence at best and the belief that
the 13th allele was a meaningless bit of stutter or contamination at worst, leaving
Petitioner as the sole moral agent involved in the homicide. Petitioner asserts that he has
satisfied both prongs of Strickland.

3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Effectively Cross-Examine Norma Jean Oliver.
Trial counsel's cross-examination of Ms. Oliver fell well below the standards of
acceptable trial practice and was both deficient and prejudicial under Strickland. Trial
counsel failed to cross-examine Ms. Oliver about discrepancies between her grand jury
testimony in the statutory rape case and her testimony at Petitioner's sentencing tria1. 38
Trial counsel failed to cross-examine Ms. Oliver about discrepancies between her
testimony and Dr. Hess' report. Trial counsel failed to cross-examine Ms. Oliver about
discrepancies between her testimony and Dr. Vickman's emergency room report, which

Petitioner does not yet have the Grand Jury transcripts, but has good cause to believe
that there will be significant discrepancies given Ms. Oliver's inability to testify in the
rape case, and her lack of memory at Petitioner's sentencing. Furthennore, it does not
appear that trial counsel obtained transcripts of the grand jury proceedings or used those
transcripts to cross examine Ms. Oliver, Detective Hess or Jay Rosenthal. The failure to
obtain prior testimony to prepare for cross-examination is in itself woefully deficient.
38
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was contained in trial counsel's files. These failures, as well as those described in Claims
D.1 and E.4, fell well below an objectively reasonable standard for effectiveness. But
for trial counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that outcome of the
trial and the sentencing would have been different.
4. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Effectively Cross-Examine Detective Daniel Hess.
Trial counsel's cross-examination of Detective Daniel Hess fell well below the
standards of acceptable trial practice and was both deficient and prejudicial under
Strickland. Trial counsel failed to cross-examine Det. Hess about discrepancies between

his report and Ms. Oliver's testimony/9 his report and his own testimony, his report and
Dr. Vickman's emergency room report.

Petitioner asserts that he has satisfied both

prongs of Strickland.
5. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Effectively Cross-Examine Jay Rosenthal.
Trial counsel's cross-examination of Jay Rosenthal fell well below the standards
of acceptable trial practice and was both deficient and prejudicial under Strickland. In
addition to failing to cross-examine Mr. Rosenthal about the reduction of charges against
Petitioner with respect to the Norma Jean Oliver case, trial counsel failed to crossexamine Mr. Rosenthal about Petitioner's ultimate sentence for the statutory rape.
Petitioner received a mere five years, with one year fixed in that case. This sentence is
just barely above the mandatory minimum sentence, and the statute allows a maximum of
a life sentence.

I.C. § 18-6104

(prescribing minimum sentence of one year and

39 It appears as though Detective Hess had reviewed his reports (Tr., p. 4789, Ls. 10-14),
so it is inexplicable why trial counsel did not effectively use the reports during the crossexamination.
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maximum sentence of life imprisonment). The low sentence, presumably recommended
by the Mr. Rosenthal as part of a plea agreement, indicates either that the State's case
against Petitioner was weak, or that the State did not believe Ms. Oliver's allegations of
violence. Petitioner asserts that he has satisfied both prongs of Strickland.

6. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Effectively Cross-Examine April Sebastian.
Trial counsel's cross-examination of April Sebastian was both deficient and
prejudicial under Strickland. Counsel was actively representing Ms. Sebastian at the time
of Petitioner's trial. (See Claims J.3, supra.) During cross-examination, trial counsel
seemed more concerned with Ms. Sebastian's well being than with impeaching her
testimony:
Q. Tell him that. How were you making a living?
A. I was stealing from stores, you know, ashamed of myself now, but,
yeah, I stole from stores and re-sell stuff, sell it to people to make a living,
pay my bills.
Q. In fact, that's not an uncommon way for some folks to make a living?
A. Huh-uh, it's not.

Q. Stealing and either taking it back to stores or selling it to people, things
like that?
A. Yes.

Q. Okay. But you're doing better now?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. In fact, I think you were telling me that you're working on your GED?
A. Yes.
Q. And you're feeling pretty good about the future?
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A. Yes.
Q. All right.
A. Yes, new programs out.
Q. You think you're benefiting from them?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. And I'm sure when you get out you're going to have a happy life?
A. Yeah, a totally different life.
Q. Good. Good for you, April. Thanks.
A. Yes.
THE COURT: Redirect?
MR. BOURNE: Not any on that. Thank you.
(Tr., p. 4895, L. 6 - p. 4896, L. 11.) Trial counsel's cross-examination of a critical
witness who testified that Petitioner told her he hit people over the head and take their
money, amounted to nothing more than a friendly "chat," rather than the "crucible" it is
supposed to be.
Petitioner requires additional time to continue to investigate Ms. Sebastian's
incentives to testify favorably for the State, her representation by Petitioner's trial
counsel, and the substance of her testimony.

Petitioner anticipates that much of the

information will be contained in the discovery he has requested.

7. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Rebut The State's Presentation Of Evidence That Petitioner Has A
Propensity To Murder And Probably Constitutes A Continuing Threat
To The Community Through The Testimony Of Dr. Mark Cunningham.
Trial counsel apparently believed that the Court's ruling that any presentation of
evidence by the defense that Petitioner would not pose a continuing threat to the
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community if not executed would necessarily open the door to evidence of the Hanlon
homicide investigation. Competent capital counsel would have persisted.
Specifically, trial counsel should have sought through a motion in limine to clear
the path for the introduction of testimony of Dr. Mark Cunningham that, in his expert
opinion, Petitioner does not pose a continuing threat to society. Dr. Cunningham's
assessment would have been based on Petitioner's criminal history, his past behavior
while incarcerated, and other information, including the facts uncovered in the Hanlon
homicide investigation. A motion in limine would have included the following points:
•

Reliance on the Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, including his constitutional right to due process, to
present a defense, and to present mitigation evidence.

•

Reliance on IRE 703 which provides that "Facts or data that are otherwise
inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the
opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value
in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect."

•

Permission for the State to conduct a risk assessment of Petitioner with
consideration of the same evidence in the Hanlon case.

•

A comparison of the State's risk assessment with the assessment made by
Dr. Mark Cunningham. If the State's risk assessment indicates that
Petitioner probably constitutes a continuing threat, then a determination of
whether evidence of the Hanlon homicide was a determinative or relevant
factor in that assessment of future dangerousness.

If the State's risk assessment did depend on the Hanlon homicide for the
divergent results, then trial counsel would not present evidence. However, if the State's
risk assessment did not depend on the Hanlon homicide for the divergent results, then
there would have been no reason for introduction of evidence from the Hanlon homicide
investigation. Petitioner asserts that even a risk assessment by the State would not have
found that facts suggesting that Petitioner committed a rape/murder of another woman in
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addition to the victim makes Petitioner more of a risk when incarcerated. If Petitioner's
assertion is correct, and the Court still did not permit trial counsel to proceed, then the
issue would have been properly preserved for appeal.
In addition, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel should have asserted that they

could not make an informed decision whether to present the testimony of Dr. Mark
Cunningham because they had not yet conducted an adequate investigation of the
Hanlon case. Therefore, any strategic decision not to present the full testimony of Dr.
Cunningham so as to preclude opening the door to evidence from the Hanlon homicide
was necessarily unreasonable because it was not based on an adequate investigation.
Petitioner asserts that an adequate investigation of the Hanlon case would have
either: (1) precluded introduction of the evidence under any circumstance; or (2)
seriously undermined the State's presentation of the Hanlon case if the defense opened
the door. Petitioner asserts that either of these two outcomes would have occurred
because of serious questions about the DNA evidence in the Hanlon case. Petitioner
has reasonable grounds to assert that DNA testing, had it been conducted by trial counsel
at that time, would have shown that he is excluded as the perpetrator of rape against
Cheryl Hanlon and thus likely excluded as her killer.
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim due to the trial team's failure to adequately
cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case. Further, Petitioner requires additional time to
consult with Dr. Cunningham. 40 Finally, Petitioner fears disclosing too much information
will prematurely disclose his defense in the on-going prosecution of him for the capital

Petitioner anticipates obtaining a declaration from Dr. Mark Cunningham stating that
in his opinion Petitioner does not present a continuing threat to the community if
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
40
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murder of Ms. Hanlon. At this time, the Hanlon trial is scheduled for April 2007.
Petitioner requests that these proceedings be suspended so as to preclude unnecessary,
premature and prejudicial disclosures of his defense in that case. While Petitioner's
reinvestigation is not yet complete and he still awaits a hearing and ruling on his Motion
For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006, he nevertheless asserts that he has satisfied both
prongs 0 f Strickland.

Q. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
ELICITING AGGRAVATING EVIDENCE.
Through careless cross-examination, i.e., by asking open-ended, non-leading
questions on cross, trial counsel eliciting evidence suggesting that Petitioner was
suspected of committing rapes other than that of the victim in the underlying case. (Tr.,
p. 4428, Ls. 9-13.)

Petitioner cannot fully state this claim due to the trial team's failure to adequately
cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case. Further, Petitioner is still awaiting a hearing
and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006. Nevertheless, Petitioner
asserts that trial counsels' performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable
probability that but for counsels' deficient performance the outcome of the trial and
sentencing would have been different.
R. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO

THEIR FAILURE TO CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE GUILT PHASE
INVESTIGATION.
The ABA Guidelines set forth trial counsels' obligations to conduct a thorough
investigation in preparation for both phases of the case, guilt/innocence and penalty.
Guideline 10.7 .A.l. provides in relevant part that,
The investigation regarding guilt should be conducted regardless of any
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admission or statement by the client concerning the facts of the alleged
crime, or overwhelming evidence of guilt, or any statement by the client
that evidence bearing upon guilt is not to be collected or presented.
The Commentary further provides:
With respect to the guilt/innocence phase, trial counsel must
independently investigate the circumstances of the crime and all
evidence-whether testimonial, forensic, or otherwise-purporting to
inculpate the client. To assume the accuracy of whatever information the
client may initially offer or the prosecutor may choose or be compelled to
disclose is to render ineffective assistance of counsel. As more fully
described infra in the text accompanying notes 195-204, the defense
lawyer's obligation includes not only finding, interviewing, and
scrutinizing the backgrounds of potential prosecution witnesses, but also
searching for any other potential witnesses who might challenge the
prosecution'S version of events, and SUbjecting all forensic evidence to
rigorous independent scrutiny.
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 1.1.
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Adequately Investigate And Present Evidence Of An Alternate
Perpetrator Of The Murder And Co-Perpetrator Of Rape.

Trial counsel retained an independent expert in part for the purpose of reviewing
the DNA testing conducted by Cellmark forensic laboratories. Trial counsels' expert
indicated that there was a possibility of a contributor to the DNA sample other than the
victim and Petitioner. However, rather than pursue this line of investigation or retain the
services of their experts to assist them in the cross-examination of the State's expert, trial
counsel ended their investigation of an alternate or co-perpetrator theory.
Had trial counsel conducted an adequate investigation, they would have
discovered evidence linking Patrick Hoffert to the crime. See supra, claim D-7,
incorporated herein by reference. As additional support for this claim, Petitioner submits
the affidavit of Dr. Greg Hampikian, who will testify to a reasonable degree of medical
probability that based on Cellmark's own testing, there is a contributor to the DNA
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removed from the victim that belongs neither to the victim nor to the Petitioner. (Exhibit
8.)

Trial counsel should have investigated and presented evidence of an alternate
perpetrator through evidence from lay witnesses in combination with the opinions of an
qualified and independent expert DNA.

Trial counsels' failures constitute deficient

performance. But for counsels' deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability
that Petitioner would not have been convicted of murder of the first degree or sentenced
to death.
S. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
THEIR FAILURE TO CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE SENTENCING
PHASE INVESTIGATION.
Trial counsel has a duty to conduct a thorough investigation in preparation for the
penalty phase at trial. See Rompilla v. Beard, _

U.S. _ , 124 S. Ct. 2456 (2005);

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 US 510 (2003); Williams v. Tay/or, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). In
Rompilla, the Supreme Court found counsel ineffective for failing to conduct an adequate
mitigation investigation despite consulting with mental health experts and conducting an
investigation into the defendant's background. Specifically, trial counsel failed to
examine a court file on the defendant's prior conviction for rape and assault where the
filed included additional mitigating evidence. In Wiggins, the Supreme Court found
counsel ineffective on basis of inadequate mitigation investigation despite the fact that
counsel arranged psychological testing for their client and obtained some government
records to assist in developing their client's social history. Finally, in Williams, the
Supreme Court found counsel ineffective in failing to adequately investigate their client's
background despite a "competently handled the guilt phase of the trial." Id. at 395-96.
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Thus, the high court has recognized that the effectiveness of counsel's assistance will be
subjected to great scrutiny in a capital case. In short, the constitutional demand on
counsel to conduct a thorough investigation of the penalty phase is high. Consistent with
such demands, the ABA Guidelines provide in part:
At that [penalty) phase, trial counsel must both rebut the prosecution's
case in favor of the death penalty and affirmatively present the best
possible case in favor of a sentence other than death. If the defendant has
any prior criminal history, the prosecution can be expected to attempt to
offer it in support of a death sentence. Trial counsel accordingly must
comprehensively investigate--together with the defense investigator, a
mitigation specialist, and other members of the defense team-the
defendant's behavior and the circumstances of the conviction. Only then
can counsel protect the accused's Fourteenth Amendment right to deny or
rebut factual allegations made by the prosecution in support of a death
sentence, and the client's Eighth Amendment right not to be sentenced to
death based on prior convictions obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights. If uncharged prior misconduct is arguably admissible, trial counsel
must assume that the prosecution will attempt to introduce it, and
accordingly must thoroughly investigate it as an integral part of preparing
for the penalty phase. Along with preparing to counter the prosecution's
case for the death penalty, trial counsel must develop an affirmative case
for sparing the defendant's life. A capital defendant has an unqualified
right to present any facet of his character, background, or record that
might call for a sentence less than death. This Eighth Amendment right to
offer mitigating evidence "does nothing to fulfill its purpose unless it is
understood to presuppose that the defense lawyer will unearth, develop,
present, and insist on the consideration of those 'compassionate or
mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. '"
Nor will the presentation be persuasive unless it (a) is consistent with that
made by the defense at the guilt phase and (b) links the evidence offered in
mitigation to the specific circumstances of the client.
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 1.1.
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Adequately Investigate And Present Evidence Of Erick Hall's Traumatic
Childhood Through Live Testimony Of Family Members Including His
Mother And Father.
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Trial counsel built their sentencing case almost entirely around Petitioner's
developmental years. 41 Their apparent goal was for the jury to understand Petitioner's
childhood and find mercy in their hearts with that understanding. Most of the defense's
case focused negatively on Petitioner's mother and father, Jean and Frank McCracken.
Neither testified. Trial counsels' failure to call Petitioner's parents, and other family
members, to testify was objectively unreasonable. Further, trial counsel failed to fully
elicit mitigating evidence through the testimony of family members that did testify. Their
failures undermine the confidence in the outcome ofthe sentencing proceedings.
During the course of Petitioner's reinvestigation of this case, he has discovered
that both Jean and Frank would have been willing to testify for the defense. Indeed, Jean
expected to testify but was told at the last moment by trial counsel that she was not
necessary. Jean was necessary, and so was Frank. Both seek to a certain extent to
downplay the abuse and neglect experienced by all family members, and each tend to
point the finger at the other, or at failures of institutions established to assist them.
Nevertheless, Petitioner's parents do accept responsibility for their failures, and just as
importantly, both love their son ... despite his failures. See US. v. Hanken, 381 F.Supp.2d
936 (N.D. Iowa 2005)(noting that jury considered mitigating value in the fact that the

defendant was loved by his mother, and the emotional trauma that she would be feel from
the execution of her son)
The jury should have heard their stories, and the stories of other relatives; because
only by hearing their stories could the jury have truly understood Petitioner's childhood

Indeed, as discussed below, counsels failed to adequately investigate and present
evidence of Petitioner's later years. In addition, it appears that trial counsel spent
absolutely no time investigating a defense to the presentation of the State's case in
aggravation through various witnesses, primarily Norma Jean Oliver.
41
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and "the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse
frailties of humankind." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). In
support of this claim, Petitioner attaches the affidavits from the following family
members who did not testify:
•

Jean Hall McCracken: Jean, Erick's mother was never called to testify
although she was willing and planned on it. Jean admits that she used
drugs during her pregnancy with Erick. Jean provides further confirmation
and further evidence of head injuries sustained by Erick, as well as
incidents where Erick "would almost black out in terms of being
conscious of what he was doing, saying, or engaged in." Jean also
describes similar experiences she has had, suggesting a genetic component
to Erick's behaviors. Based on a layperson's perspective, but bolstered by
her intimate knowledge of Erick's childhood behaviors, Jean believes that
Erick is Bi-Polar. Jean has also experienced the loss of a loved one by
violence, noting that her father was murdered in 1998. As a witness, Jean
would have bridged the gap between the loss the victim's family felt and
the loss that a convicted murderer's mother feels. 42 Like so many of
Erick's family members and friends, Jean loves him and does not want to
see him executed. Noted elsewhere, Jean was willing to testify to all these
matters despite the prosecution's efforts to dissuade her from presenting
mitigating circumstances at her son's sentencing hearing.

•

Frank McCracken: Frank Sr., Erick's father, acknowledges that he was
physically and verbally abusive of Jean in front of the children. He reports
signs of abuse to Erick following his time at juvenile detention center.
"When Erick came back to California from the boy's home in 1986-87 he
had markings on his back from having an iron pressed into his body."
Frank concludes that he loves Erick, "he is my son, he's always been my
son, and he will always be my son." Frank does not want Erick to be
executed.

•

Frankie McCracken: Frankie, Erick's older half-brother, further confirms
the degree of violence in the McCracken family. Frankie has also
experienced significant problems in the criminal justice system, having
spent eight years in prison. He does not want Erick to be executed.

42 The information provided by Jean, including confirmation of her prenatal substance
abuse and other incidents of head injuries and strange behaviors is relevant to Dr.
Merikangas' on-going neurological and psychiatric evaluation but was not available at
the time of the doctor's preliminary report.
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•

Tiffaney Conner: Tiffaney, Erick's youngest half-sister, has no real
memories of him as a child but does treasure a picture of him holding her
when she was a baby. Tiffaney does feel a strong connection to him as an
adult and loves him. She does not want him to be executed and hopes to
continue a relationship with him despite his incarceration. "My letters are
my most prized possession of my brother."

•

Kenneth Douglas, Erick's cousin, further tells of instances of violence in
Erick's childhood. He also describes another serious head injury when
Erick fell off a second story roof and hit his head on the rock sidewalk.
Also apparently drawing from a layperson's perspective, Kenneth
describes Erick's childhood behaviors as characteristic of "manic
depressive, Bi-Polar, and schizophrenic." He does not want Erick to be
executed.

•

John Thompson: John, Erick's younger brother, does not want his older
brother to be executed. John describes the disruption in the household and
characterizes Erick's mood swings dramatically as a "Dr. Jekyll and Mr.
Hyde" split personality as a child. John also confirms Shannon's abuse of
Erick.

•

Kimberly Bacon: Kimberly was married to Erick's older brother,
Shannon, and knew Erick as a teenager. She was never contacted by trial
counsel. She has much more information that confirms family accounts of
Shannon's explosive, unpredictable violence. Her testimony would have
bolstered claims that Shannon was extremely abusive, would have added
accounts of Erick witnessing Shannon's violence against Kimberly, and
would have described the relationship between Shannon and Erick as one
in which "Shannon kept Erick around so he could have a scapegoat."
Kimberly, who since meeting Erick has worked at Columbia River Mental
Health for two years as a specialist, describes Erick's behavior as a
teenager as "mentally ill, incompetent, and [having] developmental
delays," suffering from "severe attachment disorder," "major mental
instability issues," and "extreme mood swings."

In addition, Petitioner attaches the affidavits from testifying family members

whose testimony was incomplete due to trial counsels' ineffectiveness in interviewing
them and preparing them for their testimony:
•

Shawnra McCracken Hemming: Shawnra, Erick's older half-sister felt
inhibited from disclosing all details of their troubled childhood, feeling
that the jury might find it unbelievable. She also loves her brother, and
notes the important role he plays in their family.
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•

Tamara McCracken: Tamara, Erick's older half-sister, would have
testified just how much she loves her brother, that she does not want to see
him die, and the turmoil that his execution will cause her. In addition,
Tamara would have testified to the techniques that the State utilized to try
to undermine the effectiveness of her testimony, or even dissuade her from
testifying. While Tamara testified, trial counsel failed to elicit any of these
mitigating facts.

•

Deanna McCracken: Deanna, Erick's younger sister, would have testified
that she has heard that when her mother was pregnant with Erick, her
father, Frank, hit and kicked her in the stomach. She also describes
moments where Erick would "black out and go into rages." In such
circumstances, after Erick calmed down, he would have no memory of the
incident.

Petitioner cannot fully state this claim due to the trial team's failure to adequately
cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case. Further, Petitioner is still awaiting a hearing
and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006. Nevertheless, Petitioner
asserts that trial counsels' performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable
probability that but for counsels' deficient performance the outcome of the trial and
sentencing would have been different.

2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Adequately Investigate And Present Evidence Of An Alternate
Perpetrator Of The Murder And Co-Perpetrator Of Rape.
Petitioner incorporates by reference all facts and legal arguments from, D.7, D.8,
E.6, P .2, and asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
adequately investigator an alternate perpetrator or co-perpetrator theory. Trial counsels'
deficient performance creates a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different.
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim due to the trial team's failure to adequately
cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case. Further, Petitioner is still awaiting a hearing
and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5,2006.
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3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Adequately Investigate And Present Evidence Of Institutional Failure In
Addition To Evidence Of Abuse In Petitioner's Teen-age Years.
Evidence that institutions created for the benefit of abandoned and neglected
youth failed a capital defendant is valid mitigating evidence. See In re Lucas, 33 Ca1.4th
682 (2004) (vacating death sentence due to ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to
adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence including evidence of institutional
failure) In the reinvestigation of his case, Petitioner has located and interviewed Gayle
Ihringer, an attorney who formerly represented Petitioner when he was juvenile housed at
the Clark County Juvenile Detention Center in Vancouver, Washington.
Attached is an affidavit obtained from Ms. Ihringer. (Exhibit 25.) Ms. Ihringer
relates incidents in which the juvenile system and the psychologist at the detention center
failed Petitioner and perpetuated the abuse and neglect that he experienced as a child. For
example, around the time that Petitioner was housed at the center, there were reports that
one ofthe teacher's had previously molested a child; another teacher posted papers on the
classroom walls that identified various youth using names such as 'Prison Barbie,' and
'Jail Janis.' After Petitioner had left the center, she sued the center for placing special
education youth in closet-sized rooms and locking the doors for extended periods of time.
On one occasion a youth at the center was contained in such a room for 105 school days.
Ms. Ihringer notes that Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA), it is mandatory that all special education youth be re-evaluated every three years.
In addition, changes in placements also trigger mandatory assessments in Washington.
She states that based on the poor practices of the center, and in particular, its
psychologist, Petitioner did not received a properly Individualized Education Plan (IEP)
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even though one should have been completed for Erick Virgil Hall when his placement
was changed to Mission Creek.
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim due to the trial team's failure to adequately
cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case. Further, Petitioner is still awaiting a hearing
and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006. Nevertheless, Petitioner
asserts that he has satisfied both prongs of Strickland.

4. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Adequately Investigate And Present Evidence Of Petitioner's
Neurological Deficits, Mental Retardation and Mental Illness.
Trial counsel did not have Petitioner submit to any neurological testing despite
ample evidence of closed head injuries and other neurological problems. Trial counsel
also did not seek psychiatric diagnoses of Petitioner or adequately examine Petitioner's
childhood diagnosis of mild mental retardation. 43
During the reinvestigation of this case, counsel is uncovenng evidence of
neurological and physical impainnent that require additional investigation. Petitioner has
consulted with Dr. James Merikangas, an expert in neuropsychiatry. (Exhibit 26.)
Petitioner's consultation is not yet complete. Dr. Merikangas met with Petitioner one
time, and during that preliminary examination, Petitioner's blood pressure was extremely
high, indicated he had frequent and severe headaches, was unable to walk on his heels or

Due to trial counsel's failure to consult with Petitioner's attorneys, and due to the time
constraints imposed by the Court, counsel does not fully understand the pre-trial
investigation into mental illness and mental retardation. It is counsel's understanding that
an intelligence test was administered and that Petitioner's score was higher than the score
he achieved as a child. However, Petitioner maintains that the more recent intelligence
testing was inaccurate or inadequately administered, and will either withdraw this claim
or provide further support for the claim after conducting an adequate investigation. In
any case, any significant discrepancies between test score should have been explained
and must be explored.
43
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toes, and was unable to walk tandem without swaying. Petitioner had a scar on the right
parietal scalp. (Exhibit 26.) Dr. Merikangas is recommending blood work, an MRI scan
of the brain, a PET scan of the brain, and x-ray ofthe cervical spine. (Exhibit 26.).
Full psychiatric examination is also warranted. Due to Petitioner's inability to
obtain an Order from the Court, Dr. Merikangas was not given the usual "quiet and
confidential setting" required for Petitioner to be forthcoming in answering sensitive
questions.

However, even in his brief testing of Petitioner, Dr. Merikangas noted

psychiatric anomalies that warrant further investigation. Dr. Merikangas notes in his
affidavit that Petitioner drew a "very strange person" drawn "without a face" and
"without genitalia." After asking Petitioner to draw the face, Petitioner "drew a face
without eyebrows or ears." Under standard scoring, this drawing was appropriate for a
child of eight or nine years old. (Exhibit 26.)
Interviews with Petitioner's friends, acquaintances and family members have
uncovered prenatal exposure to amphetamines, extensive head injuries, black outs or
lapses in memory, and abnormally pronounced mood swings.

Wendy Levy has

witnessed Petitioner, as an adult, experience "lapses in memory or brief losses of
memory," where "Erick would pause and have a blank look in his eyes," before
becoming "re-oriented." (Exhibit 7.) Petitioner's sister describes an occasion where
Erick went into a rage over his brother Shannon. Afterwards, when Deanna tried to
discuss the incident with Erick, Erick had no memory of the event.

(Exhibit 27.)

Petitioner's mother describes witnessing similar black outs, and describes experiencing
her own "[s]imilar explosions with this blackout-type memory loss."

(Exhibit 28.)

Various witnesses have characterized the mood swings as "Jekyll and Hyde," and
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describe explosive outbursts. (Exhibit 7.), (Exhibit 29.), (Exhibit 27.), (Exhibit 28),
(Exhibit 30.) Family members describe Petitioner as bipolar and ADHD. (Exhibit 28.),
(Exhibit 31.) One family member describes him as "mentally ill, incompetent, [having]
developmental delays," exhibiting "severe attachment disorder" and "ADHD." (Exhibit
31.)

Petitioner's mother took amphetamines while pregnant with him. (Exhibit 28.)
Petitioner fell off his bicycle and hit the back of his head and lost consciousness for up to
a few minutes. (Exhibit 28.) He required a hospital trip, and for several years afterward
complained about severe headaches and neck pain, and eye pain. He fell off a roof, and
when he landed on his feet he fell forward and hit his head on a rock sidewalk. (Exhibit
32.) All of the symptoms and injuries described above are indicators that Petitioner has
neurological damage and/or mental illness.
Witnesses also describe Petitioner's lack of adaptive skills, a critical factor in
diagnosing mild mental retardation.

Wendy Levy describes Petitioner as being

"uncomfortable in crowds," desiring to provide for her family but lacking the "skills and
understanding about how to appropriately do so," unable to keep a job, "completely
unfocused and lost in determining a future course of action," lacking the "skills to
organize himself, structure events in his life, or plan into the future." Ms. Levy reports
that several times Petitioner told her he "ate out of the garbage can at a McDonald's."
(Exhibit 7.)
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim due to the trial team's failure to adequately
cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case. Petitioner's reinvestigation is not yet
complete and he still awaits a hearing and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed
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January 5, 2006. However, given the preliminary evidence of neurological damage,
mental illness and mental retardation uncovered thus far, Petitioner asserts that trial
counsel was deficient in failing to pursue leads readily available, and that will be able,
upon proper investigation, to satisfy both prongs of Strickland.

5. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Adequately Investigate And Present Evidence Of Petitioner's Good
Character As An Adult.
Petitioner was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel in failing to
adequately investigate and present evidence of Petitioner's good character as an adult.
During sentencing proceedings, the defense offered testimony from family
members and two experts that described Petitioner's horrific childhood. However, trial
counsel failed to adequately investigate Petitioner's life in adolescence and adulthood. In
their closing argument, the prosecution argued this very fact to the jury. Thus, it was
difficult for the jury to discern that the child, so damaged and abused, nonetheless
developed into an adult with kind, generous and loving characteristics. The jury was left
with the impression that there were no mitigating circumstances in Petitioner's adult life.
Had trial counsel adequately investigated and presented mitigating circumstances
of Petitioner's adolescence and adulthood including mitigating evidence near the time of
the crime, it is reasonably probable that the jury would have found that the mitigation
outweighed the aggravation and sentenced Petitioner to a life sentence.
This information was readily available.

In the course of Petitioner's

reinvestigation, Petitioner has discovered evidence of caring, loving relationships.
Wendy Levy was interviewed by trial counsel and provided them with similar
information, but was never called to testify. (Exhibit 7.) Ms. Levy would have testified
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that he played with her children, was good with her children, including her special-needs
daughter, and that her children referred to him as their "Uncle Erick." Petitioner assisted
with chores, provided food and money to the family when they were hungry and
otherwise attempted to provide for the family. He was never violent in any manner with
any of the members of the family. He was a talented artist, playful, a good worker, and
protective of Wendy and her children. Petitioner referred to Wendy as his sister.
Evelyn Dunaway, who testified for the State at sentencing regarding violent
incidents between herself and Petitioner, nonetheless had loving things to say about him,
which were never elicited by trial counsel. Petitioner tried to help Evelyn quit a meth
habit and describes him as "very caring with regard to talking to [her], and supporting
[her] as [she] tried to stay off drugs." (Exhibit 15.) Petitioner exhibited compassion and
generosity toward her children-spoon-feeding them medicine when they were sick,
drawing pictures for them, and purchasing a drawing book. Evelyn, the same woman the
State used to depict Petitioner as a violent monster, states that he "had a lot of good
qualities," and would pick her flowers almost every day and "did a number of very kind
things" for Evelyn. Evelyn states that Petitioner was "genuinely nice and wanted to help
people" and took in homeless people to stay and fixed up bicycles for people who had no
transportation. Evelyn continues to hold onto a photograph of herself and Petitioner, and
likes "to think about the good times [they] shared together." To this day, she has feelings
of care and concern for Petitioner and does not want him to be executed. To the best of
Evelyn's recollection, trial counsel did not interview her.
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While this claim is still under investigation, Petitioner nonetheless asserts that
trial counsel's failure to adequately investigate and present evidence of Petitioner's
mitigation as an adult was both deficient and prejudicial under Strickland.
6. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Adequately Investigate The State's Experts' Opinions By Requesting
Appropriate Discovery Of Their Reports.
Petitioner believes that reports from Dr. Michael Estess and Dr. Robert Engle
contain exculpatory and material evidence. He believes that the reports of their findings
regarding Petitioner's mental health and his propensity for murder and risk of committing
murder in the future would be consistent with his experts' findings as well as inconsistent
with the State's evidence and arguments. Even if reports were not generated, Petitioner's
counsel should have moved for the preparation of reports.
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as Dr. Estess has refused to discuss his
findings or opinions of the defense testimony with Petitioner. In addition, trial counsel
has refused to adequately consult with Petitioner and has not disclosed all documents in
their possession that may include materials relevant to this claim. Finally, Petitioner is
still awaiting a hearing and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5,2006, in
which he made several requests relevant to this claim.
7. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Adequately Investigate Evelyn Dunaway And Rebecca McCusker.
Trial counsel was ineffective under the Strickland standard for failing to
adequately investigate the state's witnesses prior to sentencing. Had counsel interviewed
Evelyn Dunaway, they would have had information with which to impeach Rebecca
McCusker.

Ms. McCusker testified that she and her sister intervened on the day

Petitioner and Ms. Dunaway broke up, and that Petitioner would not allow her to leave
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his home and told her and Ms. Dunaway that he would kill them both. (Tr., p. 4862, Ls.
8 -19.)

In the course of reinvestigating this case, however, Petitioner has interviewed Ms.

Dunaway. Ms. Dunaway disputes Ms. McCusker's account of the events of that day, and
specifically states that "When April Stone and Rebecca McCusker came into the trailer
home in March 2002, Erick never threatened to kill Rebecca, in contrast with her trial
testimony." (Exhibit 15.)
8. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Adequately Investigate Michelle Deen.
Trial counsel was ineffective under the Strickland standard for failing to
adequately investigate the state's witnesses prior to sentencing. Had counsel investigated
Michelle Deen, they would have had information with which to impeach her testimony
and illustrate her motive to testify falsely against Petitioner.
In the course of reinvestigating this case, Petitioner has uncovered information of

previous deals. In Ada County case no. M0203902/H0200584, Ms. Deen was charged
with felony possession of a controlled substance. In that court file, Petitioner discovered
a note, stating that Ms. Deen contacted the author of the note and stated she wanted to
talk to the police about a "deal." (Exhibit 6.)
and did not close until August of 2005.

This case was opened in April of 2002,

The "Cover Sheet" immediately follows a

document filed May 3, 2002, prior to Petitioner's trial.
In Ada County case no. M031644/H0301398, Ms. Deen was again charged with

felony possession of a controlled substance. The register of actions, which Petitioner
readily obtained from the courthouse, shows that Ms. Deen was ordered to undergo a
court ordered psychiatric evaluation. The Order was entered on June 30, 2004, prior to
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Petitioner's trial. Trial counsel should have cross-examined her about the necessity of an
evaluation.
Trial counsel also failed to investigate Petitioner's claim that Ms. Deen testified
falsely because she was angry that he and Janet Hoch reported Ms. Deen to the police
after Ms. Deen burglarized Petitioner's residence. In the course of reinvestigating this
case, Petitioner was easily able to obtain police reports from the Boise City Police
Department confirming Petitioner's claim. (Exhibit 34.)

T. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR FAILING TO OBJECT
SHACKLING OR FAILING TO ADEQUATELY OBJECT TO EVIDENCE
OF DEFENDANT'S CUSTODIAL STATUS.

Trial counsel should have asserted, argued and moved for written findings from
the court stating that shackling was not visible, or asserted, argued and moved for a
mistrial if the shackling was visible to any juror at any time. This failure was both
deficient prejudicial. See Claim C, supra.
Trial counsel also failed to adequately object to and argue an objection to
admission of States Exhibit No. 149, which was a mug shot of Petitioner taken while he
was wearing a standard orange prison uniform. (Tr., p. 4824, L. 19 - p. 4829, L. 17).
Counsel did object, however, counsel never argued any constitutional basis for the
objection. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 505 (1976) (making a defendant
appear in prison garb poses such a threat to the "fairness of the factfinding process" that it
must be justified by an "essential state policy.") Trial counsel should have objected on
the basis of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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U. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
THEIR FAILURE TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
DURING CLOSING ARGUMENTS.
Trial counsel should have objected to the misconduct in the prosecution's closing
arguments both in the guilt and the sentencing phases. Petitioner incorporates by
reference the facts and legal arguments from claims previous claims. Counsels' failure to
object constitutes deficient performance. Petitioner asserts that but for counsels' deficient
performance, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted of
murder of the first degree or sentenced to death.
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim due to the trial team's failure to adequately
cooperate in his reinvestigation of the case. While Petitioner's reinvestigation is not yet
complete and he still awaits a hearing and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed
January 5, 2006, he nevertheless asserts that he has satisfied both prongs of Strickland.

V. The Composition of Jury Pool Violated Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, And Petitioner Was Deprived The Effective Assistance Of
Counsel By Their Failure To Challenge The Jury Pool Composition.
The composition of Petitioner's petit jury, the pool from which the petit jury was
selected, and the composition of the grand jury did not represent a "fair cross-section of
the community," and thus violated Petitioner's rights under the Sixth Amendment, Due
Process and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Eighth
Amendment. Petitioner asserts that Hispanics are underrepresented and systematically
exclude from the jury pool, and therefore petit and grand juries are not selected from a
fair cross-section of the community.
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Petitioner was entitled to select a jury from a fair cross-section of the community.
See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975). It is part of the established

tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly
representative of the community. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). A jury
system that results in systematic exclusion of a cognizable group violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

See also, Williams v. Florida, 399

U.S. 78 (1970)(holding 6-person jury scheme violative of the Sixth Amendment for
failure to provide juries drawn from a cross section of the community).
In addition, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in

failing to challenge the composition of the jury pool. Petitioner requires additional time
and discovery to substantiate these claims, and reserves the right to withdraw the claims
at a later date.

w. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING
THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS.
Despite the exercise of due diligence, it is impossible for Petitioner to fully state
this claim as Petitioner has not yet received the juror questionnaires.
questionnaires were critical in the selection of a jury.

These

As the State noted, the

questionnaires were the parties' "bible" during voir dire. (Tr., p. 5445, Ls. 1-3.) Further,
the Court has improperly precluded Petitioner from unrestricted access to jurors that
would provide additional support for this claim. Nevertheless, Petitioner asserts that he is
entitled to relief on this claim as set forth below.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to an impartial jury. Trial counsel
attempted to utilize a nationally recognized technique for effective assistance of counsel
in jury selection known as the "Colorado Method." This technique is based on capital
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jury selection jurisprudence as set forth in Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992)
(holding 'juror[ s] who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case" or are
unwilling or unable to give meaningful consideration to mitigating evidence must be
disqualified from service); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424-26 (1985) (holding that
trial judges may exclude jurors whose "views on [capital punishment] would 'prevent or
substantially impair the performance of [their] duties .... "'); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S.
38,42,49 (1980) (invalidating statute disqualifying any juror who would not swear "that
the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life would not affect his deliberations
on any issue of fact"); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,519-23 (1968) (holding that
the exclusion in capital cases of jurors conscientiously scrupled about capital punishment,
without inquiring whether they could consider the imposition of the death penalty in the
appropriate case, violated a defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury.)
Because the defendant must demonstrate that the juror lacks impartiality, voir dire
must be adequate to uncover such bias. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. at 733-34. It is not
enough simply to ask the jurors if they could be fair and follow the law. Id., at 734-36.
The defendant must be able to ascertain whether the prospective jurors find mitigating
evidence irrelevant or even not worth their consideration. Id., at 735.
The ABA Guidelines, pertaining to the effective assistance of counsel in a capital
jury selection, state that:
Counsel should be familiar with the precedents relating to questioning and
challenging of potential jurors, including the procedures surrounding
"death qualification" concerning any potential juror's beliefs about the
death penalty. Counsel should be familiar with techniques: (1) for
exposing those prospective jurors who would automatically impose the
death penalty following a murder conviction or finding that the defendant
is death-eligible, regardless of the individual circumstances of the case; (2)
for uncovering those prospective jurors who are unable to give meaningful
consideration to mitigating evidence; and (3) for rehabilitating potential
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jurors whose initial indications of opposition to the death penalty make
them possibly excludable.
Guideline 10.1 0.2.B. Counsel should devote substantial time to determining the
makeup of the venire, preparing a case-specific set of voir dire questions, planning a
strategy for voir dire, and choosing a jury most favorable to the theories of mitigation that
will be presented. Guideline 10.10.2, Commentary. Given the intricacy of the process
and the sheer amount of data to be managed, counsel should consider obtaining the
assistance of an expert jury consultant. Guideline 10.1 0.2.c.
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failure To Insist On
Appropriate Procedures Under ICR 24

Idaho Criminal Rule 24 requires that all jurors, including alternate jurors be
selected in the same manner, and be removed by lot at the conclusion of the trial:
... At the conclusion of closing arguments, jurors exceeding the number
required of a regular panel shall be removed by lot. Those removed by lot
may be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict, unless the
court otherwise directs as provided below.
LC.R. 21(d). There is no discretionary component to the first requirement of this rule,
'jurors exceeding the number shall be removed by lot." When a state implements
procedures designed to ensure a fair trial, including a fair jury selection process, it must
follow that process or violate a defendant's due process rights. Hicks v. Oklahoma,
supra. Trial counsel was therefore ineffective in stipulating to an alternate procedure

wherein the above prescribed procedure was abandoned:
MR. MYSHIN: And the other thing that has always given me heartburn is
this notion that alternate jurors are selected by lot andTHE COURT: I agree with you, sir. I think I am coming at this -- you
and I and Mr. Bower and Mr. Bourne and the Court have always agreed in
the past that this was a solution in search of a problem. I respect former
Justice Walters' committee and the work he did. He was motivated by an
effort, sincere effort to improve the system, but there wasn't a problem
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

here to fix. And I was hoping that by stipulation we would just agree to
do it the way we've always done it, which is the persons that end up sitting
in -- I will have a chart for you, seating chart that I'll show you. This is
the way we've done it before, the way we did it in State versus Payne in
fact. The persons that end up sitting in Boxes 13, 14 and 15 are alternates
No.1, No.2 and No.3 respectfully, but we don't tell them. We don't tell
them that they're alternates unless and until their services are no longer
needed when the jury is sent out to deliberate, so that human nature being
what it is, these folks will pay careful attention to every single thing that
happens in the trial and will only get the disappointing news when it is
necessary to tell them. I think you and I are on the same page.
MR. MYSHIN: We are, Judge, entirely on the same page. I just would
like to add fuel to the fire and tell you that it is my information that the
civil lawyers are the ones that cooked up this dismissal by lot idea. So it's
not us fine criminal lawyers. I think it's more the subject THE COURT: Sometimes they don't understand the differences in nature
between civil and criminal cases. I think the whole purpose of the struck
jury system is to know who you have coming and to know who's there and
to know, for example, that the person in Box 13 is Alternate No. 1 and the
person in Box 14 is Alternate No.2 and Box 15 is Alternate No.3, and
that that means something and we all know who they are in advance, but
we don't tell them that. Mr. Bourne, are you -- this is the way we've
always -- are you okay with it?
MR. BOURNE: We'll stipulate.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Myshin subject of a stipulation?
MR. MYSHIN: Yes, sir.
(Tr., p. 607, L. 21 - p. 609, L. 18.) Trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective under
Strickland in failing to guarantee that Petitioner receive all of the procedural protections

he was afforded by the State of Idaho. Investigation into this claim is ongoing, and in
part relies on receiving jury questionnaires and conducting juror interviews.
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2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Conduct An
Adequate Voir Dire, Failing To Move To Strike For Cause, And Failing
To Utilize A Preemptory Challenge To Strike Biased Jurors.
Petitioner asserts that trial counsel performance during jury selection was both
deficient and prejudicial under Strickland. Petitioner has retained an expert attorney,
David Lane, to assist in evaluating trial counsels' performance during voir dire,
especially in light of trial counsels' use of a jury selection technique known around the
country as "The Colorado Method of Jury Selection." (Exhibit 35.) The details of the
Colorado Method are set forth in Mr. Lane's declaration.
Mr. Lane concludes that "trial counsel attempted to utilize the Colorado method,
however the effort was absolutely premised upon a complete lack of understanding of the
basic principals of this technique." (Exhibit 35.) "Trial counsel's voir dire in every
instance was ineffective in identifying and ranking jurors, in stripping jurors to help in
the identification process and in insulating or isolating jurors, or in challenging
mitigation-impaired jurors for cause." (Exhibit 35.) Mr. Lane concluded:
The voir dire conducted in this matter was among the worst examples
of capital voir dire undersigned counsel has ever read. Trial counsel
failed repeatedly to challenge jurors for cause even in the face of the juror
telling the court and counsel that they would automatically vote for the
death penalty or that they were substantially impaired in their ability to
give meaningful consideration to mitigating evidence.
As a result, the jury consisted of many 7-rated jurors who should have
been excused for cause.
(Exhibit 35 at 39-40)(emphasis added).44

Mr. Lane's noted that he was "somewhat circumspect" in his analysis due to the lack of
jury questionnaires, but was confident based on the voir dire "that the level of
44
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Petitioner relies in part on the declaration of Mr. Lane to support his claim that
trial counsel was constitutionally deficient in failing to move to strike jurors for cause,
which left Petitioner with a biased, mitigation-impaired jury.

In addition to those

grounds set forth in the affidavit, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel should have moved
to strike the following jurors for cause for the reasons set forth below.

All of the

following claims require further investigation, including jury questionnaires and juror
interviews. Petitioner reserves the right to withdraw any claim at a future date if such
claim is not supported by facts uncovered during Petitioner's reinvestigation.

Juror Linda Ostolas indicated she would have great difficulty with sequestration
beyond a "few days." (Tr., p. 1056, Ls. 8-11.) Trial counsel should have moved to strike
for cause.

Juror Betty Mitchell indicated THAT she is a regular Greenbelt user. (Tr., p.
1829, Ls. 15-24.) Petitioner asserts that this juror's familiarity with the Greenbelt biased
her views of the crime and the Petitioner. Trial counsel should have moved to strike for
cause.

Juror Elisabeth Keeney knew Angie Abdullah, attended the same church, and
knew "a lot of information about her." (Tr., p. 2074, Ls. 12-19.) Petitioner asserts that
this juror's relationship with Angie Abdullah, the alleged victim in a near-simultaneous
capital murder trial, biased her views of the crime and Petitioner. Trial counsel should
have moved to strike for cause.

Juror Tammie Johnson had hearing impediments, had to wear hearing aids, and
suffered from hearing loss most of her life. (Tr., p. 2117, L. 22 - p. 2118, L.3, p. 2123,

performance by trial counsel in the voir dire is far below the standard of that of
reasonably effective trial counsel." (Exhibit _ at 17, nA.)
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Ls. 7-21.) Given the poor quality of the police interrogation tapes played to the jury,
Petitioner asserts that this juror was unable to hear critical evidence offered at trial. Trial
counsel should have moved to strike for cause.

Juror Omar Alloway previously worked for

moc,

including work at the

maximum security prison. (Tr., p. 2251 - p. 2252.) Petitioner asserts that this juror's
dealings with the correctional system, inmates, and death row inmates biased his views of
the crime and the Petitioner. Trial counsel should have moved to strike for cause.

Juror Ann McNeese is married to Timothy McNeese, who is a Deputy Attorney
General for the State of Idaho. Mr. McNeese is specifically assigned to the

moc.

His

job includes defending against conditions of confinement lawsuits, including those
brought by death-sentenced inmates. (See Gomez v. Spalding, D. Idaho, Civ. 91-0299-SLMB.)

Conditions of confinement were referenced during the sentencing phase of

Petitioner's trial.

See, e.g., Tr., p. 4904 et seq. (testimony of Dennis Dean).

Mr.

McNeese's job also includes developing the moc protocol to be used in executions. Mr.
McNeese was sanctioned by the federal district court for opening prisoner mail during a
conditions lawsuit, and possibly faced or faces bar sanctions. (Exhibit 36.) Petitioner
asserts that trial counsel should have moved to strike Ms. McNeese for cause. Ms.
McNeese ultimately served as the foreperson. It is hardly reasonable to assume that the
wife of an advocate for the State in carrying out death sentences would not be affected by
her husband's employment when determining whether to impose the death sentence.
Further, Petitioner served a 10-year term in the

moc

during the period that Mr.

McNeese served as the Deputy Attorney General. It is likely that Mr. McNeese was
familiar with Erick Hall and there is a reasonable probability that he shared discussions
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about inmates, possibly including Petitioner, as well as infonnation about conditions of
confinement and other matters that a juror might consider, appropriately or not, during
the sentencing process with his wife. As stated, Petitioner does not have trial transcripts,
the record or files in this case and thus has not had the opportunity to review them. In
addition to the above, because a key State witness-Jay Rosenthal-also worked for the
Attorney General's office, Ms. McNeese was not able to objectively weigh his testimony.
Furthennore, Ms. McNeese worked for IDOC, which biased her views of the crime and
Petitioner. Moreover, Ms. McNeese's cousin was raped and murdered. It is unreasonable
to assume that that event did not color Ms. McNeese's views of crime and punishment.
Petitioner asserts that that event biased her views of the crime and Petitioner. Trial
counsel should have moved to strike for cause.
Juror Joann Brown's husband was an investigator for the U.S. Investigative
Services.

(Tr., pp. 2547 - 2548.)

Petitioner asserts that this juror was unable to

objectively weigh law enforcement testimony and had biased views toward the crime and
Petitioner.
Juror Luke Call admitted that his mind wanders in the afternoon. (Tr., p. 2863,
L. 25 - p. 2864, L.3.) Petitioner asserts that this juror was unable to hear evidence at trial

and sentencing.
Juror James Kennedy works for the Department of Transportation and works
with a Deputy Attorney General. (Tr., p. 3020, Ls. 19-20.) The juror works, with his
son, with the Ada County Court. (Tr., p. 3022, Ls. 10-16.) The juror worked at the
penitentiary for several years, and managed Correction Industries, and had inmates
working for him. (Tr., p. 3044, Ls. 13-16, p. 3045, Ls. 5-6.) The juror worked for the
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Department of Law Enforcement. (Tr., p. 3051, Ls. 1-2.) Petitioner asserts that this
juror's background biased his views against the crime and Petitioner.
Juror Diane Proctor works for the Sheriffs Office and was a former neighbor of
Detective Dave Smith, a key prosecution witness. (Tr., p. 3074, Ls. 6-7, p. 3075, Ls. 39.) Petitioner asserts that this juror's background biased her views against the crime and
Petitioner. Trial counsel should have moved to strike for cause.
3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Object To
The Court's Preliminary Instructions To Jurors.
The preliminary question asked by the Court prior to the commencement of voir
dire by counsel simply asked whether the jurors would weigh aggravation against

mitigation and arrive at a decision. This is a burden..:shifting question, as the prosecutor
has to prove an aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt prior to the weighing process. Trial
counsel was ineffective under Strickland in failing to object to the court's erroneous
instructions to jurors. Instructions that shift the burden of persuasion violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that the state prove every element of a criminal
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979);
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).

x.

DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
FAILING TO ENSURE THAT ALL PROCEEDINGS WERE RECORDED
AND THAT PETITIONER WAS PRESENT FOR ALL PROCEEDINGS.
Numerous unrecorded proceedings were held in chambers without Petitioner's

presence. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to protect
Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to be present and his due process right to meaningful
appellate and post-conviction review. The ABA Guidelines provide in part:
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[C]ounsel at every stage must ensure that there is a complete record
respecting all claims that are made, including objections, motions,
statements of grounds, questioning of witnesses or venire members, oral
and written arguments of both sides, discussions among counsel and the
court, evidence proffered and received, rulings of the court, reasons given
by the court for its rulings, and any agreements reached between the
parties. If a court refuses to allow a proceeding to be recorded, counsel
should state the objection to the court's refusal, to the substance of the
court's ruling, and then at the first available opportunity make a record of
what transpired in the unrecorded proceeding.
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.8. See also Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357,
358 (1993). Proceedings that Petitioner is aware took place off the record and outside his
presence include:
•

An unrecorded in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and
the State in which the parties discussed a note received from the jury
foreman during jury deliberations. (Tr., p. 5463, L. 25 - p. 5464, L. 11.)
(noting that jury foreperson Ann McNeese was concerned that her privacy,
i.e., identity, had been violated in open court).

•

An unrecorded in-chambers conference with the Court and trial counsel in
which the parties discussed retaining attorney Rolf Kehne as a jury
consultant. (Tr., p. 2062, Ls. 3-8.) There was no mention of Petitioner's
presence.

•

An unrecorded discussion between trial counsel and the Court in which
the parties discussed trial counsel's intention not to file a brief, and the
decision to not employ Mr. Kehne "from this point forward" as a jury
consultant. (Tr., p. 2067, Ls. 10-20.) There was no mention of
Petitioner's presence.

•

An unrecorded, in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and
the State in which the parties discussed expert access to Petitioner, use of
experts, and the defense's Motion to Suppress. (Tr., p. 530, L.9 - p. 535,
L. 20.) There was no mention of Petitioner's presence.

•

An unrecorded, in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and
the State in which the parties discussed the videotapes and transcripts of
the interrogations of Petitioner. (Tr., p. 359, L. 9 - p. 362, L.3.) Petitioner
was not present, apparently at the request of trial counsel. (Tr., p. 359, Ls.
3-12.)
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•

An unrecorded, in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and
possibly the State in which the parties discussed the logistics and
substance of what portions of the videotapes would be shown and "the
issues that Defense was concerned about." (Tr., p. 431, Ls. 3-17.) There
was no mention of Petitioner's presence.

Petitioner is still investigating this claim. His investigation has been compromised
by trial counsels' failure to adequately consult with him, making it difficult, if not
impossible, to identify matters that are not of record.
Y. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
FAILING TO RAISES CHALLENGES TO ANY NONSTATUTORY
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Challenge The Introduction Of Victim Impact Evidence.

The jury was instructed to consider and weigh all evidence presented at
sentencing. The jury was also instructed that "victims" have a right to personally address
them regarding the victim's personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the
defendant's crimes. (Tr., p. 4955, L. 16 - p. 4956, L. 3.) The jury was never told that
victim impact is not evidence. The instructions gave the jury absolutely no guidance on
how to utilize such statements in assessing the gravity of aggravating circumstances, the
existence or weight of mitigation, and the weighing of aggravators against the mitigation.
It is reasonably likely that the jury, considered victim impact as non-statutory

aggravating circumstances. As such, without a proper limiting construction, the victim
impact is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Eighth Amendment and violated
Petitioner's rights to due process and notice as protected by the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.
It is reasonably likely that the jury used the victim impact when weighing the

aggravators against the mitigation. Victim impact is irrelevant to any of the statutory
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aggravating circumstances. The introduction of the victim impact without additional
instructions violated Petitioner's due process rights, as protected by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, as well as his rights under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments.
It is reasonably likely that the jury used the victim impact in a way that precluded

or otherwise undermined their ability to give meaningful consideration to Petitioner's
mitigating evidence in violation of Petitioner's due process rights, as protected by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as his rights under the Sixth and Eighth
Amendments.
In addition, introduction of unsworn victim impact statements not subjected to

cross-examination violated Petitioner's right to confront witnesses against him under the
Sixth Amendment, as well as his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Due to time constraints and Petitioner's duty to investigate matters outside the
record as well as matters hidden within the record, Petitioner has not had sufficient time
to consider all elements of this legal issue, as well as other legal issues in this case, and
reserves the right to provide further factual and legal support for this and all other issues
raised in this Amended Petition.

Nevertheless, Petitioner asserts that he has satisfied

both prongs of Strickland.

2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Challenge The Introduction Of Any Nonstatutory Aggravating
Circumstances.
Beyond the victim impact evidence, other nonstatutory aggravating circumstances
were introduced against Petitioner, including his convictions for Escape and Burglary as
well as evidence that he committed a forcible rape against Norma Jean Oliver. Petitioner
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asserts that none of this evidence was admissible for reasons stated in this claim and
through the Amended Petition.
Prior to Ring v. Arizona, the Idaho Supreme Court, in State v. Creech, 105 Idaho
362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983), held that the finding of aggravating circumstances other than
those listed in I.C. § 19-2515, was not error as long as at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance was found beyond a reasonable doubt:
We hold that the list of aggravating factors set forth in the statute is not
exclusive, albeit one of those factors must necessarily be found to exist
beyond a reasonable doubt for a sentence of death to be upheld.
Id. at 369-70,670 P.2d at 470-71.

In the advent of jury sentencing, trial counsel should have challenged the
admissibility of non-statutory aggravating circumstances on the following grounds:
•

That such evidence was not pled by way of Indictment or Information;

•

That jury was not properly instructed on the manner in which to consider
nonstatutory aggravating circumstances and likely weighed them when
finding statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and
when weighing such statutory aggravators against the mitigation;

•

That I.C. 19-2515, in its latest incarnation post-Ring, does not provide for
consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances and provides an
exclusive list of statutory aggravating circumstances;

•

That neither the statute nor the instructions given offer any guidance to jury
and thus affords them unbridled discretion;

•

That the jury was not instructed to find the nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; and

•

That Petitioner was not given adequate notice.

Trial counsel should have objected to nonstatutory aggravating circumstances
based on Petitioner's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Petitioner asserts that he has satisfied both prongs of Strickland.
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Z. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
FAILING TO RAISES CHALLENGES
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

TO

THE

STATUTORY

Aggravating circumstances must "genuinely narrow the class of death-eligible
persons" in a way that reasonably 'justifies the imposition of a more severe sentence on
the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Zant v. Stephens, 462 US.
462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). Further, both on their face, and as applied, aggravating
circumstances must permit the sentencer to make a "principled distinction between those
who deserve the death penalty and those who do not." Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 US. 764, 774
(1990); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 US. 356 (1988) ("[t]he construction or application

of an aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally broad or vague if it does not channel
or limit the sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty").
Even if an aggravating circumstance is vague on its face, it can nevertheless
support a death sentence if the state courts have narrowed its scope to a constitutionally
sufficient degree and if such a narrowing construction actually guided the sentencer in the
case under review. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 US. 420 (1980). Applying this principle, the
US. Supreme Court held that Idaho's limiting instruction of the "utter disregard for
human life" aggravating circumstance, specifically, that the aggravator "is meant to be
reflective of acts or circumstances surrounding the crime which exhibit the highest, the
utmost, callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded pitiless slayer," was
sufficient under the Eighth Amendment. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 468 (1993).
Idaho's limiting instruction was satisfactory because it defined a "state of mind that is
ascertainable from surrounding facts." Id. at 1541-42. Because some murderers do exhibit
feeling, the Court also determined that the aggravating circumstance genuinely narrowed
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the class of persons eligible for the death penalty as required by Zant v. Stephens, 462
US. 862 (1983). Id.
Petitioner recognizes that he is asserting, for at least a few of the claims below,
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise challenges that the Idaho Supreme
Court, and even in one case, the US. Supreme Court, have previously rejected.
Nevertheless, trial counsel has a duty to consider all potential claims in capital cases. See
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline, 10.8 ("As described in the commentary to
Guideline 1.1, counsel also has a duty, pursuant to Subsection (A)(3)(a)-(c) of this
Guideline, to preserve issues calling for a change in existing precedent; the client's life
may well depend on how zealously counsel discharges this duty.") Indeed, over the past
few years, the US. Supreme Court has expressed a willingness to overrule precedent in
capital cases. See e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 US. 551 (2005) (holding that it is
unconstitutional to execute juveniles, overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 US. 361
(1989)); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US. 304 (2002) (holding that it is unconstitutional to
execute the mentally retarded, overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)); Ring
v. Arizona, 536 US. 584 (2002) (holding that a jury must find aggravating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt, overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)).
With the advent of jury sentencing, counsel should have considered raising all
claims for reconsideration by the Idaho Supreme Court and federal courts. See State v.
Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 877, 781 P.2d 197, 214 (1989) (recognizing that Idaho's
"especially

heinous,

atrocious

or

cruel"

aggravating
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unconstitutional if relied upon in a jury sentencing). The failure to raise a claim on the
grounds that it has been repeatedly rejected may cost a capital defendant his life.

45

This following does not represent a final statement of this claim. Petitioner
requires additional time to fully state the legal and factual grounds for all challenges to
the statutory aggravating circumstances listed under this claim.
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To

Challenge Aggravating Circumstances As Vague And Overbroad.
Trial counsel should have argued that, in light of jury sentencing in Idaho, the
following aggravating circumstances were vague and overbroad in violation of the Eighth
Amendment:
a. The "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating circumstance set
forth in I.C. § 19-2515(9)(e).
b. The "utter disregard for human life" aggravating circumstance set forth in
I.C. § 19-2515(9)(f).
c. The "propensity" aggravating circumstance set forth in I.C. § 192515(9)(h). But see State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 674 P.2d 396 (1983).

2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Challenge Aggravating Circumstances On The Grounds That An
Inadequate Limiting Construction Was Given.
Trial counsel should have argued that, in light of jury sentencing in Idaho, that the
limiting instructions were insufficient to pass muster under the Eighth Amendment:

For example, in Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), the Supreme Court declined to
address the merits of a petitioner'S claim that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated
by the testimony of a psychiatrist who had examined him without warning him that the
interview could be used against him. Appellate counsel failed to assert this claim because
the Virginia Supreme Court had rejected such claims. The Supreme Court subsequently
found such testimony unconstitutional in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). The
Court concluded that the claim was not deemed sufficiently novel to constitute cause for
the procedural default. Id., at 536-37. Mr. Smith was barred from raising the issue in
federal habeas proceedings, id., at 539, and later executed.
45
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a. The "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" (herein "HAC") aggravating
circumstance set forth in I.C. § 19-2515(9)(e). But see Leavitt v. A rave,
383 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2004).
The limiting instruction given to the jury was inadequate, in part, because it did
not preclude the jury's consideration of circumstances occurring after the victim's death
when determining whether the aggravator existed. Cf State v. Kingsley, 252 Kan. 761,
851 P.2d 370, 390 (1993) (holding that in regard to the "heinous, atrocious or cruel"
factor: "[t]he murder is complete with the death of the victim. Subsequent abuse of the
body would not constitute the manner in which the murder was committed"); Robedeaux
v. State, 866 P.2d 417,435 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (same)
b. The "utter disregard for human life" aggravating circumstance set forth in
I.C. § 19-2515(9)(f). But see Arave v. Creech507 U.S. 463, 468 (1993).
The limiting instruction given to the jury was inadequate, in part, because it does
not limit the language, "circumstances surrounding [the murder's] commission," to premortem conduct of the defendant. Cf State v. Kingsley, 252 Kan. 761, 851 P.2d 370,390
(1993) (holding that in regard to the "heinous, atrocious or cruel" factor: "[t]he murder is
complete with the death of the victim. Subsequent abuse of the body would not constitute
the manner in which the murder was committed"); Robedeaux v. State, 866 P.2d 417, 435
(Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (same); but see State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 103-04, 967 P.2d
702, 717-18 (1998).
c. The "propensity" aggravating circumstance set forth in I.C. § 192515(9)(h). But see State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 674 P.2d 396 (1983).
First, the limiting instruction given to the jury was inadequate, in part, because it
permitted the jury to consider circumstances occurring after the victim's death when
determining whether the aggravator existed. Cf State v. Kingsley, 252 Kan. 761, 851
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P.2d 370, 390 (1993) (holding that in regard to the "heinous, atrocious or cruel" factor:
"[t]he murder is complete with the death of the victim. Subsequent abuse of the body
would not constitute the manner in which the murder was committed"); Robedeaux v.
State, 866 P.2d 417, 435 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (same)
Second, the limiting instruction does not distinguish this aggravator from the
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravator. The jury could determine that both
aggravating circumstances exist on the single determination that the defendant enjoys to
kill. Specifically, "cruel" as used in the "HAC" aggravator means murder "with utter
indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others."} (emphasis added). This
definition is sufficiently similar to "propensity," which is described a person with "an
affmity toward committing the act of murder," to render the "propensity" aggravator
unconstitutionally duplicative.
Third, the limiting instruction does not limit consideration of the defendant's
"continuing threat to society" to an incarcerated environment. Instead, the jury was
invited to consider the risk to the public upon the speculation that the defendant might be
released, or might escape, from prison. Specifically, the prosecution urged the jury to find
this aggravator based solely on a finding of propensity, without regard to any actual
likelihood that he would commit another murder. (Tr., p. 5459, Ls. 18-21) ("If you're
tempted to give him prison over this, remember prison only affect (sic) his ability to
murder? He still has that propensity to murder. He's still a threat."}.}(sic added}. In
addition, trial counsel should have requested a definition of "society" limiting it to the
prison context.
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3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Challenge The "Propensity" Aggravating Circumstances On The
Grounds Other Grounds That Asking A Jury To Find That He "Likely
Constitutes A Continuing Threat To Society" Is Unconstitutional In
Vlolation Of The Mandate Of Ring V. Arizona, In That It Permits The
Jury To Find An Aggravating Circumstances By A Preponderance Of
The Evidence.
4. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Challenge Aggravating Circumstances On The Grounds That There Was
Insufficient Evidence To Find The Aggravating Circumstances Beyond A
Reasonable Doubt.
Trial counsel should have argued that there was insufficient evidence to find the
following aggravating circumstances:
a. The "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating circumstance set
forth in I.e. § 19-2515(9)(e).
b. The "utter disregard for human life" aggravating circumstance set forth in
I.C. § 19-2515(9)(f).
c. The aggravating circumstance set forth in I.C. § 19-2515(9)(g).
d. The "propensity" aggravating circumstance set forth in I.C. § 192515(9)(h).
AA.

DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
FAILING TO ADEQUATELY RAISE LEGAL CHALLENGES.

To render effective assistance of counsel, capital counsel must consider all legal
claims potentially available to protect the client's constitutional rights and stay abreast of
the latest developments in the law that might provide additional claims for the client.
ABA Guidelines, Guidelines 1O.8.A.l; 1O.8.C.1.
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1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Move To Challenge The Idaho Death Penalty Scheme And Disqualify The
District Court For Lack Of Qualifications To Preside Over A Capital
Case.
Trial counsel should have challenged the Idaho death penalty scheme on the
grounds that it does not require judicial qualifications for district court judges to preside
over capital cases. In addition, trial counsel should have moved to disqualify this Court
from presiding over this case due to a lack of death penalty qualifications in light of all
the new law and issues applicable to capital jury sentencing which were previously
irrelevant under Idaho's former death penalty scheme. Trial counsel should have drawn
upon the language and rationale of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 42 that provides:
(a) In order to insure the highest degree of judicial competency during a
capital trial and sentencing hearing Capital Litigation Seminars approved
by the Supreme Court shall be established for judges that may as part of
their designated duties preside over capital litigation. The Capital
Litigation Seminars should include, but not be limited to, the judge's role
in capital cases, motion practice, current procedures in jury selection,
substantive and procedural death penalty case law, confessions, and the
admissibility of evidence in the areas of scientific trace materials, genetics,
and DNA analysis. Seminars on capital cases shall be held twice a year.
(b) Any circuit court judge or associate judge who in his current
assignment may be called upon to preside over a capital case shall attend a
Capital Litigation Seminar at least once every two years.
The Special Supreme Court Committee on Capital Cases explained the need for
the rule in part as follows:
The committee's proposal to require judicial training follows from the
finding that reliability and fairness in a capital trial depend upon the skill
and knowledge of the trial judge, the prosecutor, and counsel for the
defense. The training requirement for judges complements rules
establishing minimum qualifications for trial counsel and prosecutors in
capital cases .... Rule 43 is intended to increase judicial training and access
to information and should not be viewed as a limitation on the kind or
amount of training judges receive. For example, in requiring attendance at
seminars, Rule 43 is not intended to foreclose the use of video
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conferencing, Internet access, or other technological means to participate
in training from remote locations. Trial judges are encouraged to
participate in additional training whenever possible. It is contemplated that
any judge who presides over a capital case on or after the effective date of
paragraph (b) of the rule will have prior thereto attended a Capital
Litigation Seminar.
The "reliability and fairness" required in capital cases is mandated by the Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Trial counsel should have relied on these
constitutional mandates in challenging Idaho's death penalty scheme, which currently
only requires qualifications for trial counsel. See ICR 44.3. Further, trial counsel should
have moved to disqualify this Court as unqualified to preside over a capital case,
especially in light of the new death penalty scheme requiring jury sentencing. Trial
counsels' failures to make these challenges constituted deficient performance. Their
deficient performance prejudiced Petitioner because the "reliability and fairness" of his
proceedings was undermined by the lack of the Court's "skill and knowledge" in
fundamental areas of capital jurisprudence. For instance, during jury selection, the Court
indicated that it was not familiar with some constitutional concepts common in capital
jury sentencing litigation. For instance:
•

The Court did not understand what trial counsel meant when counsel
moved to excuse a potential juror on the grounds that the juror was
"substantially mitigation impaired." (Tr., p. 2030, Ls. 2-3.)

•

The Court did not understand what trial counsel meant when counsel
relied on the decision in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), in
support of a motion to excuse a juror for cause. (Tr., p. 2032, Ls. 21-22)("1
don't know anything about Whitt (sic). Do you want to give me a
cite?")(sic added).46

46 In Witt, the Supreme Court clarified the standard for excusing a potential capital juror
for cause, holding that "the standard is whether the juror's views would 'prevent or
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath." ld., at 424. A recent Westlaw search of all state and federal
cases for ("Wainwright v. Witt") yielded 2085 results, exceeding by approximately 500
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•

The Court expressed frustration with Rolf Kehne's assistance as a jury
consultant. (Tr., p. 2062, Ls. 9-14) ("I'm now getting a cite Whitt (sic) v.
Waynewright (sic) that I've not heard before, that I've never had a chance
to look at. Sixth Amendment has been referred to in ways that are unclear
without a chance to reflect on it, and a brief that's promised after the
weekend.") (sic added).47

•

The Court readily invited trial counsel to elicit a waiver from Petitioner his
right to challenge his counsels' ineffectiveness during the jury selection
process. (Tr., p. 2536, L. 23 -po 2540, L. 19.)

Trial counsel had a duty to assess the new death penalty statute, in all its facets.
Trial counsel should have recognized the need for qualified judges, just as they should
have recognized the need to reassess what it means to be a qualified trial lawyer in the
State of Idaho with the advent of jury sentencing. Trial counsels' failure to challenge the
lack of a judge-qualifying procedure and their failure to move to disqualify this Court as
unqualified constituted deficient performance. Petitioner asserts that but for counsels'
deficient performance, he would not have been convicted of murder of the first degree or
sentenced to death.
similar searches for ("Woodson v. North Carolina") and ("Ring v. Arizona"), but falling
short of ("Furman v. Georgia") with just under 3000 results. The same search for
("Wainwright v. Witt") but limited to Idaho cases yielded just two results, the most recent
decided over fifteen years ago, State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 807 P.2d 610 (1991). It is a
simple and natural consequence of Idaho's long history of judicial sentencing, that Idaho
district and appellate courts are not accustomed with addressing capital jury selection
procedures. This fact is born out by the somewhat crude but meaningful Westlaw search
demonstrations.
47 Beyond the right to effective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment provides that
an "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed ... ") The Sixth Amendment jury-trial right "guarantees to the criminally
accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717, 722 (1961). At its core, the right contemplates that jurors will render their decision
based on the law and the facts presented. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73
(1965). The right to an impartial juror in capital cases is likewise grounded, not in the
Eighth Amendment, but in the Sixth Amendment. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 414.
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2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Object To Jurors Use Of Inaccurate Transcripts While Viewing
Videotaped Interrogations Of Petitioner.
Trial counsel failed to object to the use of transcripts as "an aid to understanding"
video tape recordings of police interrogations of Petitioner. (Tr., p. 4024, L. 13 - p.
4027, L. 18) The videotapes were of "pretty marginal" quality. (Tr., p. 4020, L.8) The
transcripts were inaccurate and the transcripts of those videotapes stated "inaudible" in
places where a person could hear what was being said. (Tr., p. 4020, Ls. 12-16) Trial
counsel's failure to object to the jury's use of these transcripts was clearly deficient.
Investigation of this claim is ongoing, since counsel for Petitioner have not yet received
copies of the transcripts provided to the jury, or the tapes-as played-to the jury. At
least one juror had a significant hearing impediment and would most likely have relied on
the transcripts rather than the poor audio quality of the tape. (Tr., p. 2217, L. 22 - p.
2118, L. 3, p. 2123, Ls. 7-21)

3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Object To
The Prosecutor's Misconduct During Opening And Closing Arguments
At Both Phases Of The Trial.
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the
prosecution's improper arguments at both phases of the trial. In support of this claim,
Petitioner incorporates by reference Claims I, Trial counsel were ineffective for allowing
each these arguments to be presented to the jury without objection. But for trial counsels'
failure to object and request a mistrial, and in the alternative, request an admonishment
and corrective instruction by the Court, there is a reasonable probability that the result of
the proceedings would have been different.
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4. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Challenge
The Failure Of Idaho's Death Penalty Scheme And Instructions To
Adequately Address The Weighing Process.

a. Trial counsel should have challenged the constitutionality of the death
penalty statute for its failure to assign a burden of proof to the jury's
weighing findings.
A defendant cannot be sentenced to death, even if aggravators are found, unless it
is also found that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigation. See e.g., State
v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 153, 774 P.2d 299, 323 (1989) ("We hold that the trial

court may sentence the defendant to death, only if the trial court finds that all the
mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the gravity of each of the aggravating
circumstances found and make imposition of death unjust.") Unless this additional
finding is made, the maximum punishment is life without the possibility of parole.
Accordingly, based on the rationale of Ring, this finding represents a finding that must be
presented to a jury and found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. The rule adopted by the
Court in Ring states:
[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice
and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than
prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Ring, 536 U.S. at 600 (citations omitted). See also, Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256 (Colo.

2003) (holding that the determination of whether aggravation outweighs mitigation is of
the type of factual finding encompassed by Ring); Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787, 59
P.3d 450 (2002).
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Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to challenge the
Idaho death penalty scheme for removing from the State the burden of proving this fact
beyond a reasonable doubt.
In addition, by failing to assign the burden upon the State, the new death penalty

statute impermissibly shifts the burden of proof upon the defendant to disprove an
element, or functional equivalent of an element, or even just an essential fact. This
violates the defendant's rights to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), as well as his rights under
the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. But see
State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405,417,631 P.2d 187, 199 (1981) (holding pre-Ring, that

the scheme does not violate due process because weighing process is not part of an
element of the offense).
Petitioner asserts that trial counsels' failures to challenge the weighing process
satisfies both prongs of Strickland.
b. Trial counsel should have challenged the constitutionality of the death
penalty statute for its failure to define "sufficiently compelling" in a
manner requiring that the individual aggravating circumstances outweigh
the mitigation.
Under well-established Idaho law, the rule is that a defendant cannot be sentenced
to death unless it found that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigation. See
e.g., State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 153, 774 P.2d 299, 323 (1989) (holding that a

defendant can be sentenced to death, only if it is found "that all the mitigating
circumstances do not outweigh the gravity of each of the aggravating circumstances
found and make imposition of death unjust.") Accordingly, if the mitigation outweighs
the gravity of each of the aggravators, by any degree, then the defendant cannot be
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sentenced to death. Under Idaho law, even where the mitigation is only of equal weight to
the gravity of the aggravation, the maximum punishment is fixed life.

48

Trial counsel should have challenged the new Idaho death penalty statute because
it does not provide that the individual aggravators must outweigh the mitigation. The
death penalty statute provides in relevant part:
If the statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, whether all mitigating circumstances, when weighed
against the aggravating circumstance, are sufficiently compelling that the
death penalty would be unjust.

I.e.

§ 19-2515 (8)( a)(ii). The statute does not define "sufficiently compelling" as

requiring the aggravation to "outweigh" the mitigation. The instructions likewise provide
no definition for "sufficiently compelling" and do not require that the jury find that
individual aggravators each "outweigh" the mitigation.
There is simply no way of knowing whether the jury imposed a death sentence
even if they believed the mitigation was of equal weight to the aggravation. Indeed, there
is a reasonable probability that the jury believed that the mitigation outweighed the
aggravation, but not in such a manner or degree as to make imposition of the death
penalty unjust. It may very well be that the jury believed that the mitigation must
substantially outweigh the aggravation for the imposition of the death penalty to be unjust
under the facts of this case. The State advocated this unconstitutional interpretation of
the statute. In closing argument, the Ada County Prosecutor argued:
48 In Kansas v. Marsh, 04-1170 (cert granted May 31,2005) (case below: 102 P.3d 445
(Kansas)), the United States Supreme Court is presented with the question of whether a
death penalty statute violates the Eighth Amendment if it provides for the death penalty
to be imposed when the sentencing jury finds the aggravating and mitigating factors to be
equal. To the extent the Idaho Supreme Court construes the new death penalty statute in a
fashion inconsistent with its prior construction, Petitioner asserts that such construction
violates the Eighth Amendment.
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And I believe that when we go back over these things you will agree that
these aggravating factors have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and
that the mitigation does not outweigh the aggravation in a manner that
would make the death penalty unjust ...
(Tr., p. 5447, Ls. 6-11.) It is worth repeating: the prosecutor tells the jury that the law
requires imposition ofthe death sentence so long as "the mitigation does not outweigh the
aggravation in a manner that would make the death penalty unjust." What could that
mean other than that the jury could find that the mitigation outweighs the aggravation,
but perhaps not "in a manner" that would make the death penalty unjust? The prosecutor
played off the lack of guidance provided by the statute or the instructions, and, in the
course of doing so, violated Petitioner's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. Trial counsel, seemingly ignorant of the prosecutor's slight of
hand, failed to object, and moreover, failing to challenge the death penalty weighing
scheme as unconstitutional and in failing to request a jury instruction for the proper
weighing required as set forth in Charboneau and its progeny.
c. Trial counsel should have challenged the Court's instruction that the jurors
have a duty to consult with one another regarding their findings, including
their findings of whether mitigation exists and whether the mitigation is
sufficiently compelling as to make the imposition of the death penalty
unjust because the instruction undermines the defendant's constitutional
rights to the individual opinion of each juror who exercises his or her own
personal moral judgment despite competing views or moral beliefs of the
other jurors.
A capital defendant has a due process and Eighth Amendment right to the
individual opinion of each juror who exercises his or her own reasoned moral judgnlent,
regardless of the competing views or beliefs of the other jurors. See e.g., Simmons v.

South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 172 (1994)(Souter, J. and Steven, J., concurring); Mills v.
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367,382 (1988).
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These rights were violated by the Court's Instruction No. 51 informing the jurors
that they had a duty to consult with one another before making their own individual
decisions, and to deliberate with the goal of reaching an agreement as a group. (Tr., p.
5439, Ls. 10 - p. 5440, L. 5.) Further, the instruction suggesting that even the juror's
individual beliefs about the existence of a mitigating fact, i.e., whether certain evidence
presented was actually mitigating, and the weight afforded to any mitigation found,
should be subjected to the views of the other jurors. Petitioner asserts that trial counsels'
failures satisfy both prongs of Strickland.
5. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Request A
Special Jury Instruction That Would Require The Jury To Provide
Written Findings Delineating The Mitigating Circumstances That Were
Found And In Their Failure To Challenge The New Death Penalty
Statute On Grounds That It Forces A Defendant To Choose Between
Constitutional Rights.
Prior to the new death penalty statute, a judge was required to make written
findings setting forth any statutory aggravating circumstance found and set forth in
writing any mitigating factors considered. I.C. § 19-2515(f) (Michie 2000). The failure
to make such written findings constituted reversible error. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho
405,415-16,631 P.2d 187, 197-98 (1981).
A written findings requirement serves two purposes: (1) it helps to ensure that the
imposition of the sentence of death is reasoned and objective as constitutionally required,
and (2) it protects a capital defendant's right to meaningful appellate review.

See

Osborn, at 414-15; 631 P.2d at 196-97. Without the findings, the reviewing court cannot

determine whether the fact-finder overlooked or ignored any mitigation that was
presented, whether the evidence supports the aggravating factors found, and whether the
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fact-fmder properly weighed all factors. Id. at 415,631 P.2d at 197; State v. Pratt, 125
Idaho 546, 873 P.2d 800 (1993).
Pursuant to the current version of the statute, if a defendant waives the right to a
jury at his sentencing proceeding, the district court is still required to make written
findings of the aggravation, mitigation considered, and the weighing process. I.C. § 192515(8)(b). In contrast, when a defendant chooses not to waive his Sixth Amendment
right to a jury, he must forgo the written findings requirement; a jury is only required to
indicate on special verdict forms whether a statutory aggravating circumstance has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and "whether all mitigating circumstances, when
weighed against the aggravating circumstance, are sufficiently compelling that the death
penalty would be unjust." I.C. § 19-2515(8)(a).
Because the jury is not required to specify the mitigating circumstances it found, a
defendant who chooses to have a jury make the findings of fact at his sentencing
proceeding relinquishes his constitutional right to have his sentence meaningfully
reviewed by the district court and by the Idaho Supreme Court on direct appeal and as a
part of its mandatory sentencing review under I.e. § 19-2827.

Without a complete

record, the district court and the Idaho Supreme Court are precluded from conducting a
meaningful review which includes a determination whether imposition of the death
sentence was reasoned and objective or the result of arbitrariness and passion. See e.g.,

Osborn, at 415,631 P.2d at 197 ("If the findings of the lower court are not set forth with
reasonable exactitude, this court would be forced to make its review on an inadequate
record, and could not fulfill the function of 'meaningful appellate review' demanded by
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court."); see also State v. Lanliford, 116
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Idaho 860, 877, 781 P.2d 197, 214 (1989) (recognizing the increased potential of
arbitrary and inconsistent imposition of the death penalty by juries).
Trial counsel should have requested a special verdict form requiring the jury to
delineate the mitigating circumstances it found and the weighing of such mitigation
against the individual aggravating circumstances when rendering its sentencing decision.
Petitioner has been deprived of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to
have this Court and an appellate court make a meaningful determination of whether his
sentence was the product a reasoned and objective, as opposed to an arbitrary and
unguided, analysis.
Trial counsel should have requested special written findings from the jury, as
required of judges, on all the federal constitutional grounds stated above. In addition,
counsel should have asserted that the new death penalty statute is unconstitutional
because it forces a defendant to choose between his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
and his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Because of trial counsel's
ineffectiveness, Petitioner has lost the necessary predicate for his right to a meaningful
review. Petitioner's sentence should thus be vacated and be afforded a new sentencing
proceeding where the sentencer is required to provide adequate written findings.

6. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Request A
Special Jury Instruction That Would Require The Jury To Provide
Written Findings Delineating The Evidence Considered In Finding The
Aggravating Circumstances And By Failing To Request An Instruction
To The Jury That The Same Evidence Can Be Used To Find Multiple
Aggravating Circumstances So Long As Additional Aggravating
Evidence Is Found To Support The Other Aggravator Beyond A
Reasonable Doubt.
In determining whether a certain aggravating circumstance exists, the jury may
consider the same evidence they considered in relation to a different aggravator so long
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as the jury finds additional aggravating evidence to support a finding of that particular
aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197,210, 731 P.2d 192,
205 (1986). Trial counsel should have requested written findings and an instruction to
prohibit improper duplication of evidence in support of multiple aggravating
circumstances. Without written findings, the record is insufficient to detennine whether
the jury properly considered additional aggravating evidence to support its finding of
each of the aggravating circumstances. The lack of findings violated Petitioner's rights
under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner asserts that he has
satisfied both prongs of Strickland showing that trial counsels' failures denied him
effective assistance of counsel.
7. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Object To
The Court's Instruction Regarding The Governor's Power To Commute
Or Pardon.

At the request of the State, and without objection by trial counsel, (Tr., p. 5420,
Ls. 1-4), the Court gave the following instruction, not previously approved by Idaho
appellate courts or contained in the proposed Idaho Supreme Court death penalty
instructions:
The governor of the State of Idaho has the authority to grant a
commutation or pardon for any crime except treason, based upon a
recommendation from the Idaho Department of Pardons and Parole. Such
a commutation or pardon could apply to either a life or death sentence.
(Tr., p. 5438, L. 25 - p. 5439, L. 5.) This instruction was constitutionally infinn for
several reasons including, but not limited to the following. First, the instruction has not
been approved by the Idaho Legislature or the Idaho Supreme Court. Second, the
instruction is not an accurate and complete statement of Idaho law. Third, the instruction
failed to instruct the jury not to speculate on what parole authorities will do in the future.
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Fourth, the instruction diminishes the jury's sense of responsibility for the gravity of their
decision in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. But see California v.
Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1001-1005, 1014 (1983). Fifth, the instruction diverts the jury from
its individualized sentencing determination mandated by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. But see Ramos, supra. Finally, Petitioner asserts that his federal right to
due process was violated because there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury utilized the
instruction in an unconstitutional manner.
While the Supreme Court decision in Ramos would seemingly approve this
instruction, the rationale of Ramos is called into question by Ring. Specifically, when
rejecting Ramos' Beck49 argument that the instruction diverts the sentencer's attention
from a "central focus," the Court distinguished Beck on the grounds that Beck involved
the guilt/innocence phase where the prosecution bore the burden of proving elements of
capital murder whereas Ramos' case involved an instruction at the penalty phase
involving no similar "central issue." Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1007-09. Petitioner asserts that
Ramos no longer controls since capital sentencing now involves a jury's determination of
elements, or at least the functional equivalent of elements, during the penalty phase.
Accordingly, the instruction is unconstitutional.
In addition to these specific grounds, Petitioner's counsel should have asserted

that the instruction violated Petitioner's federal constitutional rights under the Fifth,
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the concomitant rights under the
Idaho Constitution providing greater, but not less, protection than the federal constitution.
Each of these constitutional violations was due to trial counsels' failure to object to the

49

Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
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instruction. Petitioner asserts that he has satisfied both prongs of Strickland. Petitioner
requires additional time to research the factual and legal foundation for this claim.

8. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Raise International Law Violations.
Trial counsel were ineffective in failing to raise international law violations on
behalf of Petitioner, which prejudiced Petitioner under Strickland. The convictions and
sentences entered against Petitioner were obtained in violation of international law.
Petitioner requires additional time to research this claim, but his preliminary investigation
shows that his death sentence was obtained in violation of The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which prohibits death sentences where (a) the
accused will endure a prolonged incarceration on death row which violates Article 7, (b)
the accused does not have access to a meaningful clemency process, which violates
Article 6, (c) the accused is arbitrarily deprived of his life, which violates Article 6, and
(d) the accused is denied his rights to due process, which violates Article 14. Petitioner's
death sentence was also obtained in violation of the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man, Article XXVI (guaranteeing an "impartial" hearing to the accused),
and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (providing protection for the less culpable co-defendant who refuses to
cooperate as Damocles' Sword of the death penalty is held over his head).
The ICCPR, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment were signed and ratified by the United States. Idaho may not impose or
execute Petitioner's death sentence without violating the Supremacy Clause ofthe United
States Constitution, which states:
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All Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. Const., Article VI, § 2.
Moreover, Petitioner's death sentence does and will violate (a) the American
Convention of Human Rights, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relation, which have not yet been signed by the United
States, but which inform Customary International Law. The United States is obligated to
pay heed to Customary International Law. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 670
(1900)("[I]nternationallaw is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determinations.")

Petitioner's death

sentence further violates the principle ofjus cogens. Ajus cogens norm is an elementary
right of humanity, so basic as to be recognized by the international community as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
Article 53; Restatement 3d of Foreign Relations Law, § 102. The execution of the
neurologically damaged, mentally ill and/or mentally retarded violates this principle.

BB.

DEPRIVATIONS OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
DUE TO COUNSELS' FAILURE TO RAISE AND PRESERVE
CLAIMS BY FILING MOTIONS IN LIMINE.

"Because '[p]reserving all [possible] grounds can be very difficult in the heat of
battle during trial,' counsel should file written motions in limine prior to trial raising any
issues that counsel anticipate will arise at trial." Commentary, ABA Guidelines,
Guideline 10.8 (footnotes and quotations omitted). Trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to file numerous motions in limine. Trial counsels' failure
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to file motions in limine left them in the dark as to whether critical evidence would be
admitted at trial and precluded adequate preparation and presentation of a defense at both
the guilt and penalty phases. But for trial counsels' failure to file each of the following
motions in limine there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings
would have been different.
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
File A Motion In Limine To Preclude Evidence Of Petitioner's Prior
Convictions For Burglary And Escape.

Without objection, the State introduced at sentencing Petitioner's pnor
convictions for burglary and escape. This evidence was irrelevant to any aggravating
circumstance properly before the jury and thus inadmissible. Trial counsel should have
moved in limine to preclude the evidence. The introduction of such evidence violated
Petitioner's constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
File A Motion In Limine To Preclude The State From Making Improper
Closing Arguments At Both Phases Of The Trial.

Elsewhere in his Amended Petition, Petitioner notes numerous Improper
arguments made by the prosecution. Based on trial counsels' years of experience with the
prosecutors in this case, including trial experience in which some of their previous
client's were sentenced to death, counsel was intimately familiar with the State's tactics
in closing arguments. Thus, counsel should have anticipated the prosecutors' arguments
and moved to preclude them by way of a motion in limine. 50 Trial counsels' performance

See ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.11 ("Counsel should also object to
and be prepared to rebut arguments that improperly minimize the significance of
50
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was deficient. Petitioner incorporates by reference the legal arguments in claims 1.1-12,
and asserts that motions in limine would have precluded the State's misconduct and
created a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different.
3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
File A Motion In Limine To Determine Whether Limiting The Scope Of
The Mitigation Presented To Petitioner's Childhood Would Preclude The
State From Eliciting The IQ Score Test Results Of Petitioner As An
Adult.
Trial counsel elicited mitigating evidence from Petitioner's childhood including
an intelligence quotient (herein "IQ") test scores that placed him in the mildly mentally
retarded range of intelligence. Counsel had previously disclosed to the State that
mitigating evidence315 or equate the standards for mitigation with those for a first-phase
defense. 316".) Footnote 315, written before Tennard, supra, provides:
Prosecutors will frequently try to argue, for example, that "not everybody"
who is abused as a child grows up to commit capital murder or that mental
illness did not "cause" the defendant to commit the crime. See Haney,
supra note 93, at 589-602. Both of these arguments are objectionable on
Eighth Amendment grounds because they nullify the effect of virtually all
mitigation. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 277-80. In any event,
counsel can seek to counter such arguments by emphasizing the unique
combination of factors at play in the client's life and demonstrating that
there are causal connections between, for example, childhood abuse,
neurological damage, and violent behavior. See, e.g., Phyllis L. Crocker,
Childhood Abuse and Adult Murder: Implications for the Death Penalty,
77 N.C. L. REv. 1143, 1157-66 (1999) (reviewing psychological and
medical "research on the correlation between childhood abuse and adult
violence").
Footnote 316 provides:
Arguments confusing the standards for a first phase defense and mitigation
also violate the Eighth Amendment. See generally Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1982) (finding unconstitutional trial judge's failure
to consider defendant's violent upbringing as a mitigating factor at
sentencing); see generally Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and
Deathworthiness: Differentiating Between Guilt and Punishment in Death
Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 21 (1997).
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Petitioner tested at a significantly higher, yet subaverage, range as an adult. Entering the
sentencing phase, trial counsel apparently either hoped that their limited scope of defense
would not open the door to Petitioner's subsequent higher IQ score or hoped that the
prosecution would just kind of forget about it.
Had trial counsel filed a motion in limine then they would have been able to make
informed decisions. One possible informed decision would have been to elicit the
damaging information on direct. It is impossible at this time for Petitioner to state the full
nature of this claim due to trial counsels' failure to adequately consult with Petitioner's
current counsel and because Petitioner's reinvestigation of the case is not yet complete. In
addition to speaking to trial counsel, Petitioner must yet speak to Drs. Linda Gummow,
Mark Cunningham and Roderick Pettis regarding their professional views on how to
handle the intelligence scores. 51
Further, the Court should withhold judgment on this claim and all others in this
Amended Petition, as Petitioner may determine to withdraw this claim if it cannot justify
sacrificing attorney-client communications and work product. Petitioner's counsel cannot
make this assessment without adequate consultation with trial counsel and without review
of all their files and notes.
4. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
File A Motion In Limine To Preclude Introduction Of The Reenactment
Photographs Depicting the Victim's Deceased Body Hogtied In Ligatures.
Trial counsel was in possession of highly aggravating evidence depicted in
various reenactment photographs made at the direction of Dr. Glen Groben. Trial counsel

Petitioner has only had preliminary discussions with Dr. Mark Cunningham regarding
his involvement of the case. Meaningful discussions require prior consultation with trial
counsel.
51

AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

205

...... 0

__

was thus on notice that the State may attempt to utilize those at both phases of the trial.
Counsel clearly believed the photographs were irrelevant and unduly prejudicial yet
failed to file a motion in limine or even to coordinate their oral arguments following their
objection. See e.g., (Tr., p. 4012, Ls. 1-3.) Trial counsels' performance was deficient. Had
counsel filed a motion in limine with the factual and legal arguments in Petitioner's
claims 0.1 and P.l, hereby incorporated by reference, then counsel would have
successfully precluded the State from using the reenactment photographs resulting in a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different at both phases of the
trial. At the very least, trial counsel would have been on notice that such evidence would
be admitted, and thus in a position to prepare a defense.
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v.

PRAYERS FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, respectfully prays this

Honorable Court:
1.

To allow civil discovery pursuant to the IRCP and ICR 57(b);

2.

For leave to file a final amendment to the Amended Petition as more
information becomes available during the course ofthese proceedings;

3.

For an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a finalized petition;

4.

For an order vacating the convictions and sentences imposed against
Petitioner;

5.

For such other, further relief as, to the Court, seems just and equitable.

APr\1

DATED this If day ~of200'.

Deputy State ~ellate Public Defender
.~

;

~..\!
( l ( '- (l'- }. ,kJc;I..L -Lc.kk V\.""...,
PAULA M. SWENSEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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VERIFICATION
STATEOFIDAHO )
) $S.

County of Ada

)

Erick Hall, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

That I am the Petitioner in the above entitled action; that I have read the foregoing
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, and I know the contents thereof. and
that the facts contained therein ate true and correct as I verily believe based upon his

review of the record, conversations with Petitioner.
DATED this (}-tft day of April, 2006.

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
Petitioner

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

I-i~day of April, 2006.

otary Pu lie for Idaho
Residing at A4 C<
My commission expires
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. SPOT0500155
ADDENDUM TO
AMENDED PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF
(CAPITAL CASE)

COMES NOW PETITIONER, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his counsel at the State
Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), and by agreement with the State, files this Addendum to
Petitioner's Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Amended Petition) filed with the
Court on April 17, 2006.
The purpose of this Addendum is to correct errors inadvertently made in the Amended
Petition.

The Addendum does not purport to correct typographical or grammatical errors.

Petitioner anticipates filing a final amended petition, with leave of the Court, upon the
completion of discovery and the full investigation necessary for post-conviction counsel to
identify and raise all "arguably meritorious" claims. See ABA Guidelines for the Appointment
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and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, Guidelines 1O.15.1(C), (E); I.e. §
19-4906(a) ("court may make appropriate orders for amendment of the application ... "); I.R.C.P.
15(a) (the court shall grant leave freely to amend ''when justice so requires"). A final amended
petition will correct any typographical or grammatical errors.
Petitioner submits the following corrections to the Amended Petition:
1.

On page 38, Petitioner states: "This information does not appear in
trial counsels' files ... " This refers to the identification made by
Ms. Lewis when shown the photographic array.

2.

On page 50, Petitioner states: "His report, however, does not note
this injury, and Dr. Vickman's report does not note swelling and
specifically states that there were external signs of bruising on
neck."

The sentence should read: "His report, however does not
note this injury, and Dr. Vickman's report does not note swelling
and specifically states that there were no external signs of choking
on the neck."
3.

On page 152, Petitioner states: "Had trial counsel conducted an
adequate investigation, they would have discovered evidence
linking Patrick Hoffert to the crime."
Based in part on current counsels' meeting with Amil Myshin
on May 23, 2006, trial counsel was aware of evidence linking
Patrick Hoffert to the crime, but did not recall why this theory was
not pursued.

4.

On page 164, Petitioner states: "Petitioner exhibited compassion
and generosity toward her children-spoon-feeding them medicine
when they were sick, drawing pictures for them, and purchasing a
drawing book."

Petitioner's reference to "spoon-feeding" Evelyn Dunaway's
children is inaccurate. Ms. Dunaway's affidavit states that
Petitioner spoon fed the child of another family living with Ms.
Dunaway. (See Exhibit 15 (affidavit of Evelyn Dunaway).)
5.

The Affidavit of Dr. James Merikangas states that Petitioner could
not identify the scent of either vanilla or cloves. (See Exhibit 26.)
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Petitioner believes he was able to identify the scent of
vanilla, but not cloves. Petitioner intends to submit a corrected
affidavit, upon confirmation with Dr. Merikangas.
6.

On page 171, Petitioner quotes from Idaho Criminal Rule 24, but
incorrectly cites to "I.C.R. 21(d)." The citation should read "I.C.R.
24(d)."

7.

On pages 174-175, footnote no. 44, fails to reference a particular
exhibit. The reference should be to Exhibit 35 (declaration of
David A. Lane).

A final note is necessary in fairness to trial counsel. Specifically, throughout the
Amended Petition, Petitioner referenced the ongoing lack of cooperation by trial counsel.
(See, e.g., Amended Petition, p. 4 at n.2, p. 23 at n.8, p. 34 at n.12, p. 90, p. 93, p. 133, p.

143, p. 150, p. 158, p. 160 at n.43, and p. 179.) Petitioner notes that the refusal of D.C.
Carr continues to date. However, on May 23, 2006, Petitioner's current counsel met
Amil Myshin for several hours. At that meeting, Mr. Myshin disclosed a file folder of
hand-written notes containing Mr. Myshin's thought processes, team assignment, and
witness summaries, among other matters. The folder contains over two hundred (200)
pages of such notes. Mr. Myshin hadn't reviewed his notes prior to the meeting. Even a
cursory review of the note indicates many relevant areas which Mr. Myshin's had no
recollection.

Petitioner's counsel anticipates that the notes will contain factual

information relevant to claims made in the Amended Petition, will provide further factual
support for claims raised, and will provide a basis for raising additional claims or even
narrowing or withdrawing current claims.

ADDENDUM TO AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

3

OO!lh7

L 11--. day May, 2006.
r

DATED this

PAULA M. SWENSEN
Co-Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this'::X'"1 day of May, 2006, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document, ADDENDUM TO AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF, was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
/

l\. U.S. Mail

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
POBOX51
BOISE ID 83707

- - Statehouse Mail
- - Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

THOMAS F. NEVILLE
DISTRICT JUDGE
200W.FRONT
BOISE ID 83702

- - U.S. Mail
- - Statehouse Mail
~Facsimile

Hand Delivery
- - E-Mail
- - U.S. Mail

- - Statehouse Mail
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Hand Delivery
E-Mail
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BARBARA THOMAS
CLU Administrative Assistant

ADDENDUM TO AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Roger Bourne
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 2127
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

Case No. SPOT0500155D
STATE'S RESPONSE TO
THE AMENDED PETITION
FOR POST CONVICTION
RELIEF AND STATE'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and makes the State's response to the petitioner, Erick
Virgil Hall's Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief as follows.
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The State admits that this Court has jurisdiction over the action pursuant to
various Idaho statutes and rules. The State denies that any international human rights
laws are applicable or give the Court additional authority that it did not otherwise have.
The State admits that the petitioner is in the custody of the Idaho State
Department of Corrections pursuant to a judgment and sentence pronounced by this
Court in Ada County after conviction in Ada County case number H0300518 for the
crimes of Count I, Murder in the First Degree; Count II, Rape; Count III, Kidnapping
in the First Degree. After a finding by jury that the death penalty was the appropriate
punishment for the defendant's criminal behavior, this Court imposed a sentence of
death in January 2005 for the crime of Murder with consecutive fixed life sentences for
Rape and Kidnapping. The State admits that the petitioner pled not guilty and that a
jury returned verdicts of guilty and the death sentence.
The State admits that the petitioner is restrained of his liberty pursuant to the
convictions referred to above, but denies that the restraint is illegal in any respect and
denies that the convictions and sentences were obtained in violation of the law or of the
Constitution of United States or the State of Idaho. The State denies each and every
claim upon which the petitioner relies in support of any of his claims. Further, the
State denies that the petitioner requires additional time for the filing of any amended
petition given the amount of time that has transpired from the original conviction to
date.
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The State will respond to the specifics of the petitioner's claims using the same
numbering system set up by the petitioner. However, before doing so a review of the
current law on post conviction claims for ineffective assistance of counsel and other
similar claims is appropriate.

The Idaho Supreme Court has stated the standard for

judging ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581 (Sup.
Ct. 2000) as follows:
The benchmark for judging a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is "when a counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning
of the adversarial process, that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result." State v. Matthews, 133 Idaho 300 (S.Ct.1999), cert.
denied, 2000 WL 198035 (2000) (quoting, Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984». The test for evaluating whether a criminal defendant has
received the effective assistance of counsel is two-pronged and requires the
petitioner to establish: (1) Counsel's conduct was deficient because it fell
outside the wide range of professional norms; and (2) The petitioner was
prejudiced as a result of that deficient conduct. Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96
(1999). (Citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). In assessing the reasonableness
of attorney performance, counsel is "presumed to have rendered adequate
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment." Id. at 329-30 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
In addition, strategic and tactical decisions will not be second guessed or
serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel unless the decision is shown to have resulted from
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other short
comings capable of objective review. Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921 (1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1130 (1995).
The Idaho Court of Appeals further defmed "prejudiced" as it relates to an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269 (Ct. App.
2002).
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The court stated:
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must
show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant
was prejudiced by the deficiency. Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, (Ct.
App. 1995); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65 (Ct. App. 1990); Davis v. State,
116 Idaho 401 (Ct. App. 1989). To establish a deficiency, the applicant has
the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758
(1988); Russell, supra. To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the
outcome of the trial would have been different. Aragon, supra, and Russell,
supra.
In other words, it is not good enough for current counsel to merely point out that
trial counsel conducted the trial differently than current counsel would have done. It is not
even good enough to point out that trial counsel committed a mistake in the law or the
facts. The petitioner must establish that trial counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, the defendant was prejudiced, and that the outcome
of the trial would have been different but for the deficient performance.
The court is not required to accept either the petitioner's mere conclusory
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner's conclusions of law.
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 736 (Ct. App. 1987); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156 (Ct.
App. 1986). The Goodwin court went on to say that a petition for post conviction relief
differs from a complaint in a civil action because the petition must contain more than "a
short and plain statement of the claim" that would be sufficient for a civil complaint under
LR.C.P. 8(a)(1):
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Rather, an application for post conviction relief must be verified with respect
to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits,
records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the
application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the
application. Idaho Code §19-4903. In other words, the application must
present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations
or the application will be subject to dismissal.
Idaho Code §19-4906 authorized summary disposition of an application for
post conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the courts
own initiative. Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's
evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in
the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If
such a factual issue was presented, an evidentiary hearing must be
conducted. Citations omitted.
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not a test of whether "another lawyer,

with the benefit of hindsight, would have acted differently, but whether counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington supra
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently emphasized, "the relevant
inquiry under Strickland is not what defense counsel could have pursued, but whether the
choices made by defense counsel were reasonable." Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d. 732,
736 (9th Cir. 1998).
Finally, it is important to point out that the petitioner's claims cannot be mere
conclusions, but must be supported by admissible evidence. As the Idaho Supreme Court
stated in State v. Lovelace, 140 ID 53 (Sup. Ct. 2003):
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Lovelace's argument that counsel should and would have advocated
for a plea bargain, but for his campaign challenge to the sitting
prosecutor whom he claimed was 'soft on crime' is speculative and
nothing more than a conclusion. We do not give evidentiary value to
mere conclusory allegations that are unsupported by admissible
evidence. Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 543 (1986). 140 ID at page 61.
GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
A. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO ACT WITH DILIGENCE IN ENSURING
THAT ALL OF THEm CLAIMS WERE FULLY INSULATED FROM ANY
FUTURE CLAIMS BY THE GOVERNMENT THAT THE CLAIMS WERE
NOT SUFFICIENTLY PRESERVED.
1. ...ineffective assistance for failing to fully insulate "motion to allow
defense to provide copy of Grand Jury transcript to the defendant from
future attacks that the claim was not sufficiently preserved."

The petitioner admits that trial counsel did move to provide a Grand Jury transcript
to the petitioner, but that the motion was only "partially denied." The petitioner claims no
prejudice nor does he cite to any case law. The petitioner shows no reason to think that
the claim is not "fully insulated." The claim should be dismissed.

2. . ..ineffective assistance for failing to insulate their "motion to declare
Idaho's capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional."
The petitioner admits that trial counsel did file a motion to declare the scheme
unconstitutional, but only claims that there should have been other specific constitutional
provisions alleged. No showing is made that the constitutional claims cannot be argued on
appeal nor that the motion is not "insulated." The claim should be dismissed.
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3 •... failing to insulate a motion to establish voir dire proceedings.
The petitioner admits that trial counsel did file such a claim and does not show that
it was denied by the Court. This claim should be dismissed.

4.... to preclude Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) evidence.
The petitioner admits that trial counsel did file such a motion. To the undersigned's
knowledge, the Court granted the motion by precluding the use of the Hanlon murder facts
and the statements of Amanda Stroud.

The State was allowed to use the Norma Jean

Oliver rape case and the petitioner's escape conviction during sentencing. The petitioner
makes no effort to show what further could have been done by trial counsel. The claim
should be dismissed.

S.... by failing to raise constitutional grounds in support of their "motion
to exclude"
No prejudice is shown. The petitioner makes no effort to show what trial counsel
could have done differently. This is a bald assertion unsupported by admissible evidence.

It should be dismissed.
6. ... ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise constitutional
grounds of their "ex parte motion to appoint jury selection consultant."
To the undersigned's knowledge, trial counsel did use Rolf Kehne as a jury
consultant. There is no evidence asserted by the petitioner that the trial Court ever denied
trial counsel's motion for a jury consultant or that the trial Court dismissed Mr. Kehne.
This is a bald assertion without a factual basis and it should be dismissed.
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7. ... failing to raise constitutional grounds to support their "motion to
strike/dismiss aggravating circumstances."
The petitioner admits that the motion was made by trial counsel. No showing is
made citing to different constitutional provisions than those referred to in the motion nor
that the claim has not been preserved. This claim should be dismissed.

8. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise constitutional
grounds in support of their objection to Dennis Deen's testimony.
The petitioner admits that the motion was made, but makes no effort to show how
arguing additional constitutional basis for the objection would have been successful. This
claim should be dismissed.

B. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY LITIGATE ERRORS OCCURING
DURING THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS.
1. ...ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move to dismiss the
Amended Indictment on the grounds that it charged an additional or
different offense than initially presented to the Grand Jury.
The petitioner admits that trial counsel filed motions to declare Idaho's capital
sentencing scheme unconstitutional and to dismiss or strike the aggravating circumstances.
The petitioner has made no showing that those motions in combination with the argument
do not adequately preserve the issues for appellate review. The petitioner does not show
why the petitioner would be precluded from making the arguments that he asserts in the
petition. This claim should be dismissed.
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2. . ..trial counsel failed to move to dismiss the Indictment on the ground
that the Grand Jury failed to fmd that each aggravator outweighed
mitigation.
It appears to the undersigned that the petitioner thinks the Grand Jury was required
to weigh mitigation against aggravation rather than determine probable cause. No legal
justification is forwarded to support this novel argument. The Grand Jury did not sentence
the defendant to death. The Grand Jury's obligation was only to determine the question of
probable cause on the existence of certain charged statutory aggravators. The petitioner's
analysis that the Grand Jury must do the weighing is completely novel and appears to be
made up by the petitioner. The claim should be dismissed.

3. . .. failing to object to the interlineation of "drowning" as one of three
possible causes of death.
The petitioner makes no effort to support his argument that a "unanimity
instruction" is a requirement under these facts. This claim should be dismissed.

C. THE PETITIONER'S FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS IMPROPERLY
SHACKLED DURING THE COURSE OF IDS TRIAL.
The petitioner makes no showing of a factual basis for this claim.

Indeed, the

petitioner merely says that he "believes that the jurors were able to discern this device."
No factual showing is claimed. The State observes at page 2067 the Court noted that the
restraint was not visible. The Court said, " ... he is incustody although it's not apparent."
This claim should be dismissed.
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D. THE STATE COMMITTED MULTIPLE BRADY VIOLATIONS.
1. ... by failing to disclose favorable evidence pertaining to Norma Jean
Oliver.

The apparent claim is that trial counsel did not cross-examine Ms. Oliver from the
emergency room report nor Detective Hess's police report. No claim is made that either
of those two reports contain information useful for cross-examination nor that any
prejudice resulted. This claim should be dismissed.

a. ... by not disclosing documentation or information that Ms.
Oliver suffers from bi-polar disorder or other conditions
tending to undermine her credibility as a witness
The petitioner pretends in this claim that the jury and trial counsel were not told
that Norma Jean Oliver had been treated for mental illness. The petitioner ignores Ms.
Oliver's own statements that she had a chemical imbalance; that she stayed in
Intermountain Hospital for a while; that she is currently on SSI because she can't hold a
job and that her memory of the events were not very good because she did not want to
remember the things that happened to her on the night of the rape; and that Detective Hess
initially interviewed her at Intermountain Hospital. Jay Rosenthal later testified that she
was fragile at the time of the crime; that she was staying at Intermountain Hospital in the
adolescent unit and that she was being treated by a psychiatrist named Lamar Heyrend.
Otherwise, the State is not in possession of any Intermountain Hospital medical
records and does not know if any exist. Further, the State is not informed as to whether or

STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE AMENDED PETITION FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF AND STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS (HALL), Page 10
r~ n

c'" I-.I.r\.

<

not Ms. Oliver was diagnosed with any particular disorder in 1991.

No material

information favorable to the defendant was withheld. There was no Brady violation.
b ....not disclosing the complete results of the "rape kit."
The petitioner asserts without factual basis that the rape kit contained exculpatory
evidence. There is no factual basis upon which a ruling could be made in the petitioner's
favor. This should be dismissed.
c .... by not disclosing all photographic evidence that would have
impeached the testimony of Norma Jean Oliver and Detective
Daniel Hess ...
The petitioner's claim is only argument as to the relative value of the photographs
utilized at triaL The photographs speak for themselves. No showing is made that some
photos were withheld. No prejudice has been shown and this claim should be dismissed.
d. . .. by not disclosing evidence suggesting that Norma Jean
Oliver was incompetent to testify.
All of the information about Norma Jean Oliver's memory and ability to testify was
before the jury. No evidence is known by the undersigned to indicate that Norma Jean
Oliver was legally incompetent to testify. No factual basis has been shown and this claim
should be dismissed.
e. . .. by not disclosing incentives given to Ms. Oliver to testify.
No factual basis has been shown and no incentives are suggested. This should be
dismissed.
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2. The prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose favorable evidence
pertaining to April Sebastian.
The petitioner suggests without factual basis that the State offered Ms. Sebastian a
benefit in exchange for her testimony. The claim is not true and there is no factual basis
to support the claim. It should be dismissed.
3 .... by failing to disclose favorable evidence pertaining to Michelle Deen.
The petitioner makes the assertion that the State did not disclose Ms. Deen's full
criminal record. The State notes that at transcript page 4823 Ms. Deen admitted that she
had been convicted of possession of methamphetamine and was on probation. She also
said that she had done a "Rider." A record check shows that Michelle Deen does have
two felony convictions; a 2002 possession of controlled substance and a 2003 possession
of a controlled substance. The jury was on notice that Ms. Deen had been convicted of at
least one felony and possibly two if one resulted in probation and the other in a rider.
Arguably she could not be impeached by either conviction because they are both drug
offenses. There is nothing about this that would cause the Court to lose confidence in the
outcome.
The petitioner claims that there is significance to the fact, if it is one, that Ms. Deen
underwent court ordered substance abuse and psychological evaluations in her case. There
is no evidence to suggest that the result of either of those was evidence favorable to the
defendant. The claim should be dismissed.
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4. . .. failing to disclose favorable evidence pertaining to Rebecca McCusker.
The petitioner asserts that Ms. McCusker had a motivation to retaliate against the
petitioner. No evidence to support the claim is suggested. It should be dismissed.
5. . .. failing to disclose favorable evidence pertaining to Evelyn Dunaway.
This is merely a claim without a factual basis and should be dismissed.
6.... failing to disclose favorable evidence pertaining to Wendy Levy.
The petitioner claims that Ms. Levy provided evidence to the State that was
exculpatory.

In Ms. Levy's affidavit, she claims that she was interviewed by the

prosecution and the defense prior to the petitioner's conviction and sentencing. Whatever
information she had, she claims she told both the prosecution and the defense, neither of
whom called her as a witness.
7. .. .failing to disclose favorable evidence pertaining to a potential alternate
perpetrator.
To begin with, the State has no evidence suggesting that there is an "alternate
perpetrator." The claim is based upon what appears to be completely fabricated reports by
two women, Lisa Lewis and Peggy Hill. They told Detective Dave Smith in May 2004
that they had seen Lynn Henneman in Garden City on the day of her disappearance with
Erick Hall. Ms. Lewis and Ms. Hill have recently embellished their story to increase the
participation in that story of a person named Patrick Hoffert. The Hoffert story, as now
claimed by Lewis, was not given to Detective Smith in his May 2004 interview of Hill and
Lewis, as can be seen from his police report, petitioner's Exhibit #9.
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Lewis said that Diedre Muncy states that Hoffert said he had "raped the girl"
without any further reference to who "the girl" was. This is double hearsay and as such is
not admissible evidence that can support a claim. Lewis's assertion that Hoffert told her
that "he made sure the woman got back to her hotel" is also inadmissible hearsay. There
is no admissible evidence to support the claim that the State failed to disclose favorable
evidence. This claim should be dismissed.

8.... by failing to disclose favorable evidence connecting Christian Johnson
to the Henneman homicide.
All information tending to connect Christian Johnson to the Henneman homicide
was given to the jury by Detective Smith during the trial.

DNA results eliminated

Christian Johnson as a suspect as did his alibi witnesses. This claim is speculation only
and should be dismissed.

E. THE STATE COMMITTED NUMEROUS NAPU VIOLATIONS.
1. The prosecutor elicited materially false testimony from Dennis Deen
regarding Idaho Department of Corrections Inmate Classification
System...
There is nothing in this assertion indicating that there was anything false about the
testimony of Dennis Deen. Dennis Deen testified that the petitioner would not be eligible
for minimum custody under the current classification system.
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2. The prosecutor deliberately created the materially false impression that
the petitioner seriously choked Evelyn Dunaway while engaging in
sexual intercourse.
The petitioner cites an excerpt from the transcript of Ms. Dunaway's testimony.
There is nothing in that excerpt that supports his claim. This should be dismissed.
3. The prosecutor deliberately created the materially false impression that
the petitioner choked Michelle Deen while engaging in forcible sexual
intercourse.
Again, the petitioner quotes an excerpt from the testimony of Michelle Deen.
There is nothing in that excerpt that supports the defendant's claim.

It should be

dismissed.
4. The prosecutor elicited materially false testimony from Norma Jean
Oliver.
The petitioner argues the weight of Norma Jean Oliver's testimony in the context of
the other testimony at the trial. There is nothing about his argument that supports his
claim that the prosecutor elicited false testimony.

All of the relevant information was

before the jury so they could make a determination of what weight to give Ms. Oliver's
testimony.
5. The prosecutor deliberately injected extra-record and materially
misleading evidence through leading questions to Detective Daniel Hess.
The petitioner cites to a certain excerpt from the testimony of Detective Hess.
There is nothing in that excerpt that supports his claim. It should be dismissed.
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6. The prosecution committed misconduct by misrepresenting conclusions
that could be drawn from the DNA test results taken from Christian
Johnson.
The petitioner's argument to support this claim appears to be nothing more than
wild speculation that Christian Johnson raped Lynn Henneman and did not leave any
semen. He doesn't even pretend to have evidence to support this. It should be dismissed.

F. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT FOR USING TECHNIQUES TO
DISSUADE MITIGATION WITNESSES FROM TESTIFYING OR
PREDISPOSE THEM TO DISREGARD OR DOWN PLAY VALID
MITIGATING EVIDENCE.
The bald assertion here is that the State somehow influenced Tamara McCraken
and Jean McCraken from cooperating with the defense. Tamara McCraken testified for
the defense in the penalty phase beginning at transcript page 4971. Jean McCraken was
interviewed for two hours and twenty-two minutes by Dr. Cunningham, transcript page
5299. She was also interviewed by Dr. Pettis, transcript page 5202. No showing is made
why she did not testify. No prosecution agent used any technique to dissuade any witness
from testifying or to otherwise affect their testimony.

G. ADMISSION OF TESTIMONIAL AND OTHER HEARSAY VIOLATIONS
VIOLATED PETITIONER'S SIXTH AMENDMENT AND DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS.
This is a claim that inadmissible hearsay under the Crawford decision was put
before the jury through Detective Hess concerning things that Norma Jean Oliver had told
Detective Hess. Since Ms. Oliver testified and was available for cross-examination, there
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is no Crawford violation. Additionally, Idaho Rule of Evidence lOl(e)(3) indicates that
the Rules of Evidence do not apply at sentencing hearings.

H. THE PROSECUTION COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY ASKING THE
JURY TO SPECULATE THE WORST SCENARIO BY PRESENTING
ARGUMENT INCONSISTENT WITH THE EVIDENCE AND BY
ALLUDING TO EVIDENCE OF ANOTHER MURDER.
The excerpts of argument cited by the petitioner appear to be proper comment on
the facts and a proper method of drawing inferences from the facts. There is nothing in
the quoted excerpts that support this claim and it should be dismissed.

I. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN SENTENCING PHASE CLOSING
ARGUMENTS.
1. The prosecution committed misconduct by making an improper closing
argument regarding the defmition of mitigation by asserting that
mitigation evidence is limited to evidence that is causally linked to the
defendant's criminal conduct, evidence that excuses the defendant's
criminal conduct, and evidence that prevented the defendant from
choosing not to kill.
There is nothing about the arguments cited that shows misconduct. The State is as
free to argue its view of the weight of the evidence as is the defendant. The argument did
not impede the jury's ability to consider mitigation nor did it impede the defendant's
ability to present evidence. Whether the mitigation was "valid" or had any weight to it of
any kind was a jury determination that could be argued by both sides. This claim should
be dismissed.
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2. The prosecution committed misconduct by making an improper closing
argument regarding the manner in which mitigation is weighed against
the aggravation.
In this case, the jury was correctly instructed on the need to weigh all mitigation

against each aggravating circumstance. The verdict form could not have been more clear
that all mitigation was to be weighed against each individual aggravating circumstance.
Trial counsel, in his closing argument, also correctly argued that all mitigation needed to
be weighed against each individual aggravator separately. The drawing of the scale in the
petitioner's argument was not an effort by the State to instruct the jury on the method of
weighing.

Rather, it was only to show that all of the mitigation was not sufficiently

compelling to make the death penalty unjust. The jury was correctly instructed and the
argument was not misconduct.

3. The prosecution committed misconduct by arguing that the defense
experts were hired guns.
The petitioner argues that the State impermissibly argued that the defense experts
were "hired guns." To begin with, the petitioner cannot point to any argument where the
words "hired guns" or the equivalent were used. Second, even if those words were used,
the petitioner shows no legal basis suggesting that an argument of that sort was
impermissible. The bias or reliability of a witness is always subject to argument. Nothing
about the petitioner's claim shows that the prosecutor's arguments were improper.
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4. The prosecution committed Doyle error by eliciting through Dr. Mark
Cunningham testimony that petitioner did not speak to him about the
crimes for which he had been charged.
The petitioner cites an excerpt from the State's cross-examination of one of the
defense experts. The excerpt shows that the expert did not ask the defendant anything
about the murder of Lynn Henneman. It was not suggested that the defendant refused to
answer questions. It showed that the expert was biased in his research and presentation of
the facts.

5. The prosecution committed misconduct by misrepresenting the
testimony of Michelle Deen and Evelyn Dunaway.
The petitioner cites to an excerpt from closing argument. Nothing in the excerpt
shows a misrepresentation of the testimony of Deen or Dunaway and does not support the
claim made.

6. The prosecution committed misconduct by encouraging the jury to
speculate in the course of determining whether the propensity
aggravator existed beyond a reasonable doubt.
There is nothing improper in the excerpt of the closing argument quoted by the
petitioner as support for this claim.

7. The prosecution committed misconduct by making an argument
inconsistent with evidence outside the record.
This is mere speculation by the petitioner with no citation to admissible evidence.
It should be dismissed.
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8. The prosecution committed misconduct in arguing for imposition of the
death penalty to deter future crimes or other would-be criminals and as
retribution for the victim's family.
There is nothing improper about the excerpts of closing arguments cited by the
petitioner. The petitioner does not cite to any authority standing for the proposition that a
State argument as to retribution, protection of society or deterrence is improper.

9. ... by expressing their personal opinion that the death penalty was the
appropriate punishment.
The excerpt of the closing argument cited by the petitioner is the prosecutor making
the obvious point that the verdict of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the gUilt phase
was overwhelming proof. He does not state his opinion as to the propriety of the death
sentence.

10.... by making extra-record argument that lethal injections are painless
and humane.
The excerpt of the closing argUment referred to by the petitioner is merely part of
an argument showing that Lynn Henneman's murder was much more painful and horrific
for her than execution will be to the petitioner. Additionally, the British journal cited by
the petitioner only indicates that some prisoners "may" receive inadequate anesthesia.
This claim is baseless.

11. ... by arguing that a life sentence would be too lenient and otherwise
speculating as to what might happen to petitioner if the death sentence
were withheld.
There is nothing about the quoted closing argument that is improper. The jury was
properly instructed and the argument was not false or misleading.
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12. . .. by arguing that petitioner showed a lack of remorse.
The petitioner's argument is that the State's argument was a comment on the
defendant's right to remain silent.

Nothing about the quoted argument makes any

reference to the defendant's silence. The argument refers to his observable conduct in the
courtroom. It was not improper.

J. TRIAL COUNSEL LABORED UNDER MULTIPLE AND VARIED
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST THAT ADVERSELY AFFECTED THEIR
PERFORMANCE.
1. Trial counsel's competing obligations to attend to other cases created a conflict

of interest adversely affecting counsel's performance.
The petitioner cites to no facts supporting this allegation. It should be dismissed.

2. Norma Jean Oliver.
The petitioner asserts that Mr. Myshin had a conflict of interest that adversely
affected his ability to investigate Ms. Oliver's case. Besides the assertion, the petitioner
has no facts to support this claim.

3. April Sebastian.
The petitioner asserts that Mr. Myshin represented April Sebastian in past criminal
cases. The petitioner asserts that this was a conflict for Mr. Myshin, but points to no facts
to support this assertion. He also asserts that the State offered Ms. Sebastian benefits in
exchange for her testimony. No facts are contained in the argument to support that claim.

4. Christian Johnson.
No facts are asserted to support this claim.
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K. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
FAILURE TO REQUEST PRETRIAL EVIDENTIARY HEARING FOR THE
PRESENTATION OF FACTS ALLEGED IN SUPPORT OF THE NOTICED
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
This seems to be nothing more than an assertion by the petitioner without the
support of admissible evidence or legal authority.
L. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
CASELOAD.
This seems to be a restatement of the claim made J1, that trial counsel had large
caseloads. It is again asserted without any accompanying factual basis.
M.DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
FAILURE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.
The petitioner admits that he has not reviewed the trial proceedings to determine
whether this claim is correct. It should be dismissed.
N. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
FAILURE TO MOVE FOR CHANGE OF VENUE, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, FAILING TO MOVE TO HAVE A JURY FROM ANOTHER
COUNTY EMPANELED.
No showing is made by the petitioner indicating that any juror was biased due to
pretrial pUblicity. The claim should be dismissed.
1- 4. The petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
analyze media broadcasts, to poll the community, to change venue or impanel
a jury from another county and for failing to question jurors sufficiently about
pretrial pUblicity.
While the petitioner cites to certain pretrial publicity, he cites to no facts indicating
that any of the seated jurors were biased due to pretrial pUblicity. Whether or not the
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community had an opinion is of no relevance. The only question is whether the petitioner
received a fair trial from an unbiased jury and there is no evidence to think otherwise.
These claims should be dismissed.

5-7. Ineffective assistance claims for failing to develop an adequate record of
juror's knowledge, for failing to know who to strike for cause and failing to
use preemptory challenges correctly on pUblicity questions.
Again, the petitioner has no facts to support any of these claims. The undersigned
recalls that in addition to extensive questioning during jury selection, the parties had the
benefit of the jury questionnaires which also asked about pretrial publicity. These claims
should be dismissed.

O. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
FAILURE TO PRECLUDE AND OBJECT TO TESTIMONY.
1.... in failing to object to, or otherwise preclude, opinion evidence by Dr.
Groben as not being based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty.
The record shows that Dr. Groben did testify that his opinions were to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty or that otherwise the evidence that he observed supported the
conclusions that he drew. The fact, if it is one, that another pathologist disagrees with Dr.
Groben is not evidence that Dr. Groben is incorrect or that trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel.
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2. . .. in failing to object to, or otherwise preclude, testimony of Norma Jean
Oliver due to her lack of competency to testify.
The fact that a witness remembers certain things and does not remember other
things does not render the witness incompetent to testify. The petitioner makes no effort
to show why a motion to strike Ms. Oliver's testimony would likely have been granted.

3 ....in failing to object to, or otherwise preclude, testimony of other criminal
acts.
The State assumes that this claim is in relation to the defendant's prior criminal
record, which was presented to the jury during the penalty phase. This seems to be no
more than an assertion by the petitioner and should be dismissed.

4. . .. in failing to object to, or otherwise preclude hearsay testimony.
The petitioner says that he requires additional time to analyze this claim. It should
be dismissed.

P. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
FAILURE TO EFFECTIVELY CROSS EXAMINE WITNESSES AND REBUT
STATE THEORIES.
1. ... in failing to effectively cross examine Dr. Groben and rebut the State's

presentation of evidence that the victim was hogtied and suffered a
terrifying and tortuous death.
The argument here is that Dr. Aiken, a Spokane pathologist, has some
disagreement with Dr. Groben's fmdings and should have been consulted by trial counsel.
It is the identical claim made in 01. A close reading of Dr. Groben' s testimony and a
comparison of that testimony with Dr. Aiken's affidavit, shows that there is no material
difference between the two and no showing of prejudice to the petitioner.
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2. . .. in failing to effectively cross examine Kathryn Colombo and rebut the
State's argument the petitioner was the only contributor of DNA removed
from the victim.
The substance of this claim is that Kathryn Colombo "downplayed" the importance
of the existence of a 13th allele at the D5 marker by referring to it as a "stutter artifact" or
a "technical artifact" or "contamination."

Counsel uses a BSU professor, Greg

Hampikian to opine that Kathryn Colombo downplayed the result, though Dr. Hampikian
cites excerpts from the transcript showing that Kathryn Colombo made it clear there could
have been a second male contributor to the sperm fraction.
During direct and cross-examination, the question of the 13 th allele was discussed
several times, the State notes some of them as follows.
At transcript page 4466, Ms. Colombo refers to that allele and describes it as
being, "over the stutter cutoff, but just barely. It could be a technical artifact. It has met
our reporting guidelines, so it is in the table. I cannot make any conclusions about that
type because it is just so little information."
At page 4467, Ms. Colombo states, "there was no other type observed in these
sperm fractions where we saw secondary types that were not consistent with possible
carryover from the nonsperm fraction. So this was the only instance." Ms. Colombo is
referring to the 13th allele at D5.
She points out at page 4468 that the petitioner matches at all of the markers.
At page 4489, Ms. Colombo states unequivocally that there could be a second
donor as follows:
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Q. Could there be a second male there?
R. There could be.

Q. Okay. Now, as we go out to the - out towards the end there. The
D5 category, Yes. Is it possible that a second male contributed the 13
allele?
A. That is possible. It's not consistent with the type obtained from a
nonsperm donor, not consistent with the primary donor at that location.
So it could either be technical artifact, it could be the true nature of the
sample. It could have been picked up along the way. There is no way
for me to determine where that type came from.
Q. Okay. So it's possible that it could have come from a second male?
A. Possible.
The subject again came up at page 4505.

Q. Now, if there is a difference in the time of depositing the sample,
does that effect it?
A. Yes. If there is a sample that was deposited, specifically in a sexual
assault case, we see cases where an individual says that they had sex with
another person two weeks prior to the attack and maybe that we're getting
some residual, small amount of DNA from that partner from two weeks ago,
so in terms of a sexual assault that could come into play.
Q. And it's also true that if there are only hours separating, correct?
A. Not typically, no.
Q. It's possible?
A. It could be possible, yes.
The second contributor issue was again discussed at page 4521. Referring to the
131h allele, the following occurred:
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Q. Well, it could have come from another contributor?
A. That is correct.
The subject was again discussed at page 4526 as follows:

Q. Is it possible that there was a second male contributor to the sperm
fraction?
A. It's possible. We've got one reading, it's the only reading, a small
type that cannot be attributed to the nonsperm donor or the primary source
of the sperm fraction. So I don't know where that came from.
On page 4528 and 4529, the subject is again discussed and Ms. Colombo admits
that she cannot account for the 13 th allele. However, she does point out that Walter Us
and Christian Johnson are categorically excluded as donors.
For the petitioner to pretend that the jury was not aware of the possibility of a
second sperm donor is to completely ignore the testimony.

The affidavit from Greg

Hampildan adds nothing to the knowledge that the jury already had. He suggests that the
13 th allele came from the victim being "inseminated." There is no way for him to know
how that 13 th allele got to the place that it was discovered. He can no more tell that it is a
result of insemination than he can tell that it was "picked up along the way" during the
testing process as indicated by Kathryn Colombo. There is nothing about this information
that shows ineffective assistance of counsel. This claim should be dismissed.
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3. . .. in failing to effective cross examine Norma Jean Oliver.
The petitioner asserts that there are certain discrepancies that trial counsel should
have examined Norma Jean Oliver about. He does not state what the discrepancies are so
there is no factual basis to support this claim. It should be dismissed.
4. . .. in failing to effectively cross examine Detective Daniel Hess.
This allegation is the same as the one for Ms. Oliver.

The petitioner does not

assert what discrepancies he thinks Detective Hess should have been cross examined
about. This claim should be dismissed.
5. . .. in failing to effectively cross examine Jay Rosenthal.
The petitioner asserts that the type of sentence the petitioner received for his rape of
Norma Jean Oliver suggests that Mr. Rosenthal thought the State's case against the
petitioner was weak or that the State did not believe Ms. Oliver's allegations of violence.
Jay Rosenthal clearly testified that he went ahead with the plea agreement because he
thought Ms. Oliver was too fragile to withstand cross-examination during a trial. There is
no factual basis for this allegation. It should be dismissed.
6. . .. in failing to effectively cross examine April Sebastian.
The petitioner makes no suggestion of what evidence existed that trial counsel could
have used to impeach Ms. Sebastian with.

A reading of Ms. Sebastian's cross

examination shows that trial counsel elicited a number of good things about Erick Hall
from Ms. Sebastian. Since the petitioner asserts no factual basis to support this claim it
should be dismissed.
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7. . .. in failing to rebut the State's presentation of evidence that petitioner has
a propensity to murder and probably constitutes a continuing threat to
society through the testimony of Dr. Mark Cunningham.
The substance of this claim is that trial counsel should have convinced the Court to
allow Dr. Mark Cunningham to opine that the petitioner was not a continuing threat to
society despite the Court's ruling that if he did so, the State could present evidence about
the Hanlon murder. The petitioner makes certain assertions about the Hanlon case not
being adequately investigated and speculates about how some DNA testing may have come
out in the Hanlon case. However, no factual basis is shown as to what trial counsel could
have done differently to convince the Court otherwise nor how Dr. Cunningham would
have handled the propensity question in light of the fact that the defendant had killed
twice.

The petitioner makes no effort to explain how he thinks the jury would have

reacted to the knowledge that the defendant was a multiple murderer when considering the
death penalty question. This claim should be dismissed.
Q. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
ELICITING AGGRAVATING EVIDENCE.
In the State's view, there is nothing about the excerpt of testimony referred to by
the petitioner that tends to support the claim that the petitioner was suspected of
committing other rapes through the carelessness of trial counsel. This claim should be
dismissed.
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R. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
THEIR FAILURE TO CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE GUILT PHASE
INVESTIGATION.
1. ...in failing to adequately investigate and present evidence of an alternate
perpetrator of the murder and co-perpetrator of rape.
This is a restatement of the earlier claim that Patrick Hoffert is the murderer. This
claim is fabricated out of the notion that the 13 th allele in the DNA is Patrick Hoffert.
Since there is no factual basis to support that, the claim should be dismissed.

S. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
THEIR FAILURE TO CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE SENTENCING PHASE
INVESTIGATION.
Beneath this heading, the petitioner claims in numbers 1, 3, and 4 that trial counsel
should have put on more information at the sentencing phase about the defendant and the
effect that his traumatic childhood had upon him. They do not point to the existence of
any additional psychological or psychiatric evidence, but claim that other friends or family
members could have offered additional information about the petitioner's abusive
childhood. These claims should be dismissed as being cumulative since the jury heard
hours of this type of information. As stated above, "the relevant inquiry under Strickland
is not what defense counsel could have pursued, but whether the choices made by defense
counsel were reasonable." Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732 at 736 (9th eirc. 1998).
In claim number 2, the petitioner restates his theory that there is an alternate
perpetrator of the murder and a co-perpetrator of the rape. There is no substance to this
claim and it should be dismissed.
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In claim number 5, the petitioner claims that Evelyn Dunaway and Wendy Levy
would have provided evidence of the petitioner's good character as an adult. They rely
upon an affidavit from Evelyn Dunaway that she signed in April 2006.

Some of the

statements made by Ms. Dunaway in that affidavit are directly contradictory to statements
that she made during the trial. The fact that a year and a half after the trial she is willing
to say some good things about his character is not an indication that trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance. In the context, no showing has been made that counsel's conduct
fell below an objective standard nor that prejudice has been shown.

6.... in failing to adequately investigate the State's expert's opinions by
requesting appropriate discovery of their reports.
As the State understands it, the substance of this claim is that the petitioner
speculates that Dr. Michael Estess and Dr. Robert Engle made reports that contain
eXCUlpatory material and that those reports were withheld from trial counsel. He claims
that trial counsel should have received the reports from Dr. Estess and Dr. Engle or
should have asked the Court to force them to generate reports. Since neither Dr. Estess
nor Dr. Engle testified at the trial, it is unclear how the petitioner thinks trial counsel
would have accomplished this. Additionally, since no factual basis is shown that there
were reports nor that they contain material helpful to the petitioner, this claim should be
dismissed.
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